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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
In this thesis we discuss some topics that spring from the interactions between
the fields of computability, probability and logic. Before we discuss these interac-
tions, let us first put these fields in their respective historical contexts.
Logic in a broad sense goes back a very long time, all the way to the ancient
Greeks; the first person to thoroughly study logic was Aristotle. However, modern
mathematical logic, which is the kind of logic referred to in the title of this thesis,
starts with Frege and Russell in the late nineteenth century. The end of the
nineteenth century and the early twentieth century were characterised by the
rapid development of the field. That logic had become an important part of
mathematics is clear from Hilbert’s influential list of twenty-three mathematical
problems presented in 1900: three of the problems on this list are in mathematical
logic, and quite strikingly, the first two problems on the list are.
In particular, we should mention Hilbert’s second problem: to prove the
consistency of arithmetic. A major result in mathematical logic is Go¨del’s celebrated
incompleteness theorem from 1931, which shows that such a proof cannot be carried
out within arithmetic itself. A closely related problem is the Entscheidungsproblem
posed by Hilbert and Ackermann in 1928, asking if there is an algorithm which
decides the validity of formulas in the mathematical framework of first-order logic.
This question was answered in the negative as well, independently by Church
and Turing, in 1936. To give a negative answer, they first had to develop a
satisfactory formal definition of what an algorithm is. Although their definitions
turned out to be equivalent, it is Turing’s definition which more evidently captures
the informal notion of an algorithm, as admitted by Church himself [19]. The study
of computation born from these logical investigations eventually turned into the
flourishing field now called computability theory (ne´e recursion theory), which is
the computability referred to in the title.
Likewise, early probability theory goes back a long time, to the seventeenth
century, but its modern foundations were laid by Kolmogorov in 1933. Kolmogorov
in fact worked in all of computability, probability and logic: not only did he work
in probability theory, as just described, but he also worked on topics such as
Kolmogorov complexity (which is related to computability theory and connects to
probability through the Coding Theorem) and on semantics for intuitionistic logic
(in a way that would eventually lead to the Medvedev and Muchnik lattices, which
lie in the intersection of computability and logic).
In this thesis we investigate three topics which are a combination of comput-
ability, probability and logic. More precisely, part I concerns the combination
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of computability and logic, in the form of the Medvedev and Muchnik lattices;
part II explores algorithmic randomness and genericity, two topics which arise
from the combination of computability and probability; and part III concerns
the combination of probability and logic, in the form of a probability logic called
ε-logic.
This thesis contains a collection of eight papers the author has (co-)written
during his time as a Ph.D. candidate. Two of these are co-authored with Terwijn
(work from these papers appears in chapters 6, 8 and 9), and one of these papers
was written together with Hirschfeldt, Jockusch and Schupp (the work from this
paper appears in chapter 7). Except for some new cross-references between these
eight papers, the content remains largely unaltered from their published versions.
The original source is cited in the beginning of each chapter.
1.1. Computability and logic: the Medvedev and Muchnik lattices
There have been several attempts to connect computation and logic, which
all start from the Brouwer–Heyting–Kolmogorov interpretation for intuitionistic
logic. Informally, Brouwer’s intuitionistic logic is two-valued classical logic, except
that proofs by contradiction are not allowed; a rigorous formalisation of it was
given by Heyting. The Brouwer–Heyting–Kolmogorov interpretation gives an
informal relation between proofs in this logic on one hand and constructions on the
other hand. Probably the most well-known attempt to formalise this is Kleene’s
realisability [53], which is one way to connect computation with intuitionistic
logic. Unfortunately, this original concept of Kleene realisability captures a proper
extension of intuitionistic propositional logic (IPC), but various modifications to
this concept have been studied (see e.g. the recent book by van Oosten [89]). There
are various other approaches to formalising the Brouwer–Heyting–Kolmogorov
interpretation, which we can not all name here, but let us mention the Curry–
Howard isomorphism [20, 43] and Artemov’s Logic of Proofs [2].
In this thesis we study an approach which is based on Kolmogorov’s contribution
to the Brouwer–Heyting–Kolmogorov interpretation. His idea was that proving a
statement in intuitionistic logic is like solving a problem, where the exact definition of
a problem is left informal, but should be seen as the kind of problem a mathematician
would normally study. For example, a problem could be “proof the Riemann
hypothesis” and to solve it would be to write a proof. However, Kolmogorov’s notion
of a problem is more general; for example, he also considers “solve the equation f(x)
= 0” and “draw a circle through three given points” to be problems. There are
several natural operations on problems: for example, there is the operation “and”,
where to solve a problem A “and” B means to solve both A and B simultaneously,
and there is an operation “implies”, where to solve A “implies” B means to solve
B given an arbitrary solution of A. Kolmogorov connected these operations to the
logical connectives and argued that proving in intuitionistic logic corresponds to
solving problems.
This informal idea was formalised by Medvedev [79], using concepts from
computability theory. He interprets a problem as a set of functions from the
natural numbers to itself; a solution to this problem is then a computable element
of this set. There is also a natural notion of reducing problems to each other: a
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problem A should reduce to a problem B if the solutions of B uniformly compute a
solution of A. Muchnik [84] introduced a variant of this, by dropping the uniformity
requirement. These approaches, which came to be known as the Medvedev and
Muchnik lattices, can be used to talk about intuitionistic logic because they are
so-called Brouwer algebras, algebraic structures which have a naturally associated
propositional theory that lies between IPC and classical logic. Unfortunately, the
theory associated to the Medvedev and Muchnik lattices turned out not to be IPC,
because they both satisfy the weak law of the excluded middle ¬p ∨ ¬¬p.
While this might make it seem like we cannot use the Medvedev and Muchnik
lattices to capture IPC, it turns out that there is in fact a way to do so. As already
suggested in Rogers [98], Skvortsova [106] studied principal factors of the Medvedev
lattice and looked at their theory. Quite remarkably, she showed that there is a
principal factor of the Medvedev lattice which does capture exactly IPC. Sorbi
and Terwijn [113] later showed that the same holds for the Muchnik lattice. While
her result is certainly extraordinary, one could possibly object to the fact that the
principal factors constructed in these proofs are constructed in an ad hoc manner
and do not naturally appear in mathematics. In particular they do not have a
clear computational interpretation, hence they do not yield the precise connection
between IPC and computability we were looking for. This leads to the question,
posed in Terwijn [118]: are there any natural principal factors which have IPC as
their theory?
In chapter 3 we present an answer in the case of the Muchnik lattice. That is,
we present several natural factors of the Muchnik lattice which capture IPC, which
can be defined using well-known notions from computability theory. More precisely,
we define these factors using concepts from computability theory such as lowness,
1-genericity below ∅′, hyperimmune-freeness and computable traceability, but since
our framework is general, our results could be adapted to suit other concepts as
well. Thus, not only do we obtain a purely computational semantics for IPC, but
these results also put the above-mentioned computability-theoretic concepts in a
new light.
Next, in chapter 4 we study if there are any natural factors of the Medvedev
lattice which capture IPC. We present progress towards a positive answer, by
showing that there are principal factors of the Medvedev lattice capturing IPC
which have a stronger connection to computability theory than the one given
by Skvortsova. These factors arise from the computability-theoretic notion of a
computably independent set ; that is, a set A such that for every natural number i we
have that the ith column of A is not computed by the other columns. The existence
of computably independent sets was first proven by Kleene and Post [55]. In fact,
almost all sets are computably independent: both in the measure-theoretic sense,
because every 1-random is computably independent by van Lambalgen’s theorem
[71], and also in the Baire category sense, because every 1-generic is computably
independent by the genericity analogue of van Lambalgen’s theorem (see e.g. [25,
Theorem 8.20.1]).
In the same chapter, we also study a question posed by Sorbi and Terwijn
in [112]. Sorbi [110] showed that the theory of the Medvedev lattice is equal to
Jankov’s logic Jan, the deductive closure of IPC plus the weak law of the excluded
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middle ¬p ∨ ¬¬p. Sorbi and Terwijn were able to show that for many principal
factors of the Medvedev lattice its theory is contained in Jankov’s logic, which lead
them to ask if this is the case for all non-trivial principal factors of the Medvedev
lattice. More evidence was given by Shafer [104], who widened the class of principal
factors for which the theory is contained in Jankov’s logic. We show that the
answer is indeed positive.
Finally, in chapter 5 we study an extension of the Medvedev lattice to first-order
logic. Just like Medvedev and Muchnik, we try to keep in spirit with Kolmogorov’s
ideas from [58]. Even though Medvedev and Muchnik did not discuss first-order
logic, Kolmogorov did briefly discuss the universal quantifier in his paper:
“Im allgemeinen bedeutet, wenn x eine Variable (von beliebiger
Art) ist und a(x) eine aufgabe bezeichnet, deren Sinn von dem
Werte von x abha¨ngt, (x)a(x) die Aufgabe “eine allgemeine
Methode fu¨r die Lo¨sung von a(x) bei jedem einzelnen Wert
von x anzugeben”. Man soll dies so verstehen: Die aufgabe
(x)a(x) zu lo¨sen, bedeutet, imstande sein, fu¨r jeden gegebenen
Einzelwert x0 von x die Aufgabe a(x0) nach einer endlichen
Reihe von im voraus (schon vor der Wahl von x0) bekannten
Schritten zu lo¨sen.”1
It is important to note that, when Kolmogorov says that the steps should be
fixed before x0 is set, he probably does not mean that we should have one solution
that works for every x0; instead, the solution is allowed to depend on x0, but it
should do so uniformly. This belief is supported by one of the informal examples of
a problem he gives: “given one solution of ax2 +bx+c = 0, give the other solution”.
Of course there is no procedure to transform one solution to the other one which
does not depend on the parameters a, b and c; however, there is one which does so
uniformly. More evidence can be found in Kolmogorov’s discussion of the law of the
excluded middle, where he says that a solution of the problem ∀a(a∨¬a), where a
quantifies over all problems, should be “a general method which for any problem a
allows one either to find its solution or to derive a contradiction from the existence
of such a solution” and that “unless the reader considers himself omniscient, he
will perhaps agree that [this formula] cannot be in the list of problems that he has
solved”. In other words, a solution of ∀a(a ∨ ¬a) should be a solution of a ∨ ¬a
for every problem a which is allowed to depend on a, and it should be uniform
because we are not omniscient.
In chapter 5 we formalise this idea in the spirit of Medvedev, using the notion
of a first-order hyperdoctrine from categorical logic, which naturally extends the
notion of a Brouwer algebra. We study its theory and look at intervals to try and
obtain analogous results to Skvortsova’s result mentioned above, i.e. we try to see
if we can obtain intuitionistic first-order logic (IQC) as the theory of a suitable
1In the English translation [59] this reads as follows: “In the general case, if x is a variable
(of any kind) and a(x) denotes a problem whose meaning depends on the values of x, then (x)a(x)
denotes the problem “find a general method for solving the problem a(x) for each specific value
of x”. This should be understood as follows: the problem (x)a(x) is solved if the problem a(x0)
can be solved for each given specific value of x0 of the variable x by means of a finite number of
steps which are fixed in advance (before x0 is set).”
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factor or interval. We show that the answer is false, by showing that there is an
analogue of Tennenbaum’s theorem [116] that every computable model of Peano
arithmetic is the standard model. On the other hand, we provide a partial positive
characterisation of exactly which intuitionistic theories can be obtained.
1.2. Computability and probability: algorithmic randomness and
genericity
In algorithmic randomness, we study notions of effective randomness. That is,
we study what it means for an infinite binary sequence to be random. Roughly, we
say that an infinite binary string x is random if it is not in any ‘effective’ set of
measure 0. There are various ways to define ‘effective’, which yield different notions
of randomness, of which Martin-Lo¨f randomness is the most studied. Perhaps
surprisingly, there are two alternative definitions of randomness which can be shown
to be equivalent: instead of calling x random if it is not in any effective measure 0
set, we can also say that x is random if there is no effective compression method
which compresses x by a non-trivial amount. For the other equivalent definition,
imagine we are in a casino with some initial capital and are allowed to bet on
x(0), x(1), . . . in succession, where at time t we are allowed to divide our money in
bets on 0 and 1, and our new capital is twice the bet on x(t). Then x is random
if there is no effective betting strategy which earns arbitrarily much money while
betting on x like this.
Recently, several researchers have studied connections between notions of
randomness and the differentiability of functions. For example, Brattka, Miller and
Nies [11], building on work by Demuth [22], have shown that a real number x ∈ [0, 1]
is Martin-Lo¨f random if and only if every computable function of bounded variation
is differentiable at x. Bounded variation is a notion from analysis; instead of giving
the formal definition we mention that on a closed interval like [0, 1] a function is of
bounded variation if and only if it is the difference of two monotonically increasing
functions. Other papers in which similar connections between randomness and
differentiability are studied include Freer, Kjos-Hanssen, Nies and Stephan [30],
Pathak, Rojas and Simpson [91] and Rute [100].
Instead of using measure to define randomness, one can also use Baire category
and say that x is random if it is not in any ‘effective’ meagre set. In computability
theory, such reals are usually called generic, with 1-genericity roughly being the
equivalent of Martin-Lo¨f randomness (which is also called 1-randomness). Given
the Erdo¨s-Sierpinski duality (which roughly states that in the non-effective case
meagre and measure 0 have very similar properties), one would expect genericity
and randomness to have similar properties. In the effective setting this turns out to
often be the case, but not always. Mirroring the connections between randomness
and differentiability mentioned above, we show that there is also a connection
between differentiable functions and 1-genericity: namely, x is 1-generic if and
only if every differentiable computable function has continuous derivative at x. We
discuss this in chapter 6. In that chapter we also show that nothing changes if
we replace the derivative by the nth derivative, or if we replace computable by
polynomial time computable.
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In chapter 7 we study the interplay of algorithmic randomness with coarse
reducibility, which is one of the notions recently introduced by Jockusch and
Schupp to study the concept of being ‘almost computable’, based on the notion
of generic-case computability from complexity theory introduced by Kapovich,
Myasnikov, Schupp and Shpilrain [48]. This reducibility induces a degree structure,
the so-called coarse degrees, in which the Turing degrees embed in a natural way.
We study how this embedding interacts with the coarse degrees of random sets,
which turns out to be connected to the notion of K-triviality. We also show that
the degrees of two sets which are weak 3-random relative to each other form a
minimal pair in the coarse degrees.
1.3. Probability and logic: ε-logic
In probability logic, one combines logic with probability theory. There are
several different motivations for doing this, which in turn lead to several different
approaches. As discussed in the introduction of Kuyper and Terwijn [68], these
approaches roughly fall into two categories: there are those that consider probability
distributions over classes of models, assigning each model a certain probability (the
“probabilities over models” approach), and there are those that consider models
which each have their own probability distribution over the universe of the model
(the “models with probabilities” approach).
In this thesis we study a logic from the second category called ε-logic, introduced
by Terwijn [117], which is related to Valiant’s celebrated notion of pac-learning
[122]. This logic is learnable in a sense closely related to pac-learning: given some
unknown structure and some oracle that allows us to randomly sample elements
from the structure and that tells us all the basic properties of our sample, we want
to decide if a given (first-order) expression holds in the structure or not after taking
only a finite sample. In classical first-order logic we cannot do this, because to
decide if a universal statement holds, we cannot get around checking all elements
instead of only finitely many. In ε-logic, this problem is solved by interpreting
universal quantifiers not as ‘for all’ but as ‘with probability at least 1− ε’, while
keeping the definition of the existential quantifier as it is classically. Terwijn [117]
has shown that this logic is indeed learnable.
Of the many different approaches, let us name a few. In the “probabilities
over models” approach we have for example the papers Carnap [16] and Scott
and Krauss [103]. Another logic in this category is a logic introduced earlier by
Valiant [123] which is also related to his pac-model. However, there are major
differences between Valiant’s logic and ε-logic: not only does his logic fall under the
“probabilities over models” approach instead of under the “models with probabilities”
approach, Valiant also only studies finite models (while we look at models of
arbitrary cardinality), and his syntax captures only a fragment of first-order logic.
A logic which is actually more closely related to ε-logic is Keisler’s logic LωP ,
surveyed in Keisler [51], and which falls under the “models with probabilities”
approach. Instead of the classical quantifiers, this logic has quantifiers of the form
(Px ≥ r) which should be read as “holds for at least measure r many x”. While
this logic does not attempt to model probabilistic induction, and does not contain
the classical universal and existential quantifiers, it turns out we can adapt some
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of the ideas used to prove results about LωP to obtain similar results for ε-logic.
Another example of work in the second category is H. Friedman’s quantifier Q
(which means “for almost all” in the sense of measure theory), which is discussed
in Steinhorn [115]. Finally, we wish to mention a logic recently introduced by
Goldbring and Towsner [34]. While this logic has a completely different motivation
than ε-logic, namely to introduce a “logical framework for formalising connections
between finitary combinators and measure theory or ergodic theory”, the logic
appears to be similar to ε-logic.
First, we introduce ε-logic in chapter 8. In the same chapter we also discuss
some of the choices we make, especially with regard to the class of models we
study. After that, in chapter 9, we discuss various aspects of the model theory
of ε-logic. This model theory is very different from classical model theory: both
the results are different, as well as many of the proof techniques used, which lean
heavily on techniques from descriptive set theory. For example, we show that
there are satisfiable sentences which do not have any countable model (i.e. the
straightforward analogue of the downward Lo¨wenheim–Skolem theorem does not
hold), but every satisfiable theory is satisfied in some model of cardinality 2ω; in
fact we can build it on the unit interval with the Lebesgue measure. We also study
compactness, showing that ε-logic is in general not compact, but that a weaker
version of compactness does hold.
In chapter 10 we study the computational complexity of validity in ε-logic. In
Terwijn [119] it was already shown that the set of ε-tautologies is undecidable in
general, and that it coincides with classical validity if ε = 0. Building on a result of
Hoover [42] for LωP , we show that validity in ε-logic is, in general, Π11-hard (i.e. at
least as complex as first-order arithmetic with second-order universal quantifiers).
This shows that ε-logic is computationally much harder than first-order logic and
that we cannot hope to find an effective calculus for it.
Next, in chapter 11 we study the computational complexity of satisfiability.
Note that the complexity of satisfiability is not necessarily complementary to that
of validity, as it is in classical logic, because our logic is paraconsistent (i.e. both a
formula ϕ and its negation ¬ϕ can hold at the same time). We study the fragment
of ε-logic not containing equality or function symbols, i.e. containing only relation
and constant symbols. Terwijn [119, Conjecture 5.3] conjectured ε-satisfiability
for rational ε ∈ [0, 1) to be decidable, but we show that it is Σ11-complete for
rational ε ∈ (0, 1), thus refuting his conjecture. On the other hand, we show that
0-satisfiability is indeed decidable. These results are summarised in Table 1 below.
Note that 1-logic is fairly trivial: every formula in prenex normal form containing
a universal quantifier is trivially true, so the only interesting fragment in this case
is the existential fragment, which is just the classical fragment.
Recently, Yang [125] has studied, among other things, the complexity of
validity and satisfiability over finite models. In case ε ∈ (0, 1) ∩Q we get the same
complexities one level down (i.e. finite ε-satisfiability is Σ01-complete while finite
ε-validity is Π01-complete), but on the other hand finite 0-validity is Π
0
1-complete
while finite 0-satisfiability remains decidable. He also showed ε-satisfiability and
ε-validity for finite monadic relational languages are decidable in both the finite
and the unrestricted case.
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ε ∈ (0, 1) ∩Q ε = 0
ε-satisfiability Σ11-complete decidable
ε-validity Π11-hard Σ
0
1-complete
Table 1. Complexity of validity and satisfiability in ε-logic.
1.4. Notations and conventions
Our notation is mostly standard. We let ω denote the natural numbers, we
let 2ω denote the Cantor space and we let ωω the Baire space of functions from
ω to ω. We let 2<ω denote the set of finite binary strings. For any set A ⊆ ωω
we denote by A its complement in ωω. When we say that a set is countable, we
include the possibility that it is finite.
For finite strings σ, τ we denote by σ ⊆ τ that σ is a substring of τ , by σ ⊂ τ
that σ is a proper substring of τ and by σ | τ that σ and τ are incomparable. The
concatenation of σ and τ is denoted by σ_τ ; for n ∈ ω we denote by σ_n the
concatenation of σ with the string 〈n〉 of length 1.
We let ∅′ denote the halting problem. By {e}A(n)[s]↓ we mean that the eth
Turing machine with oracle A and input n terminates in at most s steps. For
functions f, g ∈ ωω we denote by f ⊕ g the join of the functions f and g, i.e.
(f ⊕ g)(2n) = f(n) and (f ⊕ g)(2n+ 1) = g(n). For any set X ⊆ ωω we denote by
C(X) the upper cone {f ∈ ωω | ∃g ∈ X(f ≥T g)}. We let 〈a1, . . . , an〉 denote a
fixed computable bijection between ωn and ω.
We denote by λ the Lebesgue measure on the unit interval [0, 1]. When
not mentioned otherwise D denotes a probability measure, or synonymously a
probability distribution. When we say that some property holds for D-almost all
x, we mean that the set of x for which the property holds has D-measure 1; when
D is clear from the context we will omit it. For any measure D and any n ∈ ω, we
let Dn denote the product measure of n copies of D, and we let Dω denote the
product measure of countably infinitely many copies of D.
For a poset (X,≤) and elements x, y ∈ X, we denote by [x, y]X the set of
elements u ∈ X satisfying x ≤ u ≤ y. We denote the join operation in lattices
by ⊕ and the meet operation by ⊗. By a relational formula we mean a formula
which only contains relation symbols and does not contain equality, function or
constant symbols. For all formulas ϕ and ψ, the formula ϕ ↔ ψ is short for
(ϕ→ ψ) ∧ (ψ → ϕ).
For unexplained notions from computability theory, we refer to Odifreddi [87]
or Downey and Hirschfeldt [25]. For the Muchnik and Medvedev lattices, we
refer to the surveys of Sorbi [111] and Hinman [36], for lattice theory, we refer to
Balbes and Dwinger [5], and for unexplained notions about Kripke semantics we
refer to Chagrov and Zakharyaschev [17] and Troelstra and van Dalen [121]. For
background in descriptive set theory we refer to Kechris [50] or Moschovakis [83].
Further background on (classical) Baire category theory can also be found in
Oxtoby [90]. For more information about measure theory we refer the reader to
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Bogachev [10], and for model theory we refer the reader to Chang and Keisler [18]
and Hodges [41].

Part I
The Medvedev and Muchnik
Lattices

CHAPTER 2
The Medvedev and Muchnik Lattices
As discussed in the introduction to this thesis, Kolmogorov [58] introduced
an informal calculus of problems in an attempt to give a semantics for intuition-
istic propositional logic IPC. This was later formalised by Medvedev [79] and
Muchnik [84], who introduced the Medvedev and Muchnik lattices, which are two
computability-theoretic structures. In this part of the thesis we will study the
logical content of these two structures.
In this first chapter we will introduce the Medvedev and Muchnik lattices and
briefly discuss some of the properties and theorems which are central to the rest of
this part of the thesis.
2.1. Prerequisites
First, let us recall the definitions of the Medvedev and Muchnik lattices.
Definition 2.1.1. (Medvedev [79]) Let A,B ⊆ ωω (we will call subsets of
ωω mass problems). We say that A Medvedev reduces to B (denoted by A ≤M B)
if there exists a Turing functional Φ such that Φ(B) ⊆ A. If both A ≤M B and
B ≤M A we say that A and B are Medvedev equivalent (denoted by A ≡M B).
The equivalence classes of mass problems under Medvedev equivalence are called
Medvedev degrees, and the class of all Medvedev degrees is denoted by M. We call
M the Medvedev lattice.
Definition 2.1.2. (Muchnik [84]) Let A,B ⊆ ωω. We say that A Muchnik
reduces to B (notation: A ≤w B) if for every g ∈ B there exists an f ∈ A such
that f ≤T g. If A ≤w B and B ≤w A we say that A and B are Muchnik equivalent
(notation: A ≡w B). The equivalence classes under Muchnik equivalence are called
Muchnik degrees and the set of Muchnik degrees is denoted by Mw. We call Mw
the Muchnik lattice.
To avoid confusion, we do not use ∨ for the join (least upper bound) or ∧ for
the meet (greatest lower bound) in lattices, because later on we will see that the
join corresponds to the logical conjunction ∧ and that the meet corresponds to the
logical disjunction ∨. Instead, we use ⊕ for join and ⊗ for meet.
Definition 2.1.3. (McKinsey and Tarski [77]) A Brouwer algebra is a bounded
distributive lattice together with a binary implication operator → satisfying:
a⊕ c ≥ b if and only if c ≥ a→ b
i.e. a→ b is the least element c satisfying a⊕ c ≥ b.
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First, we give a simple example of a Brouwer algebra.
Definition 2.1.4. Let (X,≤) be a poset. We say that a subset Y ⊆ X is
upwards closed or is an upset if for all y ∈ Y and all x ∈ X with x ≥ y we have
x ∈ Y . Similarly, we say that Y ⊆ X is downwards closed or a downset if for all
y ∈ Y and all x ∈ X with x ≤ y we have x ∈ Y .
We denote by O(X) the collection of all upwards closed subsets of X, ordered
under reverse inclusion ⊇.
Proposition 2.1.5. O(X) is a Brouwer algebra under the operations U ⊕V =
U ∩ V , U ⊗ V = U ∪ V and
U → V = {x ∈ X | ∀y ≥ x(y ∈ U ⇒ y ∈ V )}.
Proof. The upwards closed sets of a poset form a topology (because they
are closed under arbitrary unions and intersections). The result now follows from
Balbes and Dwinger [5, IX.3, Example 4].1 
It turns out that the Medvedev and Muchnik lattices are both Brouwer algebras.
Proposition 2.1.6. (Medvedev [79],Muchnik [84]) The Medvedev and Muchnik
lattices are Brouwer algebras under the operations induced by:
A⊕ B = {f ⊕ g | f ∈ A and g ∈ B}
A ⊗ B = A ∪ B
A → B = {g ∈ ωω | ∀f ∈ A∃h ∈ B(f ⊕ g ≥T h)}
In fact, the Muchnik lattice is of the simple form described in Definition 2.1.4
above.
Proposition 2.1.7. The Muchnik lattice is isomorphic to the lattice of upsets
of the Turing degrees.
Proof. We use a proof inspired by Muchnik’s proof that the Muchnik degrees
can be embedded in the Medvedev degrees (preserving 0, 1 and minimal upper
bounds) from [84]. For every A ⊆ ωω, we have that A ≡w C(A) := {f ∈ ωω |
∃g ∈ A(g ≤T f)}. Now it is directly verified that the mapping sending A to C(A)
induces an order isomorphism between Mw and O(D) (as defined in Definition
2.1.4). Finally, every order isomorphism between Brouwer algebras is automatically
a Brouwer algebra isomorphism, see Balbes and Dwinger [5, IX.4, Exercise 3]. 
The main reason Brouwer algebras are interesting is because we can use them
to give algebraic semantics for IPC, as witnessed by the next definition and the
results following after it.
Definition 2.1.8. ([78]) Let ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) be a propositional formula with
free variables among x1, . . . , xn, let B be a Brouwer algebra and let b1, . . . , bn ∈ B.
Let ψ be the formula in the language of Brouwer algebras obtained from ϕ by
replacing logical disjunction ∨ by ⊗, logical conjunction ∧ by ⊕, logical implication
1Throughout most of the literature, including Balbes and Dwinger, results are proved for
Heyting algebras, the order-dual of Brouwer algebras. However, all results we cite directly follow
for Brouwer algebras in the same way.
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→ by Brouwer implication→ and the false formula ⊥ by 1 (we view negation ¬α as
α→ ⊥). We say that ϕ(b1, . . . , bn) holds in B if ψ(b1, . . . , bn) = 0. Furthermore,
we define the theory of B (notation: Th(B)) to be the set of those formulas which
hold for every valuation, i.e.
Th(B) = {ϕ(x1, . . . , xm) | ∀b1, . . . , bm ∈ B(ϕ(b1, . . . , bm) holds in B)}.
The following soundness result is well-known and directly follows from the
observation that all rules in some fixed deduction system for IPC preserve truth.
Proposition 2.1.9. ([78, Theorem 4.1]) For every Brouwer algebra B: IPC ⊆
Th(B).
Proof. See e.g. Chagrov and Zakharyaschev [17, Theorem 7.10]. 
Conversely, the class of Brouwer algebras is complete for IPC.
Theorem 2.1.10. ([78, Theorem 4.3])⋂
{Th(B) | B a Brouwer algebra} = IPC
Thus, Brouwer algebras can be used to provide algebraic semantics for IPC.
Therefore, it would be nice if the computationally motivated Medvedev and Muchnik
lattices have IPC as their theory, so that they would provide computational
semantics for IPC. Unfortunately the weak law of the excluded middle ¬p ∨ ¬¬p
holds in both of them, as can be easily verified. In fact, their theory is exactly
Jankov’s logic Jan consisting of the deductive closure of IPC plus the weak law of
the excluded middle, as shown by Sorbi [110].
However, as mentioned in the introduction we can still recover IPC by looking
at principal factors.
Proposition 2.1.11. Let B be a Brouwer algebra and let x, y ∈ B. Then the
interval [x, y]B = {z ∈ B | x ≤ z ≤ y} is a sublattice of B. Furthermore, it is a
Brouwer algebra under the implication
u→[x,y]B v = (u→B v)⊕ x.
Proposition 2.1.12. Let B be a Brouwer algebra and let x ∈ B. Then
B/{z ∈ B | z ≥ x}, which we will denote by B/x, is isomorphic as a bounded
distributive lattice to [0, x]B. In particular, B/x is a Brouwer algebra.
Taking such a factor essentially amounts to moving from the entire algebra to
just the interval [0, x]Mw of elements below x. Because the top element of [0, x]Mw
is smaller than the top element of Mw if x 6= 1, the interpretation of negation ¬b,
which is defined as b→ 1, also differs between these two algebras. Thus, taking a
factor roughly corresponds to changing the negation.
Quite remarkably, Skvortsova has shown that there is an A ∈ M such that
the theory of M/A = IPC, and the same was later shown to hold for the Muchnik
lattice.
Theorem 2.1.13. (Skvortsova [106]) There exists a mass problem A ⊆ ωω
such that Th(M/A) = IPC.
16 2. THE MEDVEDEV AND MUCHNIK LATTICES
Theorem 2.1.14. (Sorbi and Terwijn [113]) There exists a mass problem
A ⊆ ωω such that Th(Mw/A) = IPC.
However, as explained in the introduction, while these results are extraordinary,
one could object to the fact that these mass problems A are constructed in an ad
hoc manner. In chapter 3 we show that there is a natural way to choose such an A
for the Muchnik lattice, and in chapter 4 we present progress towards obtaining
such a natural A for the Medvedev lattice.
Finally, let us mention one easy lemma which we will use in this thesis.
Lemma 2.1.15. Let B,C be Brouwer algebras and let α : B → C be a
surjective homomorphism. Then Th(B) ⊆ Th(C ).
Proof. Let ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) 6∈ Th(C ). Fix c1, . . . , cn ∈ C such that we have
ϕ(c1, . . . , cn) 6= 0. Fix b1, . . . , bn ∈ B such that γ(bi) = ci. Then
α(ϕ(b1, . . . , bn)) = ϕ(α(b1), . . . , α(bn)) = ϕ(c1, . . . , cn) 6= 0
because α is a homomorphism. Thus ϕ(b1, . . . , bn) 6= 0 and therefore we see that
ϕ 6∈ Th(B). 
CHAPTER 3
Natural Factors of the Muchnik Lattice
Capturing IPC
As discussed in chapter 2, the Muchnik lattice does not capture intuitionistic
propositional logic IPC. However, as shown by Sorbi and Terwijn [113], there is a
principal factor of it which does capture IPC. Unfortunately, this factor is defined
in an ad hoc manner and does not have any clear interpretation stemming from
concepts normally studied in mathematics. In this chapter we present several
natural examples of principal factors of the Muchnik lattice capturing IPC, which
can be defined using concepts from computability theory.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In section 3.1 we will describe
our framework of splitting classes. In section 3.2 we show that our framework is
non-trivial by proving that the low functions and the functions of 1-generic degree
below ∅′ fit in our framework. Next, in section 3.3 we prove that splitting classes
naturally induce a factor of the Muchnik lattice which captures IPC. Finally, in
section 3.4 we consider whether two other concepts from computability theory give
us splitting classes: hyperimmune-freeness and computable traceability.
This chapter is based on Kuyper [65].
3.1. Splitting classes
As announced above, we will present our results in a general framework so
that additional examples can easily be obtained. Our framework of splitting classes
abstracts exactly what we need for our proof in section 3.3 to work. It roughly
says that A is a splitting class if, given some function f ∈ A, we can construct
functions h0, h1 ∈ A above it whose join is not in A while ‘avoiding’ a given finite
set of other functions in A. This is made precise below.
Definition 3.1.1. Let A ⊆ ωω be a non-empty countable class which is
downwards closed under Turing reducibility. We say that A is a splitting class if for
every f ∈ A and every finite subset B ⊆ {g ∈ A | g 6≤T f} there exist h0, h1 ∈ A
such that h0, h1 ≥T f , h0 ⊕ h1 6∈ A and for all g ∈ B: g ⊕ h0, g ⊕ h1 6∈ A.
Note that, because every splitting class A is downwards closed under Turing
reducibility, we in particular have that A is closed under Turing equivalence, i.e. if
f ∈ A and g ≡T f then also g ∈ A.
We emphasise that we required a splitting class to be countable. There are also
interesting examples which satisfy the requirements except for the countability: for
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example, in section 3.4 we will see that this is the case for the set of hyperimmune-
free functions. In that section we will also discuss how to suitably generalise the
concept to classes of higher cardinality.
It turns our that in order to show that something is a splitting class it will
be easier to prove that one of the two alternative formulations given by the next
proposition holds.
Proposition 3.1.2. Let A ⊆ ωω be a non-empty countable class which is
downwards closed under Turing reducibility. Then the following are equivalent:
(i) A is a splitting class.
(ii) For every f ∈ A and every finite subset B ⊆ {g ∈ A | g 6≤T f} there exists
h ∈ A such that h >T f and for all g ∈ B: g ⊕ h 6∈ A.
(iii) For every f ∈ A there exists h ∈ A such that h 6≤T f , and for every f ∈ A,
every finite subset B ⊆ {g ∈ A | g 6≤T f} and every h0 ∈ {g ∈ A | g 6≤T f}
there exists h1 ∈ A such that h1 >T f , h0 ⊕ h1 6∈ A and for all g ∈ B:
h1 6≥T g.
Proof. (i) → (ii): Let h0, h1 ∈ A be such that h0, h1 ≥T f , h0 ⊕ h1 6∈ A and
for all g ∈ B: g ⊕ h0, g ⊕ h1 6∈ A. Let h = h0. Because h ≡T f would imply that
h0 ⊕ h1 ≡T h1 ∈ A we see that h >T f and therefore we are done.
(ii) → (iii): First, for every f ∈ A we can find h ∈ A such that h 6≤T f by
applying (ii) with B = ∅. Next, using (ii) determine h1 ∈ A such that h1 >T f
and for all g ∈ B ∪ {h0}: g ⊕ h1 6∈ A. Then the only thing we still need to show
is that h 6≥T g for all g ∈ B. However, h ≥T g would imply h ⊕ g ≡T h ∈ A, a
contradiction.
(iii) → (ii): Fix g1 ∈ A such that g1 6≤T f . Let B ⊆ {g ∈ A | g 6≤T f} be
finite. Without loss of generality, we may assume that g1 ∈ B; in particular, we
may assume that B is non-empty. So, let B = {g1, . . . , gn}. We inductively define
a sequence h1,0 <T h1,1 <T · · · <T h1,n of functions in A. First, we let h1,0 = f .
Next, to obtain h1,i+1 from h1,i, apply (iii) to find a function h1,i+1 >T h1,i such
that h1,i+1 ⊕ gi+1 6∈ A and for all i + 2 ≤ j ≤ n we have gj 6≤T h1,i+1. Then
h := h1,n is as desired.
(ii) → (i): Using (ii), we can find h0 ∈ A such that h0 >T f and g ⊕ h0 6∈ A
for all g ∈ B. By applying (ii) a second time, we can now find h1 ∈ A such that
h1 >T f and for all g ∈ B ∪ {h0}: g ⊕ h1 6∈ A. Then h0 and h1 are as desired. 
3.2. Low and 1-generic below ∅′ are splitting classes
Before we show that splitting classes allow us to capture IPC as a factor of the
Muchnik lattice, we want to demonstrate that our framework of splitting classes
is non-trivial. To this end, we will show that the class of low functions, and that
the class of functions of 1-generic degree below ∅′ together with the computable
functions, are splitting classes. We will denote the first class by Alow and the
second class by Agen≤∅′ . We remark that the second class naturally occurs as the
class of functions that are low for EX (as proved in Slaman and Solovay [108]).
Because these kinds of arguments are usually given as constructions on sets (or
elements of Cantor space) rather than the functions (or elements of Baire space)
which occur in the Muchnik lattice, we will work with sets instead of functions in
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this section. However, we do not use the compactness of Cantor space anywhere
and therefore it is only a notational matter.
First, we recall some basic facts about 1-genericity over a set.
Definition 3.2.1. (Jockusch [14, p. 125]) Let A,B ⊆ ω. We say that B is
1-generic if for every e ∈ ω there exists σ ⊆ B such that either {e}σ(e) ↓ or for all
τ ⊇ σ we have {e}τ (e) ↑.
More generally, we say that B is 1-generic over A if for every e ∈ ω there
exists σ ⊆ B such that either {e}A⊕σ(e) ↓ or for all τ ⊇ σ we have {e}A⊕τ (e) ↑.
Lemma 3.2.2. (Folklore) Let B be 1-generic over A. Then:
(i) If A is 1-generic, then A⊕B is 1-generic.
(ii) If A is low and B ≤T ∅′, then A⊕B is low.
Proof. (i): Assume A is 1-generic. Let e ∈ ω . We need to find a σ ⊆ A⊕B
such that either {e}σ(e) ↓ or such that for all τ ⊇ σ we have {e}τ (e) ↑.
If {e}A⊕B(e) ↓, we can choose σ ⊆ A ⊕ B such that {e}σ(e) ↓. Otherwise,
since B is 1-generic over A, we can determine σB ⊆ B such that for all τB ⊇ σB
we have {e}A⊕τB (e) ↑. Fix an index e˜ such that for all C ⊆ ω and all x ∈ ω:
{e˜}C(x) ↓⇔ ∃τB ⊇ σB{e}C⊕τB (e) ↓ .
We first note that {e˜}A(x) ↑ by our choice of σB. Therefore, using the 1-
genericity of A, determine σA ⊆ A such that for all τA ⊇ σA we have {e˜}τA(e˜) ↑.
By choice of e˜ we then have for for all τA ⊇ σA that ∀τB ⊇ σB{e}τA⊕τB (e) ↑, which
is the same as saying that for all τ ⊇ σA ⊕ σB we have {e}τ (e) ↑. This is exactly
what we needed to show.
(ii) We show that both (A ⊕ B)′ and its complement (A⊕B)′ are c.e. in
A′ ⊕B ≡T ∅′. To this end, we note that e ∈ (A⊕B)′ if and only if
∃σA ⊆ A∃σB ⊆ B
({e}σA⊕σB (e) ↓)
which is c.e. in A⊕B ≤T A′ ⊕B. Next, using the fact that B is 1-generic over A,
we see that e 6∈ (A⊕B)′ if and only if
∃σB ⊆ B∀τB ⊇ σB
({e}A⊕τB (e) ↑)
which is c.e. in A′⊕B. The result now follows by the relativised Post’s theorem. 
Theorem 3.2.3. Alow and Agen≤∅′ are splitting classes.
Proof. The first class is clearly downwards closed; for the second class this is
proved in Haught [35] (but also follows from the fact mentioned above that Agen≤∅′
consists of exactly those functions which are low for EX).
First, we consider the class of low functions. By Proposition 3.1.2, we can show
that the low functions form a splitting class by proving that for every low A and
every finite B ⊆ {B ∈ ωω | B low and B 6≤T A} there exists a set C 6≤T A such
that A ⊕ C is low and such that for all B ∈ B we have that B ⊕ (A ⊕ C) ≡T ∅′.
(Note that C 6≤T A ensures that A⊕ C >T A, while B ⊕ (A⊕ C) ≡T ∅′ ensures
that B ⊕ (A⊕ C) is neither 1-generic nor low.) Lemma 3.2.2 tells us that we can
make A⊕ C low by ensuring that C ≤ ∅′ and that C is 1-generic over A. Thus, it
is enough if we can show:
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(1) If A is low and B ⊆ {B ∈ ωω | B ≤T ∅′ and B 6≤T A} is finite, then there
exists a set C ≤T ∅′ which is 1-generic over A such that C 6≤T A and for all
B ∈ B: B ⊕ (A⊕ C) ≡T ∅′.
In fact, we then also immediately get the result for the class of functions of
1-generic degree below ∅′. Namely, let A ≤T ∅′ be of 1-generic degree and let
B ⊆ {B ∈ ωω | B ≤T ∅′ and B 6≤T A} be finite. Just as above, it would be enough
to have a set C ≤T ∅′ such that C 6≤T A, A⊕ C is of 1-generic degree and for all
B ∈ B: B ⊕ (A⊕ C) ≡T ∅′. Note that this expression is invariant under replacing
A with a Turing equivalent set, so because A is of 1-generic degree we may without
loss of generality assume A to be 1-generic. Then, because A ≤ ∅′ is 1-generic, it
is also low. So we can find a set C as in (1). By Lemma 3.2.2 we then have that
A⊕ C is 1-generic, and therefore C is exactly as desired.
To prove (1) we modify the proof of the Posner and Robinson Cupping Theorem
[95]. Let B = {B1, . . . , Bk}. For every Bi ∈ B, since Bi ≤ ∅′ we can approximate
Bi by a computable sequence B
0
i , B
1
i , . . . of finite sets. We now let αi be the
computation function defined by letting αi(n) be the least m ≥ n such that
Bmi  (n+ 1) = Bi  (n+ 1). Then Bi ≡T αi. Now let α = min(α1, . . . , αk). Then,
by Lemma 6 of [95], any function g which dominates α computes some Bi. Thus,
we see that no function computable in A can dominate α.
We will now construct a set C as in (1) by a finite extension argument, i.e. as
C =
⋃
n∈ω σn. Fix any computable sequence τ0, τ1, . . . of mutually incomparable
finite strings (for example, τn = 〈0n1〉, the string consisting of n times a 0 followed
by a 1). We start with σ0 = ∅. To define σe+1 given σe, let n be the least m ∈ ω
such that either (where the quantifiers are over finite strings):
(2) ∀σ ⊇ σe_τm
({e}A⊕σ(e) ↑)
or
(3) ∃σ ⊇ σe_τm
(|σ| ≤ α(m) ∧ {e}A⊕σ(e)[|σ|] ↓) .
Such an m exists: otherwise, for every l ∈ ω we could let β(l) be the least s ∈ ω
such that
∃σ ⊇ σe_τl
({e}A⊕σ(e)[|σ|] ↓ ∧|σ| = s) .
For every l such an s exists because (2) does not hold for l, while such an s has
to be strictly bigger than α(l) because (3) also does not hold. So, β would be a
function computable in A which dominates α, of which we have shown above that
it cannot exist.
Now, if case (2) holds for n, then we let σe+1 = σe
_τn
_∅′(e). Otherwise, we
let σe+1 = σ
_∅′(e), where σ is the least σ such that (3) is satisfied.
The construction is computable in A′⊕B1⊕· · ·⊕Bk ≤T ∅′: the set of m ∈ ω for
which (2) holds is co-c.e. in A, while for (3) this is computable in α ≤T B1⊕· · ·⊕Bk
and A. Therefore, C ≤T ∅′ holds.
Furthermore, per construction of σe+1 we have either {e}A⊕σe+1(e) ↓, or for
all τ ⊇ σe+1 we have {e}A⊕τ (e) ↑. So, C is 1-generic over A.
Next, for every 1 ≤ i ≤ k the construction is computable in (A⊕ C)⊕Bi: to
determine σe+1 given σe, use C to find the unique n ∈ ω such that C ⊇ σe_τn.
We can now compute in A and Bi if there exists some string σ ⊇ σe_τn of length
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at most αi(n) such that {e}A⊕σ(e)[|σ|] ↓: if so, let σ be the least such string and
then σe+1 = B  |σ|+ 1. Otherwise, σe+1 = B  |σe|+ 1. Then we also see that
∅′ is computable in (A⊕ C)⊕Bi, because ∅′(e) is the last element of σe+1. Since
also A,Bi, C ≤T ∅′ we see that (A⊕ C)⊕Bi ≡T ∅′.
Finally, because for every low A there exists some low B0 >T A (because
we can construct a 1-generic relative to A in A′ ≡T ∅′ and apply Lemma 3.2.2)
we may without loss of generality assume that such a B0 is in B. Then we have
B0 ⊕ (A⊕ C) ≡T ∅′, as shown above. Now, if it were the case that C ≤T A, then
∅′ ≡T B0 ⊕ (A⊕ C) ≡T B0, which contradicts B0 being low. So C 6≤T A, which is
the last thing we needed to show. 
3.3. The theory of a splitting class
We will now show that the theory of a splitting class equals IPC. We start
by moving away from our algebraic viewpoint to Kripke semantics (we refer the
reader to Chagrov and Zakharyaschev [17] for an introduction to Kripke frames).
The following folklore result contains the crucial idea we need for this.
Theorem 3.3.1. For any poset (X,≤), the theory of (X,≤) as a Kripke frame
is the same as theory of the lattice of upsets of X as a Brouwer algebra.
Proof. See e.g. Chagrov and Zakharyaschev [17, Theorem 7.20] for the order-
dual result for Heyting algebras. 
Proposition 3.3.2. Let A ⊆ ωω be downwards closed under Turing reducibility.
Then Mw/A (i.e. Mw modulo the principal filter generated by A) is isomorphic to
the lattice of upsets O(A) of A. In particular, Th(Mw/A) = Th(A) (the first as
Brouwer algebra, the second as Kripke frame).
Proof. By Proposition 2.1.7, Mw is isomorphic to the lattice of upsets O(D)
of the Turing degrees D, by sending each set B ⊆ ωω to C(B). Since A is upwards
closed, we see that the isomorphism sends A to itself. Therefore, Mw/A, which is
isomorphic to the initial segment [ωω,A]Mw of Mw, is isomorphic to the initial
segment [ωω,A]O(D). Finally, [ωω,A]O(D) is easily seen to be isomorphic to O(A),
by sending each set B ∈ O(A) to B ∪ A. The result now follows from the previous
theorem. 
Thus, if we take the factor of Mw given by the principal filter generated by A,
we get exactly the theory of the Kripke frame (A,≤T ). The rest of this section
will be used to show that for splitting classes this theory is exactly IPC. To this
end, we need the right kind of morphisms for Kripke frames, called p-morphisms.
Definition 3.3.3. (de Jongh and Troelstra [21]) Let (X1,≤1), (X2,≤2) be
Kripke frames. A surjective function f : (X1,≤1) → (X2,≤2) is called a p-
morphism if
(1) f is an order homomorphism: x ≤1 y → f(x) ≤2 f(y),
(2) ∀x ∈ X1∀y ∈ X2(f(x) ≤2 y → ∃z ∈ X1(x ≤1 z ∧ f(z) = y)).
Proposition 3.3.4. If there exists a p-morphism from (X1,≤1) to (X2,≤2),
then Th(X1,≤1) ⊆ Th(X2,≤2).
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Proof. See e.g. Chagrov and Zakharyaschev [17, Corollary 2.17]. 
Theorem 3.3.5. (Smoryn´ski [109]) Th(2<w) = IPC.
Proof. See e.g. Chagrov and Zakharyaschev [17, Corollary 2.33]. 
So, if we want to show that the theory of Mw/A equals IPC, it is enough to
show that there exists a p-morphism from A to 2<ω. We next show that this is
indeed possible for splitting classes.
Proposition 3.3.6. Let A be a splitting class. Then there exists a p-morphism
α : (A,≤T )→ 2<ω.
Proof. Instead of building a p-morphism from A, we will build it from A/≡T
(which is equivalent to building one from A, since any order homomorphism has to
send T -equivalence classes to equal strings). For ease of notation we will write A
for A/ ≡T during the remainder of this proof.
Fix an enumeration a0,a1, . . . of A. We will build a sequence α0 ⊆ α1 ⊆ . . .
of finite, partial order homomorphisms from A to 2<ω, which additionally satisfy
that if a,b ∈ dom(αi) and αi(a) | αi(b), then a⊕ b 6∈ A.
We satisfy the following requirements:
• R0: α0(0) = ∅ (where 0 is the least Turing degree)
• R2n+1: an ∈ dom(α2n+1)
• R2n+2: there are c0, c1 ∈ dom(α2n+2) with c0, c1 ≥T an and α2n+2(c0) =
α2n+1(an)
_0, α2n+2(c1) = α2n+1(an)
_1.
First, we show that for such a sequence the function α =
⋃
n∈ω αn is a p-
morphism α : (A,≤T )→ 2<ω. First, the odd requirements ensure that α is total.
Furthermore, α is an order homomorphism because the αi are. To show that α is
a p-morphism, let a ∈ A and let α(a) ⊆ y; we need to find some a ≤T b ∈ A such
that α(b) = y. Because α(a) ⊆ y we know that y = α(a)_y′ for some finite string
y′. We may assume y′ to be of length 1, the general result then follows by induction.
Now, if we let n ∈ ω be such that a = an then an ∈ dom(α2n+1), so requirement
R2n+2 tells us that there are functions c0, c1 ≥ an with α2n+2(c0) = α(a)_0 and
α2n+2(c1) = α(a)
_1. Now either α(c0) = y or α(c1) = y, which is what we needed
to show. That α is surjective directly follows from the fact that ∅ is in its range
and that it satisfies property (2) of a p-morphism.
Now, we show how to actually construct the sequence. First, α0 is already
defined. Next assume α2n has been constructed, we will construct α2n+1 extending
α2n such that an ∈ dom(α2n+1). The set
X := {α2n(b) | b ∈ dom(α2n) and b ≤T an}
is totally ordered under ⊆. Since, if b, c ≤T an then b⊕ c ≤T an. Now, if α2n(b)
and α2n(c) are incomparable then we assumed that b⊕ c 6∈ A. This contradicts
the assumption that A is downwards closed. So, we can define α2n+1(an) to be
the largest element of X.
We show that α2n+1 is an order homomorphism; we then also automatically
know that it is well-defined. Thus, let b1,b2 ∈ dom(α2n+1) with b1 ≤T b2. If they
are both already in dom(α2n), then the induction hypothesis on α2n already tells us
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that α2n+1(b1) ⊆ α2n+1(b2). If b1 ∈ dom(α2n) and b2 = an, then α2n(b1) ∈ X,
so by definition of α2n+1(an) we directly see that α2n+1(b1) ⊆ α2n+1(an). Finally,
we consider the case that b1 = an and b2 ∈ dom(α2n). To show that α2n+1(an) ⊆
α2n+1(b2) = α2n(b2) it is enough to show that all elements of X are below α2n(b2),
because α2n+1(an) is the largest element of the set X. Therefore, let b ∈ dom(α2n)
be such that b ≤T an. Then we have that b ≤T an ≤T b2, and since α2n is an
order homomorphism this implies that α2n(b) ≤T α2n(b2), as desired.
Finally, we need to show that if c ∈ dom(α2n) is such that α2n+1(c) and
α2n+1(an) are incomparable, then c ⊕ an 6∈ A. If α2n+1(c) and α2n+1(an) are
incomparable, there has to be some b ≤T an with b ∈ dom(α2n) such that α2n(c)
and α2n(b) are incomparable (because α2n+1(an) is the largest element of X).
However, then by induction hypothesis b ⊕ c 6∈ A and because A is downwards
closed this also implies that c⊕ an 6∈ A.
We now assume that α2n+1 has been defined and consider requirement R2n+2.
Let B = {b ∈ dom(α2n+1) | b 6≤T an}. Since A is a splitting class there exist
c0, c1 ∈ A such that c0, c1 ≥ an, c0 ⊕ c1 6∈ A and for all b ∈ B we have
b⊕ c0,b⊕ c1 6∈ A. Now extend α2n+1 by letting α2n+2(c0) = α2n+1(an)_0 and
α2n+2(c1) = α2n+1(an)
_1.
First, we show that α2n+2 is an order homomorphism. Let b1,b2 ∈ dom(α2n+2)
and b1 ≤T b2. We again distinguish several cases:
• b1,b2 ∈ dom(α2n+1): this directly follows from the fact that α2n+1 is an
order homomorphism by induction hypothesis.
• b1,b2 ∈ {c0, c1}: since c0 ⊕ c1 6∈ A and therefore differs from both c0
and c1, this can only happen if b1 = b2, so this case is trivial.
• b1 ∈ {c0, c1}, b2 ∈ dom(α2n+1): note that c0, c1 >T an (otherwise
c0⊕c1 ∈ {c0, c1} ⊆ A), so we see that b2 >T a, and then by construction
of c0 and c1 we know that b2⊕c0,b2⊕c1 6∈ A. This contradicts b1 ≤T b2,
so this case is impossible.
• b1 ∈ dom(α2n+1), b2 ∈ {c0, c1}: if b1 6≤T an, then again by construction
of c0 and c1 we have that b2 = b1 ⊕ b2 6∈ A which is a contradiction.
So b1 ≤T an and therefore α2n+2(b1) = α2n+1(b1) ⊆ α2n+1(an) ⊆
α2n+2(b2).
Finally, we show that if b ∈ dom(α2n+2) is such that α2n+2(b) and α2n+2(c1)
are incomparable, then b ⊕ c1 6∈ A (the same then follows analogously for c2).
If b = c2 this is clear from the definition of α2n+2. Otherwise, we have b ∈
dom(α2n+1). If it were the case that b ≤T an, then α2n+2(b) = α2n+1(b) ⊆
α2n+1(an) ⊆ α2n+2(c1), a contradiction. Thus b 6≤T an, and therefore b⊕ c1 6∈ A
by construction of c1. 
Theorem 3.3.7. For any splitting class A: Th(Mw/A) = IPC.
Proof. From Proposition 3.3.2, Proposition 3.3.4, Theorem 3.3.5 and Propos-
ition 3.3.6. 
Therefore, combining this with the results from section 3.2 we now see:
Theorem 3.3.8. Th(Mw/Alow) = Th(Mw/Agen≤∅′) = IPC.
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3.4. Further splitting classes
3.4.1. Hyperimmune-free functions. In this section, we will look at some
other classes and consider if they are splitting classes. First, we look at the class of
hyperimmune-free functions. Recall that a function f is hyperimmune-free if every
g ≤T f is dominated by a computable function. We can see a problem right away:
the class of hyperimmune-free functions is well-known to be uncountable, while
we required splitting classes to be countable. We temporarily remedy this by only
looking at the hyperimmune-free functions which are low2 (where a function f is
low2 if f
′′ ≡T ∅′′); after the proof, we will discuss how we might be able to look at
the entire class.1
As in section 3.2 we will present our constructions as constructions on Cantor
space rather than Baire space for the reasons discussed in that section.
Theorem 3.4.1. The class AHIF,low2 of hyperimmune-free functions which
are low2 is a splitting class. In particular, Th(Mw/AHIF,low2) = IPC.
Proof. We prove that (iii) of Proposition 3.1.2 holds. That for every hyper-
immune-free low2 set A there exists a hyperimmune-free low2 set B such that
B 6≤T A (or that there even exists one such that B >T A) is well-known, see Miller
and Martin [81, Theorem 2.1]. We prove the second part of (iii) from Proposition
3.1.2. Our construction uses the tree method of Miller and Martin [81].
Let A ≤T ∅′′ be hyperimmune-free and low2, let
B ⊆ {B ⊆ ω | B 6≤T A,B ≤T ∅′′ and B HIF}
be a finite subset and let C0 ≤T ∅′′ be a hyperimmune-free (low2) set not below A.
We need to construct a hyperimmune-free set A <T C1 ≤T ∅′′ such that C0 ⊕ C1
is not of hyperimmune-free degree (i.e. of hyperimmune degree) and such that for
all B ∈ B we have that C1 6≥T B.
First, we remark that we may assume that not only C0 6≤T A, but even that
C0 6≤T A′. Indeed, assume C0 ≤T A′. If C0 ≥T A then we see that A < C0 ≤ A′ so
by Miller and Martin [81, Theorem 1.2] we see that C0 is of hyperimmune degree,
contrary to our assumption. So, C0 |T A. However, then A <T A⊕C0 ≤ A′ and as
before we then see that A⊕ C0 is already of hyperimmune degree, so we may take
C1 to be any hyperimmune-free set strictly above A which is low2; as mentioned
above such a set exists by [81, Theorem 2.1].
Without loss of generality we may even assume that C0 is not c.e. in A
′: we
may replace C0 by C0 ⊕ C0, which is of the same Turing degree as C0, and is not
c.e. in A′ because otherwise C0 would be computable in A′, a contradiction.
Let B = {B1, . . . , Bn} and fix a computable enumeration α of n× ω. We will
construct a sequence T0 ⊇ T1 ⊇ . . . of A-computable binary trees in the sense of
Shoenfield [105] (see e.g. Odifreddi [87, Definition V.5.1]) such that:
1There are different natural countable subsets of the hyperimmune-free degrees which form
splitting classes; for example, instead of the low2 hyperimmune-free functions we could also
take the hyperimmune-free functions f for which there exists an n ∈ ω such that f ≤T ∅(n).
This follows from the proof of Theorem 3.4.1. However, since our main reason to look at these
countable subclasses is to view them as a stepping stone towards the class of all hyperimmune-free
functions, we will not pursue this topic further.
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(i) T0 is the full binary tree.
(ii) For all D on T4e+1: D 6= {e}A.
(iii) For T4e+2, one of the following holds:
(a) For all D on T4e+2, {e}A⊕D is not total.
(b) For all D on T4e+2, {e}A⊕D is total and
∀n∀σ(|σ| = n→ {e}A⊕T4e+2(σ)(n)[|T4e+2(σ)|] ↓).
Furthermore, this choice is computable in ∅′′.
(iv) For all D on T4e+3, {α2(e)}A⊕D 6= Bα1(e).
(v) T4e+4 is the full subtree of T4e+3 above T4e+3(〈∅′′(e)〉).
(vi) For every infinite branch D on all of the trees Ti, the sequence T0 ⊇ T1 ⊇ . . .
is computable in C0 ⊕ (A′ ⊕D).
(vii) The sequence T0 ⊇ T1 ⊇ . . . is computable in ∅′′.
For now, assume we can construct such a sequence. Let D =
⋃
i∈ω Ti(∅),
then D is an infinite branch lying on all of the Ti. Let C1 = A ⊕ D. Then the
requirements (ii) guarantee that D 6≤T A and therefore C1 >T A. By (vii) we
also have that C1 ≤T ∅′′. Furthermore, the requirements (iii) enforce that C1
is hyperimmune-free relative to A by Miller and Martin [81] (see Odifreddi [87,
Proposition V.5.6]), and because A is itself hyperimmune-free it is directly seen
that C1 is hyperimmune-free. The requirements (iv) ensure that C1 6≥T Bi for all
Bi ∈ B.
Next, we have that (C0 ⊕ C1)′ ≥T C0 ⊕ (A′ ⊕D) ≥T ∅′′: by requirement (vi)
the sequence Ti is computable in C0 ⊕ (A′ ⊕D), while by requirement (v) we have
that T4e+4(∅) = T4e+3(∅)_∅′′(e) which allows us to recover ∅′′(e). So, C0 ⊕ C1 is
not low2. In fact, C0 ⊕ C1 is not even hyperimmune-free: by a theorem of Martin
[76] we know that (C0 ⊕ C1)′ ≥T ∅′′ implies that C0 ⊕ C1 computes a function
which dominates every total computable function, and therefore C0 ⊕ C1 is not
hyperimmune-free, as desired.
Finally, we show that C1 is low2. By requirement (iv) and requirement (vii)
we have that ∅′′ ≥T {e ∈ ω | {e}C1 is total}. Since the latter has the same Turing
degree as C ′′1 , this shows that C1 is indeed low2.
We now show how to actually construct such a sequence of computable binary
trees. Let T0 be the full binary tree. Next, assume T4e has already been defined.
To fulfil requirement (ii), observe that T4e(0) and T4e(1) are incompatible, so at
least one of them has to differ from {e}A. If the first differs from {e}A we take
T4e+1 to be the full subtree above T4e(0), and otherwise we take the full subtree
above T4e(1).
Next, assume T4e+1 has been defined, we will construct T4e+2 fulfilling require-
ment (iii). Let n be the smallest m ∈ ω such that either
(4) m 6∈ C0 ∧ ∃σ ⊇ 〈0m1〉∃x∀τ ⊇ σ
(
{e}A⊕T4e+1(τ)(x) ↑
)
or
(5) m ∈ C0 ∧ ∀σ ⊇ 〈0m1〉∀x∃τ ⊇ σ
(
{e}A⊕T4e+1(τ)(x) ↓
)
,
where as before 〈0m1〉 denotes the string consisting of m times a 0 followed by a 1.
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Such an m exists: indeed, if such an m did not exist, then
C0 =
{
m ∈ ω | ∃σ ⊇ 〈0m1〉∃x∀τ ⊇ σ
(
{e}A⊕T4e+1(τ)(x) ↑
)}
and therefore C0 is c.e. in A
′, which contradicts our assumption above.
If (4) holds for n, let σ ⊇ 〈0n1〉 be the smallest such string and let T4e+2 be the
full subtree above T4e+1(σ). Otherwise, we inductively define T4e+2 ⊆ T4e+1. First,
if we let τ be the least τ˜ ⊇ 〈0n1〉 such that {e}A⊕T4e+1(τ˜)(0)[|T4e+1(τ˜)|] ↓, then we
let T4e+2(0) = T4e+1(τ). Inductively, given T4e+2(σ), let ρ be such that T4e+2(σ) =
T4e+1(ρ). Now, if we let τ be the least τ˜ ⊇ ρ such that {e}A⊕T4e+1(τ˜)(|σ| +
1)[|T4e+1(τ˜)|] ↓, we let T4e+2(σ_0) = T4e+1(τ_0) and T4e+2(σ_1) = T4e+1(τ_1).
For the requirements (iv) we do something similar. Let e˜ = α2(e). First, we
build a subtree S ⊆ T4e+2 such that either there is no e˜-splitting relative to A on
S (i.e. for all strings σ, τ on S and all x ∈ ω, if {e˜}A⊕σ(x) ↓ and {e˜}A⊕τ (x) ↓, then
their values are equal), or S(0) and S(1) are an e˜-splitting relative to A (in fact, S
will even be an e˜-splitting tree relative to A). Let n be the smallest m ∈ ω such
that
m 6∈ C0 ∧ ∃σ ⊇ 〈0m1〉∀τ, τ ′ ⊇ σ∀x
(
{e˜}A⊕T4e+2(τ)(x) ↓ ∧{e˜}A⊕T4e+2(τ ′)(x) ↓
→ {e˜}A⊕T4e+2(τ)(x) = {e˜}A⊕T4e+2(τ ′)(x)
)
(6)
or
m ∈ C0 ∧ ∀σ ⊇ 〈0m1〉∃τ, τ ′ ⊇ σ∃x
(
{e˜}A⊕T4e+2(τ)(x) ↓ ∧{e˜}A⊕T4e+2(τ ′)(x) ↓
∧ {e˜}A⊕T4e+2(τ)(x) 6= {e˜}A⊕T4e+2(τ ′)(x)
)
(7)
That such an m exists can be shown in the same way as above. If (6) holds for
n, let σ be the smallest such string and let S be the full subtree above T4e+2(σ).
Then there are no e˜-splittings relative to A on S. Otherwise, we can inductively
build S: let S(∅) = T4e+2(〈0n1〉) and if S(σ) is already defined we can take S(σ_0)
and S(σ_1) to be two e˜-splitting extensions relative to A of S(σ) on T4e+2.
If there are no e˜-splittings relative to A on S, then we can take T4e+3 = S.
Since, assume {e˜}A⊕D = Bi for some Bi ∈ B. Then, by Spector’s result [114]
(see e.g. Odifreddi [87, Proposition V.5.9]) we have that Bi ≤T A, contrary to
assumption.
Otherwise we can find an x ∈ ω such that {e˜}A⊕S(〈0〉)(x) and {e˜}A⊕S(〈1〉)(x)
both converge, but such that their value differs. Then either {e˜}A⊕S(〈0〉)(x) 6= Bα1(e)
and we take T4e+3 to be the full subtree above S(〈0〉), or {e˜}A⊕S(〈1〉)(x) 6= Bα1(e)
and we take T4e+3 to be the full subtree above S(〈1〉). Then T4e+3 satisfies
requirement (iv).
Finally, how to define T4e+4 from T4e+3 is already completely specified by
requirement (v). This completes the definitions of all the Ti. Note that all steps in
the construction are computable in A′′ ≡T ∅′′.
So, the last thing we need to show is that requirement (vi) is satisfied, i.e. that
for any infinite branch D on all Ti the construction is computable in C0⊕ (A′⊕D).
This is clear for the construction of T4e+1 from T4e. For the construction of T4e+2
from T4e+1 the only real problem is that we need to choose between (4) and (5).
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However, because D is on T4e+2, we can uniquely determine n ∈ ω such that
T4e+1(〈0n1〉) is an initial segment of D. Then (4) holds if and only if n 6∈ C0 and
(5) holds if and only if n ∈ C0. So, we can decide which alternative was taken using
C0. Furthermore, if (4) holds then we can use A
′ to calculate the string σ used in
the computation of T4e+2.
For T4e+3 we can do something similar for the tree S used in the definition of
T4e+3, and using D we can determine if we took T4e+3 to be the subtree above
S(〈0〉) or S(〈1〉). Finally, using D it is also easily decided which alternative we
took for T4e+4, because T4e+4 is the full subtree above T4e+3(〈i〉) for the unique
i ∈ {0, 1} such that T4e+3(〈i〉) ⊆ D. Therefore we see that the construction is
indeed computable in C0 ⊕ (A′ ⊕D), which completes our proof. 
This result is slightly unsatisfactory because we restricted ourselves to the
hyperimmune-free which are low2. Because the entire class of hyperimmune-free
functions AHIF is also downwards closed we directly see from the proof above that
the only real problem is the uncountability, i.e. AHIF satisfies all properties of a
splitting class except for the countability. Our next result shows that, if we assume
the continuum hypothesis, we can still show that the theory of the factor given by
AHIF is IPC.
Definition 3.4.2. Let A ⊆ ωω be a non-empty class of cardinality ℵ1 which is
downwards closed under Turing reducibility. We say that A is an ℵ1 splitting class
if for every f ∈ A and every countable subset B ⊆ {g ∈ A | g 6≤T f} there exist
h0, h1 ∈ A such that h0, h1 ≥T f , h0⊕h1 6∈ A and for all g ∈ B: g⊕h0, g⊕h1 6∈ A.
Proposition 3.4.3. Let A ⊆ ωω be a non-empty class of cardinality ℵ1 which
is downwards closed under Turing reducibility. Then the following are equivalent:
(i) A is an ℵ1 splitting class.
(ii) For every f ∈ A and every countable subset B ⊆ {g ∈ A | g 6≤T f} there
exists h ∈ A such that h >T f and for all g ∈ B: g ⊕ h 6∈ A.
Furthermore, if every countable chain in A has an upper bound in A, these two
are also equivalent to:
(iii) For every f ∈ A there exists h ∈ A such that h 6≤T f , and for every f ∈ A,
every countable subset B ⊆ {g ∈ A | g 6≤T f} and every h0 ∈ {g ∈ A | g 6≤T f}
there exists h1 ∈ A such that h1 >T f , h0⊕h1 6∈ A and for all g ∈ B: h1 6≥T g.
Proof. In almost exactly the same way as Proposition 3.1.2. For the implic-
ation (iii) → (ii) we define an infinite sequence h1,0 <T h1,1 <T . . . instead of a
finite one, and then let h be an upper bound in A of this chain. 
Theorem 3.4.4. For any ℵ1 splitting class A: Th(Mw/A) = IPC.
Proof. We can generalise the construction in Proposition 3.3.6 to a transfinite
construction over ℵ1. However, instead of building a p-morphism to 2<ω we show
that we can build a p-morphism to every finite tree T . It is known from folklore
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that this is already enough to show that the theory is IPC (see e.g. Chagrov and
Zakharyaschev [17, Corollary 2.33]).2
Fix an enumeration (aγ)γ<ℵ1 of A. This time we will build a sequence (αγ)γ<ℵ1
of partial order homomorphisms from A to T with countable domain, which is
increasing in the sense that αγ ⊆ αγ˜ if γ ≤ γ˜. As before, it should additionally
satisfy that if a,b ∈ dom(αγ) and αγ(a) | αγ(b), then a⊕ b 6∈ A.
Fix some bijection ζ : {0, 1} × ℵ1 → ℵ1 \ {0} satisfying that ζ(1, γ) > ζ(0, γ)
for every γ < ℵ1. We satisfy the requirements:
• R0: α0(0) = ∅
• R(0,γ): aγ ∈ dom(αζ(0,γ))
• R(1,γ): if σ := αζ(0,γ)(aγ) is not maximal in T and has children τ1, . . . , τn,
then there are c1, . . . , cn ∈ dom(αζ(1,γ)) with c1, . . . , cn ≥T aγ and
αζ(1,γ)(ci) = τi for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
That these requirements give us the required p-morphisms follows in the same
way as in Proposition 3.3.6. The construction of the sequence (αγ)γ<ℵ1 also
proceeds in almost the same way, apart from three minor details. First, if γ is a
limit ordinal it does not have a clear predecessor, so we cannot say that αγ should
extend its predecessor. Instead, we construct αγ as an extension of
⋃
γ˜<γ αγ˜ (note
that this union is countable because γ < ℵ1, and hence
⋃
γ˜<γ αγ˜ has countable
domain).
Secondly, the domains of the αγ are no longer finite but are now countable,
which means that in the construction for requirement R(1,γ) we now need to consider
countable sets B instead of just finite sets B. However, this is exactly why we
changed our definition of an ℵ1 splitting class to allow countable sets B instead of
just finite sets B.
Finally, instead of dealing with only two children we may have to deal with
up to n children at the same time; however, that we can also split into n points
instead of just into two follows in the same way as the proofs of Propositions 3.1.2
and 3.4.3. 
Theorem 3.4.5. Assume CH. Then AHIF is an ℵ1 splitting class. In particu-
lar, Th(Mw/AHIF) = IPC.
Proof. First, AHIF has cardinality ℵ1 by CH. Next, every countable chain in
AHIF has an upper bound in AHIF (Miller and Martin [81, Theorem 2.2]), so we
can use the equivalence of (i) and (iii) of Proposition 3.4.3. Thus, it is sufficient if
we show that the construction in Theorem 3.4.1 not only applies to just finite sets
B, but also to countable sets B. However, this is readily verified. 
In particular, we see that it is consistent (relative to ZFC) to have that
Th(Mw/AHIF) = IPC. Unfortunately, we currently do not know if this already
follows from ZFC or if it is independent of ZFC.
Question 3.4.6. Does Th(Mw/AHIF) = IPC follow from ZFC?
2In the published version, the author incorrectly claimed that it is enough only to consider
finite binary trees. This is false. However, as shown below the original proof also works for all
finite trees, so the result still holds without any major changes.
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3.4.2. Computably traceable functions. A class that is closely related
to the hyperimmune-free functions is the class Atrace of computably traceable
functions. We first recall its definition.
Definition 3.4.7. (Terwijn and Zambella [120]) A set T ⊆ ω × ω is called
a trace if all sections T [k] = {n ∈ ω | (k, n) ∈ T} are finite. A computable trace
is a trace such that the function which maps k to the canonical index of T [k] is
computable. A trace T traces a function g if g(k) ∈ T [k] for every k ∈ ω. A
bound is a function h : ω → ω that is non-decreasing and has infinite range. If
|T [k]| ≤ h(k) for all k ∈ ω, we say that h is a bound for T .
Finally, a function f is called computably traceable if there exists a computable
bound h such that all (total) functions g ≤T f are traced by a computable trace
bounded by h.
Computable traceability can be seen as a uniform kind of hyperimmune-
freeness. If f is computably traceable, then it is certainly hyperimmune-free: if
g ≤T f is traced by some computable trace T , then for the computable function
g˜(k) = max
(
T [k]
)
we have g ≤ g˜. Conversely, if f is hyperimmune-free and
g ≤T f , then g has a computable trace: fix some computable g˜ ≥ g and let
Tg = {(k,m) | m ≤ g˜(k)}. However, these traces Tg need not be bounded by any
uniform computable bound h. Computable traceability asserts that such a uniform
bound does exist. It can be shown that there are hyperimmune-free functions
which are not computably traceable, see Terwijn and Zambella [120].
The computably traceable functions naturally occur in algorithmic randomness.
In [120] it is shown that the computably traceable functions are precisely those
functions which are low for Schnorr null, and in Kjos-Hanssen, Nies and Stephan
[52] it is shown that this class also coincides with the functions which are low for
Schnorr randomness.
Terwijn and Zambella also showed that the usual Miller and Martin tree
construction of hyperimmune-free degrees actually already yields a computably
traceable degree. Combining their techniques with the next lemma, we can directly
see that our constructions of hyperimmune-free degrees above can also be used to
construct computably traceable degrees.
Lemma 3.4.8. Let A be computably traceable, and let B be computably traceable
relative to A. Then B is computably traceable.
Proof. Let h1 be a computable bound for the traces of functions computed
by A and let h2 ≤T A be a bound for the traces of functions computed by B.
Because A is hyperimmune-free (as discussed above) h2 is bounded by a computable
function h˜2.We claim: every function computed by B has a trace bounded by the
computable function h1 · h˜2.
To this end, let g ≤T B. Fix a trace T ≤T A for g which is bounded by h2
(and hence is also bounded by h˜2). Then the function mapping k to the canonical
index of T [k] is computable in A, so because A is computably traceable we can
determine a computable trace S for this function which is bounded by h1.
Finally, denote by De,n the (at most) n smallest elements of the set De
corresponding to the canonical index e; i.e. De,n consists of the n smallest elements
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of De if |De| ≥ n, and De,n = De otherwise. Now let U be the computable trace
such that U [k] =
⋃
e∈S[k] De,h˜2(k). Then U is clearly bounded by h1 · h˜2. It also
traces g, because g(k) ∈ T [k] and for some e ∈ S[k] we have T [k] = De,h˜2(k). 
Theorem 3.4.9. The class Atrace,low2 of computably traceable functions which
are low2 is a splitting class. In particular, Th(Mw/Atrace,low2) = IPC.
Proof. As in Theorem 3.4.1. 
Theorem 3.4.10. Assume CH. Then Atrace is an ℵ1 splitting class. In
particular, Th(Mw/Atrace) = IPC.
Proof. As in Theorem 3.4.5. 
Question 3.4.11. Does Th(Mw/Atrace) = IPC follow from ZFC?
CHAPTER 4
Natural Factors of the Medvedev Lattice
Capturing IPC
In the previous chapter we discussed natural principal factors of the Muchnik
lattice capturing IPC. In this chapter we turn towards the uniform Medvedev
lattice: we know there are principal factors of the Medvedev lattice capturing IPC,
but are there any natural ones?
In this chapter we present progress towards an affirmative answer to the
question formulated above, by showing that there are principal factors of the
Medvedev lattice capturing IPC which are more natural than the one given by
Skvortsova. These factors arise from the computability-theoretic notion of a
computably independent set : that is, a set A such that for every i ∈ ω we have that⊕
j 6=iA
[j] 6≥T A[i], where A[i] is the ith column of A, i.e. A[i](n) = A(〈i, n〉) . We
can now state the main theorem of this chapter.
Theorem 4.0.1. Let A be a computably independent set. Then
Th
(
M/
{
i_f | f ≥T A[i]
})
= IPC.
We note that the factor from Theorem 4.0.1 is not nearly as natural as the
factors for the Muchnik lattice described in the previous chapter. On the other
hand, the factor from Theorem 4.0.1 is far more natural than the one given by
Skvortsova: our factor is easily definable from just a computably independent set,
which occurs naturally in computability theory. Furthermore, while Skvortsova
used a deep result by Lachlan, we manage to work around this and therefore our
proof is more elementary.
We also study a question posed by Sorbi and Terwijn in [112]. As mentioned
above, the theory of the Medvedev lattice is equal to Jankov’s logic Jan, the
deductive closure of IPC plus the weak law of the excluded middle ¬p∨¬¬p. Let 0′
be the mass problem consisting of all non-computable functions. Recall that we say
that a mass problem is Muchnik if it is upwards closed under Turing reducibility.
In [112] it is shown that for all Muchnik B >M 0′ the theory of the factor M/B is
contained in Jan. Therefore, Sorbi and Terwijn asked: is Th(M/B) contained in
Jan for all mass problems B >M 0′? We give a positive answer to this question.
This chapter is based on Kuyper [67].
4.1. Upper implicative semilattice embeddings of P(I) into M
As a first step, we will describe a method to embed Boolean algebras of the
form P(I), ordered under reverse inclusion ⊇, into the Medvedev lattice M as an
31
32 4. NATURAL FACTORS OF THE MEDVEDEV LATTICE CAPTURING IPC
upper implicative semilattice (i.e. preserving ⊕, →, 0 and 1). It should be noted
that we will only need this for finite I, and Skvortsova [107, Lemma 7] already
showed that such embeddings exist. However, Skvortsova used Lachlan’s result
[70] that every countable distributive lattice can be order-theoretically embedded
as an initial segment of the Turing degrees. Because we want natural factors of the
Medvedev lattice, we want to avoid the use of this theorem. Our main result of
this section will show that there are various natural embeddings of P(I) into M.
These embeddings are induced by so-called strong upwards antichains, where the
notion of a strong upwards antichain is the order-dual of the notion of an antichain
normally used in forcing.
Definition 4.1.1. Let A ⊆ ωω be downwards closed under Turing reducibility
and let (fi)i∈I ∈ AI . Then we say that (fi)i∈I is a strong upwards antichain in A
if for all i 6= j we have that fi ⊕ fj 6∈ A.
Henceforth we will mean by antichain a strong upwards antichain.
Example 4.1.2. We give some examples of countably infinite antichains.
(i) Take A to be the computable functions together with the functions of minimal
degree, and f0, f1 . . . any sequence of functions of distinct minimal Turing
degree.
(ii) Let f0, f1, . . . be pairwise incomparable under Turing reducibility and take
A to be the lower cone of {fi | i ∈ ω}.
The next theorem shows that each antichain induces an upper implicative
semilattice embedding of P(I) in a natural way.
Theorem 4.1.3. Let A ⊆ ωω be downwards closed under Turing reducibility,
let (fi)i∈I be an antichain in A, and let B = A∪ C ({fi | i ∈ I}). Then the map α
given by α(X) = A∪C ({fi | i ∈ X}) is an upper implicative semilattice embedding
of (P(I),⊇) into
[
B,A
]
M
.
Proof. For ease of notation, if X ⊆ I we will denote by C(X) the set
C ({fi | i ∈ X}).
We have:
α(X ∩ Y ) = A ∪ C(X ∩ Y ).
On the other hand, because α(X) and α(Y ) are upwards closed their join is just
intersection (see Skvortsova [107, Lemma 5]), and therefore:
α(X)⊕ α(Y ) ≡M A ∪ (C(X) ∩ C(Y )).
Clearly, α(X ∩ Y ) ⊆ A ∪ (C(X) ∩ C(Y )). Conversely, let g ∈ A ∪ (C(X) ∩ C(Y )).
If g 6∈ A then clearly g ∈ α(X ∩ Y ). So, assume g ∈ A. Let i ∈ X, j ∈ Y be such
that g ≥T fi and g ≥T fj . Then fi ⊕ fj ≤T g ∈ A so fi ⊕ fj ∈ A. Since (fi)i∈I is
an antichain in A this can only be the case if i = j, so we see that g ∈ α(X ∩ Y ).
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We also have, again by [107, Lemma 5]:
α(X)→[B,A]M α(Y )
≡M B ⊕ {g | ∀h ∈ α(X)(g ⊕ h ∈ α(Y ))}
≡M {g ∈ B | ∀i ∈ X∀h ≥T fi∃j ∈ Y (g ⊕ h ∈ A → g ⊕ h ≥T fj)}
= A ∪ {g ∈ C ({fi | i ∈ I})
| ∀i ∈ X∀h ≥T fi∃j ∈ Y (g ⊕ h ∈ A → g ⊕ h ≥T fj)}.
Fix any g ∈ A ∩ C ({fi | i ∈ I}) such that
(8) ∀i ∈ X∀h ≥T fi∃j ∈ Y (g ⊕ h ∈ A → g ⊕ h ≥T fj).
Then we know that there is some k ∈ I such that g ≥T fk. We claim: k 6∈ X or
k ∈ Y .
Namely, assume k ∈ X and k 6∈ Y . Then, by (8) (with h = g) there exists
some j ∈ Y such that g ≥T fj , and since k 6∈ Y we know that j 6= k. But then
fk ⊕ fj ≤T g ∈ A so fk ⊕ fj ∈ A, a contradiction with the fact that (fi)i∈I is an
antichain in A.
Conversely, if g ∈ A is such that g ≥T fk for some k 6∈ X or some k ∈ Y , then
(8) holds: namely, if k 6∈ X then we have for all i ∈ X that g ⊕ fi 6∈ A because
(fi)i∈I is an antichain in A, while if k ∈ Y we have that g ⊕ fi ≥T fk.
So, from this we see:
α(X)→[B,A]M α(Y ) ≡M A ∪ C((I \X) ∪ Y )
= α((I \X) ∪ Y )
= α(X →P(I) Y ). 
4.2. From embeddings of P(ω) to factors capturing IPC
In this section we will show how to construct a more natural factor of the
Medvedev lattice with IPC as its theory; that is, we will prove Theorem 4.0.1. For
this proof we will use several ideas from Skvortsova’s construction of a factor of
the Medvedev lattice which has IPC as its theory, given in Skvortsova [107]. We
combine these ideas with our own to get to the factor in Theorem 4.0.1. First, let
us discuss canonical subsets of a Brouwer algebra.
Definition 4.2.1. ([107, p. 134]) Let B be a Brouwer algebra and let C ⊆ B.
Then we call C canonical if:
(i) All elements in C are meet-irreducible,
(ii) C is closed under joins and implications (i.e. it is a sub-upper implicative
semilattice),
(iii) For all a ∈ C and b, c ∈ B we have a→ (b⊗ c) = (a→ b)⊗ (a→ c).
Proposition 4.2.2. ([107, Corollary to Lemma 6]) The set of Muchnik degrees
is a canonical subset of M.
Corollary 4.2.3. The range of α from Theorem 4.1.3 is canonical in
[α(I), α(∅)]M.
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Proof. The range of α consists of Muchnik degrees, so (i) holds by Proposition
4.2.2. Furthermore, α is an upper implicative semilattice embedding, and therefore
(ii) also holds. Finally, if C0, C1 ∈ [α(I), α(∅)]M and X ⊆ I, then we see, using
Proposition 4.2.2:
α(X)→[α(I),α(∅)]M (C0 ⊗ C1)
= (α(X)→M (C0 ⊗ C1))⊕ α(I)
≡M ((α(X)→M C0)⊗ (α(X)→M C1))⊕ α(I)
≡M (α(X)→[α(I),α(∅)]M C0)⊗ (α(X)→[α(I),α(∅)]M C1). 
Proposition 4.2.4. ([107, Lemma 2]) If C is a canonical set in a Brouwer
algebra B, then the smallest sub-Brouwer algebra of B containing C is {a1 ⊗ · · · ⊗
an | ai ∈ C }, and it is isomorphic to the free Brouwer algebra over the upper
implicative semilattice C through an isomorphism fixing C .
In particular, we see:
Corollary 4.2.5. If we let α be the embedding of (P(I),⊇) from Theorem
4.1.3, then {α(X1) ⊗ · · · ⊗ α(Xn) | Xi ∈ P(I)} is a sub-Brouwer algebra of
[α(I), α(∅)]M which is isomorphic to the free Brouwer algebra over the upper
implicative semilattice (P(I),⊇).
Proof. From Corollary 4.2.3 and Proposition 4.2.4. 
LetBn be the Brouwer algebra of the upwards closed subsets of (P({1, . . . , n})\
{∅},⊇) ordered under reverse inclusion ⊇, i.e. the elements of Bn are those
A ⊆ P({1, . . . , n}) \ ∅ such that if X ∈ A and Y ∈ P({1, . . . , n}) \ {∅} is such that
X ⊇ Y , then Y ∈ A. We can use Bn to capture IPC in the following way:
Proposition 4.2.6. ([107, the remark following Lemma 3])⋂
n>0
⋂
x∈Bn
Th(Bn/x) = IPC.
Proof. Let LM =
⋂
n>0 Th(Bn), the Medvedev logic of finite problems. Given
a set of formulas X, let X+ denote the set of positive (i.e. negation-free) formulas
in X. Then LM+ = IPC+, see Medvedev [80].
Now, let ϕ(x1, . . . , xm) be any formula. Let ϕ
′(x1, . . . , xm+1) be the formula
where xm+1 is a fresh variable and where ⊥ is replaced by x1 ∧ · · · ∧ xm+1, so
ϕ′ is negation-free. Then, if ϕ 6∈ IPC, we have ϕ′ 6∈ IPC+ (see Jankov [47]), so
there are n ∈ ω and x1, . . . , xm+1 ∈ Bn such that ϕ′(x1, . . . , xm+1) 6= 0. Let
x = x1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ xm+1, then ϕ 6∈ Th(Bn/x). 
Furthermore, it is easy to obtain these Bn as free distributive lattices over
upper implicative semilattices, as expressed by the following proposition.
Proposition 4.2.7. ([107, Lemma 3]) The Brouwer algebra Bn is isomorphic
to the free distributive lattice over the upper implicative semilattice (P({1, . . . , n}),⊇
).
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Corollary 4.2.8. Let I be a set of size n. If we let α be the embedding of
(P(I),⊇) from Theorem 4.1.3, then {α(X1)⊗ · · · ⊗ α(Xm) | m ∈ ω ∧ ∀i ≤ m(Xi ∈
P(I))} is a sub-Brouwer algebra of [α(I), α(∅)]M isomorphic to Bn.
Proof. From Corollary 4.2.5 and Proposition 4.2.7. 
The following lemma allows us to compare the theories of different intervals.
Lemma 4.2.9. ([107, Lemma 4]) In any Brouwer algebra B: if x, y, z ∈ B are
such that x⊕ z = y, then Th([0, z]B) ⊆ Th([x, y]B).
Proof. Let γ : [0, z]B → [x, y]B be given by γ(u) = x ⊕ u. This map is
well-defined, since if u ≤ z, then x⊕ u ≤ x⊕ z = y. Clearly γ preserves ⊕ and ⊗,
while for → we have:
γ(u→[0,z]B v) = (u→B v)⊕ x = ((u⊕ x)→B (v ⊕ x))⊕ x = γ(u)→[x,y]B γ(v).
Furthermore, γ is surjective, so the result now follows from Lemma 2.1.15. 
Before we get to the proof of Theorem 4.0.1 we need one theorem from
computability theory.
Theorem 4.2.10. Let A,E ∈ 2ω be such that E ≥T A′. Let B0, B1, · · · ∈ 2ω
be uniformly computable in E and such that A 6≥T Bi . Then there exists a set
D ≥T A such that D′ ≤T E and such that for all i ∈ ω we have D ⊕Bi ≥T E.
Proof. This follows from relativising Posner and Robinson [95, Theorem 3]
to A. 
Finally, we need an easy lemma on extending computably independent sets. For
ease of notation, let us assume that our pairing function is such that (A⊕B)[2i] =
A[i] and (A⊕B)[2i+1] = B[i].
Lemma 4.2.11. Let A be a computably independent set. Then there exists a
set B such that A⊕B is computably independent.
Proof. Our requirements are as follows:
R〈e,2n〉 : A[n] 6= {e}
⊕
i6=2n(A⊕B)[i]
R〈e,2n+1〉 : B[n] 6= {e}
⊕
i6=2n+1(A⊕B)[i] .
We build B by the finite extension method, i.e. we define strings σ0 ⊆ σ1 ⊆ . . .
and let B =
⋃
s∈ω σs. For ease of notation, define σ−1 = ∅. At stage s, we deal
with requirement Rs. There are two cases:
• s = 〈e, 2n〉: if there is a string σ extending σs−1 and an m ∈ ω such
that {e}
⊕
i6=2n(A⊕σ)[i](m)↓ 6= A[n](m), take σs to be the least such σ.
Otherwise, let σs = σs−1.
• s = 〈e, 2n + 1〉: if there exists a string σ extending σs−1 such that
{e}
⊕
i6=2n+1(A⊕σ)[i](|σs−1|+1)↓, take the least such σ and let σs be the least
string extending σs−1 which coincides with σ outside the nth column and
such that σ
[n]
s (|σs−1|+1) = 1−{e}
⊕
i6=2n+1(A⊕σ)[i](|σs−1|+1). Otherwise,
let σs = σs−1.
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We claim: B is as required. To this end, we verify the requirements:
• R〈e,2n〉: towards a contradiction, assume A[n] = {e}
⊕
i6=2n(A⊕B)[i] . Let
s = 〈e, 2n〉. By construction we then know for every σ extending σs−1 and
everym ∈ ω that, if {e}
⊕
i6=2n(A⊕σ)[i](m)↓, we have {e}
⊕
i6=2n(A⊕σ)[i](m) =
A[n](m). Furthermore, for every m ∈ ω there is a string σ extending σs−1
such that {e}
⊕
i6=2n(A⊕σ)[i](m)↓: just take a suitably long initial segment
of B. However, this means that
⊕
i6=nA
[i] ≥T A[n], which contradicts A
being computably independent.
• R〈e,2n+1〉: let s = 〈e, 2n+ 1〉. Then by our construction we know that, if
{e}
⊕
i6=2n+1(A⊕B)[i](|σs−1|+ 1) ↓, then it differs from B[n](|σs−1|+ 1). 
We can now prove Theorem 4.0.1.
Theorem 4.0.1. Let A be a computably independent set. Then
Th
(
M/
{
i_f | f ≥T A[i]
})
= IPC.
Proof. Fix n ∈ ω and x ∈ Bn. Let I = {1, . . . , n}. For now assume we have
some downwards closed A and an antichain D1, . . . , Dn ∈ A. Then Corollary 4.2.8
tells us that
{α(Y1)⊗ · · · ⊗ α(Ym) | m ∈ ω ∧ ∀i ≤ m(Yi ∈ P(I))}
is a subalgebra of
[
A ∪ C({D1, . . . , Dn}),A
]
M
isomorphic to Bn. So, there are
X1, . . . , Xk ⊆ I such that we can embed Bn/x as subalgebra of[
A ∪ C({D1, . . . , Dn}), α(X1)⊗ · · · ⊗ α(Xk)
]
M
.
If we would additionally have that
(9)
(
A ∪ C({D1, . . . , Dn})
)
⊕
{
i_f | f ≥T A[i]
}
≡M α(X1)⊗ · · · ⊗ α(Xk),
then Lemma 4.2.9 tells us that
Th
(
M/
{
i_f | f ≥T A[i]
})
⊆ Th
([
A ∪ C({D1, . . . , Dn}), α(X1)⊗ · · · ⊗ α(Xk)
]
M
)
⊆ Th(Bn/x).
Now, if we would be able to do this for arbitrary n ∈ ω and x ∈ Bn, then
Proposition 4.2.6 tells us that
Th
(
M/
{
i_f | f ≥T A[i]
})
= IPC,
so then we would be done.
Thus, it suffices to show that for all n ∈ ω and all X1, . . . , Xk ⊆ {1, . . . , n}
there exists a downwards closed A and an antichain D1, . . . , Dn ∈ A such that (9)
holds. Fix a B for A as in Lemma 4.2.11. Let A = ωω \ C({(A⊕B)′}). For every
1 ≤ i ≤ n fix a Di ≥T
(⊕
1≤j≤k,i∈Xj A
[j]
)
⊕B[i] such that D′i ≤T (A⊕B)′, such
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that Di ⊕A[j] ≥T (A⊕B)′ for every j ∈ {1 ≤ j ≤ k | i 6∈ Xj} ∪ {k + 1, k + 2, . . . }
and such that Di ⊕ B[j] ≥T (A ⊕ B)′ for every j 6= i, which exists by Theorem
4.2.10.
We claim: {D1, . . . , Dn} is an antichain in A. Clearly, D1, . . . , Dn ∈ A. Next,
let 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n. Then:
Di ⊕Dj ≥T B[i] ⊕Dj ≥T (A⊕B)′,
so Di ⊕Dj 6∈ A.
Thus, we need to show that (9) holds. First, let g ∈ A ∪ C({D1, . . . , Dn})
and let f ≥T A[j]. If j > k, then either g ≥T Di for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n and
f ⊕g ≥T A[j]⊕Di ≥T (A⊕B)′, or g ≥T (A⊕B)′ and then also f ⊕g ≥T (A⊕B)′.
In both cases we see that f ⊕ g ∈ A ⊆ α(X1).
Thus, we may assume that j ≤ k. We claim: f⊕g ∈ α(Xj). Indeed, if g ≥T Di
for some i ∈ Xj , then f ⊕ g ≥T Di and C(Di) ⊆ α(Xj), while if g ≥T Di for
some i 6∈ Xj , then f ⊕ g ≥T A[j] ⊕Di ≥T (A⊕B)′, and finally, if g ≥T (A⊕B)′
then clearly f ⊕ g ≥T (A⊕B)′. Thus, we see that f ⊕ g computes an element of
α(X1)⊗ · · · ⊗ α(Xk), and that this computation is in fact uniform in (j_f)⊕ g.
For the other direction, note that for fixed 1 ≤ i ≤ k we have that
C(Xi) ⊆ C({D1, . . . , Dn})
and also that
C(Xi) ⊆
{
f | f ≥T A[i]
}
because for every j ∈ Xi we have that Dj ≥T A[i]. 
4.3. Relativising the construction
We will next show that Skvortsova’s construction can be performed below
every mass problem B >M 0′. This also implies that for every B >M 0′ we have
that Th(M/B) ⊆ Jan, answering a question by Sorbi and Terwijn; see Corollary
4.3.3 below.
First, note that for every B > 0′ we can find a countable mass problem E ⊆ 0′
such that E 6≥M B (e.g. by taking one function for every n ∈ ω witnessing that
Φn(0
′) 6⊆ B). Then the set {A | ∀f ∈ E(A 6≥T f)} has measure 1 (by Sacks’s result
[101] that upper cones in the Turing degrees have measure 0, see e.g. Downey and
Hirschfeldt [25, Corollary 8.12.2]), so it contains a 1-random set; in particular it
contains a computably independent set A. In this section we will show that we can
use such sets to obtain factors with theory IPC below B, by relativising Theorem
4.0.1.
However, we first show that we can relativise Theorem 4.1.3 below B.
Theorem 4.3.1. Let B be a mass problem, let E be a mass problem such that
E 6≥M B and let D = E →M B. Let A ⊆ ωω be a mass problem which is downwards
closed under Turing reducibility such that E ⊆ A. Let (fi)i∈I be an antichain in
A. Then the map β given by β(X) = (A ∪ {g | ∃i ∈ X(g ≥T fi)}) ⊗ D is an
upper implicative semilattice embedding of (P(I),⊇) into [β(I), β(∅)]M with range
canonical in [β(I), β(∅)]M.
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Proof. First, note that E 6≥M D, since if E ≥M D then
E ≡M E ⊕ D = E ⊕ (E → B) ≥M B,
a contradiction.
As in the proof of Theorem 4.1.3, if X ⊆ I we will denote by C(X) the set
C({fi | i ∈ X}). By Theorem 4.1.3, the function α : P(I) → M/A given by
α(X) = A ∪ C(X) is an upper implicative semilattice embedding of (P(I),⊇) into[
A ∪ C(I),A
]
M
. Note that E ⊆ A and therefore E ⊆ α(X) for every X ⊆ I.
Now let β : P(I)→M/A be the function given by β(X) = α(X)⊗D. Then
the range of β is certainly contained in [β(I), β(∅)]M. We prove that β is in fact an
upper implicative semilattice embedding into [β(I), β(∅)]M with canonical range.
• β is injective: assume β(X) ≤M β(Y ). Thus, we have α(X) ⊗ D ≤M
α(Y )⊗D. In particular we have that α(X)⊗D ≤M α(Y ), say via Φn.
We claim: Φn(α(Y )) ⊆ 0_α(X).
Namely, assume towards a contradiction that Φn(f) ∈ 1_D for some
f ∈ α(Y ). Determine σ ⊆ f such that Φn(σ)(0) = 1. As noted above we
have that E ⊆ α(Y ), and since α(Y ) is Muchnik we therefore see that
σ_E ⊆ α(Y ). However, then we can reduce E to 1_D by sending g ∈ E
to Φn(σ
_g), and therefore E ≥M D, a contradiction.
Thus, α(X) ≤M α(Y ), and since α is an upper implicative semilattice
embedding this tells us that X ⊇ Y .
• β preserves joins: we have
β(X ⊕ Y ) = α(X ⊕ Y )⊗D ≡M (α(X)⊕ α(Y ))⊗D
≡M (α(X)⊗D)⊕ (α(Y )⊗D) = β(X)⊕ β(Y ).
• β preserves implications: we have
β(X)→[β(I),β(∅)]M β(Y )
= ((α(X)⊗D)→M (α(Y )⊗D))⊕ β(I)
≡M ((α(X)→M (α(Y )⊗D))⊕ (D →M (α(Y )⊗D)))⊕ β(I)
≡M ((α(X)→M (α(Y )⊗D))⊕ ωω)⊕ β(I)
≡M (α(X)→M (α(Y )⊗D))⊕ β(I).
Next, using Proposition 4.2.2 we see:
≡M ((α(X)→M α(Y ))⊗ (α(X)→M D))⊕ β(I)
= ((α(X)→M α(Y ))⊗ (α(X)→M (E →M B)))⊕ β(I)
≡M ((α(X)→M α(Y ))⊗ ((α(X)⊕ E)→M B))⊕ β(I).
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As noted above, we have E ⊆ α(X), and therefore:
≡M ((α(X)→M α(Y ))⊗ (E →M B))⊕ β(I)
≡M ((α(X)→M α(Y ))⊗D)⊕ (α(I)⊗D).
≡M ((α(X)→M α(Y ))⊕ α(I))⊗D
=
(
α(X)→[α(I),α(∅)]M α(Y )
)⊗D
= α(X →P(I) Y )⊗D
= β(X →P(I) Y ).
• β has canonical range:
(i) LetX ⊆ I, we show that that β(X) is meet-irreducible in [β(I), β(∅)]M.
Indeed, let C0, C1 ≤M β(∅) be such that C0⊗C1 ≤M α(X)⊗D. Then
C0 ⊗ C1 ≤M α(X), and since α(X) is Muchnik, we see from Pro-
position 4.2.2 that C0 ≤M α(X) or C1 ≤M α(X). Since C0, C1 ≤M
β(∅) ≤M D this shows that in fact C0 ≤M β(X) or C1 ≤M β(X).
(ii) The range of β is clearly closed under implication and joins.
(iii) Let X ⊆ ω and let C0, C1 ∈ [β(I), β(∅)]M. Then we have:
β(X)→[β(I),β(∅)]M (C0 ⊗ C1)
= (α(X)⊗D)→[β(I),β(∅)]M (C0 ⊗ C1)
= ((α(X)⊗D)→M (C0 ⊗ C1))⊕ β(I)
≡M (α(X)→M (C0 ⊗ C1))⊕ β(I),
because C0 and C1 are below β(∅) and hence below D. Since α(X)
is Muchnik, we now see from Proposition 4.2.2:
= ((α(X)→M C0)⊗ (α(X)→M C1))⊕ β(I)
≡M (β(X)→[β(I),β(∅)]M C0)⊗ (β(X)→[β(I),β(∅)]M C1). 
We can now prove there is a principal factor of the Medvedev lattice with
theory IPC below a given B > 0′.
Theorem 4.3.2. Let B be a mass problem, let E be a countable mass problem
such that E 6≥M B and let D = E → B (so, D ≤M B). Let A be a computably
independent set such that for all f ∈ E we have A 6≥T f . Then
Th
(
M/
({
i_g | g ≥T A[i] or g ∈ C(E)
}
⊗D
))
= IPC.
Proof. The proof largely mirrors that of Theorem 4.0.1. Let E = {f0, f1, . . . },
let Ei be the graph of fi and let U be such that U
[0] = A and U [i+1] = Ei. Then
A,E0, E1, . . . is uniformly computable in U .
We need to make a slight modification to Lemma 4.2.11: we not only want A⊕B
to be computably independent, but we also need to make sure that A⊕B 6≥T f
for every f ∈ E . This modification is straightforward and we omit the details. The
requirements on Di are slightly different: we now want for every 1 ≤ i ≤ k that
Di ≥T
⊕
1≤j≤k,i∈Xj A
[j] ⊕B[i], that D′i ≤T (U ⊕B)′, that Di ⊕A[j] ≥T (U ⊕B)′
for every j ∈ {1 ≤ j ≤ k | i 6∈ Xj} ∪ {k+ 1, k+ 2, . . . }, that Di⊕B[j] ≥T (U ⊕B)′
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for every j 6= i and that Di ⊕Ej ≥T (U ⊕B)′ for all j ∈ ω; this is still possible by
Theorem 4.2.10. We change the definition of A into A = ωω \ C({(U ⊕B)′} ∪ E).
Then we still have Di ∈ A, because Di ≥T fj would imply that Di ≥T Di⊕Ej ≥T
(U ⊕ B)′, a contradiction. Finally, replace α with the β of Theorem 4.3.1 and
change (9) into((
A ∪ C({D1, . . . , Dn})
)
⊗D
)
⊕
({
i_g | g ≥T A[i] or g ∈ C(E)
}
⊗D
)
≡M β(X1)⊗ · · · ⊗ β(Xk).
Then the whole proof of Theorem 4.0.1 goes through. 
In particular, this allows us to give a positive answer to the question mentioned
at the beginning of this section.
Corollary 4.3.3. Let B >M 0′. Then Th(M/B) ⊆ Jan.
Proof. Since an intermediate logic is contained in Jan if and only if its positive
fragment coincides with IPC (see Jankov [46]), we need to show that, denoting the
positive fragment by +, we have that Th+(M/B) ⊆ IPC+. By Theorem 4.3.2 there
exists a C ≤M B such that Th(M/C) = IPC. Then M/C is a subalgebra of M/B,
except for the fact that the top element is not necessarily preserved. However, it
can be directly verified that for any two Brouwer algebras C and B for which C is
a (⊕,⊗,→, 0)-subalgebra of B we have for all positive formulas ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) and
all elements b1, . . . , bn ∈ B that the interpretation of ϕ at b1, . . . , bn is the same in
both C and B. Since we can refute every positive formula ϕ which is not in IPC+
in M/C, we can therefore refute it in M/B using the same valuation. In other
words, Th+(M/B) ⊆ Th+(M/C) = IPC+, as desired. 
CHAPTER 5
First-Order Logic in the Medvedev Lattice
In this chapter we will discuss an extension of the Medvedev lattice to first-
order logic, using the notion of a first-order hyperdoctrine from categorical logic to
define what we will call the hyperdoctrine of mass problems.
We will give a short overview of the necessary definitions and properties in
section 5.1. After that, in section 5.2 we will introduce the degrees of ω-mass
problems, which combine the idea of Medvedev that ‘solving’ should be interpreted
as ‘computing’ with the idea of Kolmogorov that ‘solving’ should be uniform in
the variables. Using these degrees of ω-mass problems, we will introduce the
hyperdoctrine of mass problems in section 5.3.
Next, in section 5.4 we study the intermediate logic which this hyperdoctrine
of mass problems gives us, and we start looking at subintervals of it to try and
obtain analogous results to Skvortsova’s [106] remarkable result that intuitionistic
propositional logic can be obtained from a factor of the Medvedev lattice. In
section 5.5 we show that even in these intervals we cannot get every intuitionistic
theory, by showing that there is an analogue of Tennenbaum’s theorem [116] that
every computable model of Peano arithmetic is the standard model. Finally, in
section 5.6 we prove a partial positive result on which theories can be obtained
in subintervals of the hyperdoctrine of mass problems, through a characterisation
using Kripke models.
This chapter is based on Kuyper [63].
5.1. Categorical semantics for IQC
In this section we will discuss the notion of first-order hyperdoctrine, as for-
mulated by Pitts [92], based on the important notion of hyperdoctrine introduced
by Lawvere [72]. These first-order hyperdoctrines can be used to give sound and
complete categorical semantics for IQC. Our notion of first-order logic in the Med-
vedev lattice will be based on this, so we will discuss the basic definitions and the
basic properties before we proceed with our construction. We use the formulation
from Pitts [94] (but we use Brouwer algebras instead of Heyting algebras, because
the Medvedev lattice is normally presented as a Brouwer algebra).
Let us first give the definition of a first-order hyperdoctrine. After that we
will discuss an easy example and discuss how first-order hyperdoctrines interpret
first-order intuitionistic logic. We will not discuss all details and the full motivation
behind this definition, instead referring the reader to the works by Pitts [92, 94].
However, we will discuss some of the motivation behind this definition in Remark
5.1.9 below.
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Definition 5.1.1. ([94, Definition 2.1]) Let C be a category such that for
every object X ∈ C and every n ∈ ω, the n-fold product Xn of X exists. A
first-order hyperdoctrine P over C is a contravariant functor P : Cop → Poset
from C into the category Poset of partially ordered sets and order homomorphisms,
satisfying:
(i) For each object X ∈ C, the partially ordered set P(X) is a Brouwer algebra;
(ii) For each morphism f : X → Y in C, the order homomorphism P(f) : P(Y )→
P(X) is a homomorphism of Brouwer algebras;
(iii) For each diagonal morphism ∆X : X → X ×X in C (i.e. a morphism such
that pi1 ◦∆X = pi2 ◦∆X = 1X), the upper adjoint to P(∆X) at the bottom
element 0 ∈ P(X) exists. In other words, there is an element =X ∈ P(X×X)
such that for all A ∈ P(X ×X) we have
P(∆X)(A) ≤ 0 if and only if A ≤ =X .
(iv) For each product projection pi : Γ×X → Γ in C, the order homomorphism
P(pi) : P(Γ)→ P(Γ×X) has both an upper adjoint (∃x)Γ and a lower adjoint
(∀x)Γ, i.e.:
P(pi)(B) ≤ A if and only if B ≤ (∃x)Γ(A)
A ≤ P(pi)(B) if and only if (∀x)Γ(A) ≤ B.
Moreover, these adjoints are natural in Γ, i.e. given s : Γ→ Γ′ in C we have
P (Γ′ ×X)P(s×1X)
//
(∃x)Γ′

P (Γ×X)
(∃x)Γ

P (Γ′) P(s)
// P (Γ)
P (Γ′ ×X)P(s×1X)
//
(∀x)Γ′

P (Γ×X)
(∀x)Γ

P (Γ′) P(s)
// P (Γ).
This condition is called the Beck-Chevalley condition.
We will also denote P (f) by f∗.
Remark 5.1.2. We emphasise that the adjoints (∃x)Γ and (∀x)Γ only need
to be order homomorphisms, and that they do no need to preserve the lattice
structure. This should not come as a surprise: after all, the universal quantifier does
not distribute over logical disjunction, and neither does the existential quantifier
distribute over conjunction.
Example 5.1.3. ([94, Example 2.2]) Let B be a complete Brouwer algebra.
Then B induces a first-order hyperdoctrine P over the category Set of sets and
functions as follows. We let P(X) be BX , which is again a Brouwer algebra under
coordinate-wise operations. Furthermore, for each function f : X → Y we let P(f)
be the function which sends (By)y∈Y to the set given by Ax = Bf(x). The equality
predicates =X are given by
=X(x, z) =
{
0 if x = z
1 otherwise.
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For the adjoints we use the fact that B is complete: given B ∈ P(Γ×X) we let
((∀x)Γ(B))γ =
⊕
x∈X
B(γ,x)
and
((∃x)Γ(B))γ =
⊗
x∈X
B(γ,x).
Then P is directly verified to be a first-order hyperdoctrine.
Remark 5.1.4. We obtain a special case of Example 5.1.3 when we take B to
be the Muchnik lattice. In that case we obtain a fragment of the first-order part of
the structure recently studied by Basu and Simpson [7], who independently studied
an interpretation of higher-order intuitionistic logic based on the Muchnik lattice.
Thus, if we have a sequence of problems B0,B1, . . . , we have
(∀x)∅((Bi)i∈ω) =
⊕
i∈ω
Bi = {f ∈ ωω | ∀i ∈ ω∃g ∈ Bi(f ≥T g)} ,
in other words a solution of the problem ∀x(B(x)) computes a solution of every Bi
but does so non-uniformly.
If, as in [7], we take each Bi to be the canonical representative of its Muchnik
degree, i.e. we take Bi to be upwards closed under Turing reducibility, then we
have that
(∀x)∅((Bi)i∈ω) =
⊕
i∈ω
Bi =
⋂
i∈ω
Bi,
i.e. a solution of the problem ∀x(B(x)) is a single solution that solves every Bi.
Thus, depending on the view one has on the Muchnik lattice, either the solution is
allowed to depend on x but non-uniformly, or it is not allowed to depend on x at
all. So, Basu and Simpson’s approach does not follow Kolmogorov’s philosophy
that the interpretation of the universal quantifier should depend uniformly on the
variable. On the other hand, our approach will follow this philosophy.
Of course, an important advantage of Basu and Simpson’s approach is that
it is suitable for higher-order logic, while we can only deal with first-order logic.
Another important difference between our work and theirs is that we start from
the Medvedev lattice, while they take the Muchnik lattice as their starting point.
Next, let us discuss how first-order intuitionistic logic can be interpreted in
first-order hyperdoctrines. Most of the literature on this subject deals with multi-
sorted first-order logic; however, to keep the notation easy and because we do not
intend to discuss multi-sorted logic in the Medvedev case, we will give the definition
only for single-sorted first-order logic.
Definition 5.1.5. (Pitts [92, p. B2]) Let P be a first-order hyperdoctrine over
C and let Σ be a first-order language. Then a structure M for Σ in P consists of:
(i) an object M ∈ C (the universe),
(ii) a morphism JfKM : Mn →M in C for every n-ary function symbol f in Σ,
(iii) an element JRKM ∈ P(Mn) for every n-ary relation in Σ.
Case (iii) is probably the most interesting part of this definition, since it says
that elements of P(Mn) should be seen as generalised n-ary predicates on M .
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Definition 5.1.6. ([92, Table 6.4]) Let t be a first-order term in a language
Σ and let M be a structure in a first-order hyperdoctrine P. Let ~x = (x1, . . . , xn)
be a context (i.e. an ordered list of distinct variables) containing all free variables
in t. Then we define the interpretation Jt(~x)KM ∈Mn →M inductively as follows:
(i) If t is a variable xi, then Jt(~x)KM is the projection of Mn to the ith coordinate.
(ii) If t is f(s1, . . . , sm) for f in Σ, then Jt(~x)KM is JfKM◦(Js1(~x)KM, . . . , Jsm(~x)KM).
Thus, we identify a term with the function mapping a valuation of the variables
occurring in the term to the value of the term when evaluated at that valuation.
Definition 5.1.7. ([92, Table 8.2]) Let ϕ be a first-order formula in a language
Σ and letM be a structure in a first-order hyperdoctrine P . Let ~x = (x1, . . . , xn) be
a context (i.e. an ordered list of distinct variables) containing all free variables in ϕ.
Then we define the interpretation Jϕ(~x)KM ∈ P(Mn) in the context Γ inductively
as follows:
(i) If ϕ is R(t1, . . . , tm), then Jϕ(~x)KM is (Jt1(~x)KM, . . . , Jtm(~x)KM)∗(JRKM).
(ii) If ϕ is t1 = t2, then Jϕ(~x)KM is defined as (Jt1(~x)KM, Jt2(~x)KM)∗(=M ).
(iii) If ϕ is >, then Jϕ(~x)KM is defined as 0 ∈ P(Mn); i.e. the smallest element of
P(Mn).
(iv) If ϕ is ⊥, then Jϕ(~x)KM is defined as 1 ∈ P(Mn); i.e. the largest element of
P(Mn).
(v) If ϕ is ψ ∨ θ, then Jϕ(~x)KM is defined as Jψ(~x)KM ⊗ Jθ(~x)KM.
(vi) If ϕ is ψ ∧ θ, then Jϕ(~x)KM is defined as Jψ(~x)KM ⊕ Jθ(~x)KM.
(vii) If ϕ is ψ → θ, then Jϕ(~x)KM is defined as Jψ(~x)KM → Jθ(~x)KM.
(viii) If ϕ is ∃y.ψ, then Jϕ(~x)KM is defined as (∃y)Mn(Jψ(~x, y)KM).
(ix) If ϕ is ∀y.ψ, then Jϕ(~x)KM is defined as (∀y)Mn(Jψ(~x, y)KM).
Definition 5.1.8. ([92, Definition 8.4]) Let ϕ be a formula in a language Σ and
a context ~x = (x1, . . . , xn), and let M be a structure in a first-order hyperdoctrine
P. Then we say that ϕ(~x) is satisfied if Jϕ(~x)KM = 0 in P(Mn). We let the
theory of M be the set of sentences which are satisfied (in the empty context),
and we denote this by Th(M). Given a language Σ, we let the theory of P be
the intersection of the theories of all structures M for Σ in P, and we denote this
theory by Th(P).
Remark 5.1.9. Let us make some remarks on the definitions given above.
• As mentioned above, we identify terms t(~x) with functions Jt(~x)KM, and
m-ary predicates R(y1, . . . , ym) are elements of P(Mn). Since we required
our category C to contain n-fold products, if we have terms t1, . . . , tm,
then (Jt1(~x)KM, . . . , Jtm(~x)KM) : Mn →Mm, so
(Jt1(~x)KM, . . . , Jtm(~x)KM)∗ : P(Mm)→ P(Mn).
This should be seen as the substitution of t1(~x), . . . , tm(~x) for y1, . . . , ym,
which explains case (i) and (ii).
• Quantifiers are interpreted as adjoints, which is an idea due to Lawvere.
For example, for the universal quantifier this says thatJψKM ≥ J∀xϕ(x)KM ⇔ Jψ(x)KM ≥ Jϕ(x)KM,
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where we assume x does not occur freely in ψ. Reading ≥ as `, the two
implications are essentially the introduction and elimination rules for the
universal quantifier.
• The Beck-Chevalley condition is necessary to ensure that substitutions
commute with the quantifiers (modulo restrictions on bound variables).
Let us introduce a notational convention: when the structure is clear from
the context, we will omit the subscript M in J−KM. Having finished giving the
definition of first-order hyperdoctrines, let us just mention that they are sound and
complete for intuitionistic first-order logic IQC.
Proposition 5.1.10. ([92, Proposition 8.8]) Structures in first-order hyper-
doctrines are sound for IQC, i.e. the deductive closure of Th(M) in IQC is equal
to Th(M).
Theorem 5.1.11. (Pitts [93, Corollary 5.31]) The class of first-order hyper-
doctrines is complete for IQC.
5.2. The degrees of ω-mass problems
In this section, we will introduce an extension of the Medvedev lattice, which
we will need to define our first-order hyperdoctrine based on the Medvedev lattice.
As mentioned in the introduction, Kolmogorov mentioned in his paper that solving
the problem ∀xϕ(x) is the same as solving the problem ϕ(x) for all x, uniformly in
x. We formalise this in the spirit of Medvedev and Muchnik in the following way.
Definition 5.2.1. An ω-mass problem is an element (Ai)i∈ω ∈ (P(ωω))ω.
Given two ω-mass problems (Ai)i∈ω, (Bi)i∈ω, we say that (Ai)i∈ω reduces to (Bi)i∈ω
(notation: (Ai)i∈ω ≤Mω (Bi)i∈ω) if there exists a partial Turing functional Φ such
that for every n ∈ ω we have Φ(n_Bn) ⊆ An. If both (Ai)i∈ω ≤Mω (Bi)i∈ω and
(Bi)i∈ω ≤Mω (Ai)i∈ω we say that (Ai)i∈ω and (Bi)i∈ω are equivalent (notation:
(Ai)i∈ω ≡Mω (Bi)i∈ω). We call the equivalence classes of this equivalence the
degrees of ω-mass problems and denote the set of the degrees of ω-mass problems
by Mω.
Definition 5.2.2. Let (Ai)i∈ω, (Bi)i∈ω be ω-mass problems. We say that
(Ai)i∈ω weakly reduces to (Bi)i∈ω (notation: (Ai)i∈ω ≤Mwω (Bi)i∈ω) if for every
sequence (gi)i∈ω with gi ∈ Bi there exists a partial Turing functional Φ such
that for every n ∈ ω we have Φ(n_gn) ∈ An. If both (Ai)i∈ω ≤Mwω (Bi)i∈ω and
(Bi)i∈ω ≤Mwω (Ai)i∈ω we say that (Ai)i∈ω and (Bi)i∈ω are weakly equivalent (nota-
tion: (Ai)i∈ω ≡Mwω (Bi)i∈ω). We call the equivalence classes of weak equivalence
the weak degrees of ω-mass problems and denote the set of the weak degrees of
ω-mass problems by Mwω.
The next proposition tells us thatMω is a Brouwer algebra, like the Medvedev
lattice.
Proposition 5.2.3. The degrees of ω-mass problems form a Brouwer algebra.
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Proof. We claim that Mω is a Brouwer algebra under the component-wise
operations on M, i.e. the operations induced by:
((Ai)i∈ω ⊕ (Bi)i∈ω)n = {f ⊕ g | f ∈ An, g ∈ Bn}
((Ai)i∈ω ⊗ (Bi)i∈ω)n = 0_An ∪ 1_Bn
((Ai)i∈ω → (Bi)i∈ω)n = {e_f | ∀g ∈ An(Φe(g ⊕ f) ∈ Bn).
The proof of this is mostly analogous to the proof for the Medvedev lattice, so we will
only give the proof for the implication. Let us first show that (Ai)i∈ω⊕ ((Ai)i∈ω →
(Bi)i∈ω) ≥Mω (Bi)i∈ω. Define a Turing functional Φ by
Φ(n_(g ⊕ (e_f))) = Φe(g ⊕ f).
Then Φ witnesses that (Ai)i∈ω ⊕ ((Ai)i∈ω → (Bi)i∈ω) ≥Mω (Bi)i∈ω.
Conversely, let (Ci)i∈ω be such that (Ai)i∈ω ⊕ (Ci)i∈ω ≥Mω (Bi)i∈ω. Let e ∈ ω
be such that Φe witnesses this fact. Let ϕ be a computable function sending n
to an index for the functional mapping h to Φe(n
_h). Let Ψ be the functional
sending n_f to ϕ(n)_f . Then (Ci)i∈ω ≥Mω (Ai)i∈ω → (Bi)i∈ω through Ψ. 
However, it turns out that this fails for Mwω: it is still a distributive lattice,
but it is not a Brouwer algebra.
Proposition 5.2.4. The weak degrees of ω-mass problems form a distributive
lattice, but not a Brouwer algebra. In particular, they do not form a complete
lattice.
Proof. It is easy to see that Mwω is a distributive lattice under the same
operations as Mω. Towards a contradiction, assume Mwω is a Brouwer algebra,
under some implication →. Let f, g ∈ ωω be two functions of incomparable Turing
degree. Let (Ai)i∈ω be given by Ai = {h | h ≡T f} and let (Bi)i∈ω be given by
Bi = {f ⊕ g}. For every j ∈ ω, let (Cji )i∈ω be given by Cji = {g} for i = j, and
Cji = {f ⊕ g} otherwise.
Then, for every j ∈ ω we have (Ai)i∈ω ⊕ (Cji )i∈ω ≥Mwω (Bi)i∈ω: given a
sequence (hi)i∈ω with hi ∈ Ai, let e be such that Φe(hj) = f . Now let Φ(n_(s⊕ t))
be t for n 6= j and Φe(s)⊕ t otherwise. This Φ is the required witness.
So, since we assumed → makes Mwω into a Brouwer algebra, we know that
every ((Ai)i∈ω → (Bi)i∈ω) ≤Mwω (Cji )i∈ω for every j ∈ ω. Thus, for every j ∈ ω
there is some gj ≤T g in ((Ai)i∈ω → (Bi)i∈ω)j . For every j ∈ ω, fix a σj ∈ ω<ω
such that there exists an n ∈ ω with Φj(j_(σj⊕gj))(n)↓ 6= (f ⊕g)(n), which exists
because g, and therefore gj ≤T g, does not compute f . Now let fj = σj_f . Then
we have (fi)i∈ω ∈ (Ai)i∈ω and (gi)i∈ω ∈ (Ai)i∈ω → (Bi)i∈ω, but for every j ∈ ω we
have that Φj(j
_(fj⊕gj)) 6∈ Bj . Thus (Ai)i∈ω⊕((Ai)i∈ω → (Bi)i∈ω) 6≥Mwω (Bi)i∈ω,
a contradiction. 
Finally, let us show that Mω and Mwω are extensions of the Medvedev and
Muchnik lattices, in the sense that the latter embed into the first. Furthermore, we
show that the countable products of M and Mw are quotients of Mω and Mwω.
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Proposition 5.2.5. There is a Brouwer algebra embedding of M into Mω
and a lattice embedding of Mw into Mwω, both given by
α(A)n = A.
Proof. Direct, using the fact that the diagonal of Mω, i.e. {(Ai)i∈ω ∈Mω |
∀n,m(An = Am)}, is isomorphic to the diagonal of Mω, which is directly seen to
be isomorphic to M. The same holds for Mwω and Mw. 
Proposition 5.2.6. There is a Brouwer algebra homomorphism of Mω onto
Mω and a lattice homomorphism of Mwω onto Mwω.
Proof. Follows directly from the fact that all operations on Mω and Mwω
are component-wise, and the fact that the reducibilities on Mω and Mwω are
stronger than those on Mω respectively Mωw. 
5.3. The hyperdoctrine of mass problems
In this section, we will introduce our first-order hyperdoctrine based on M
and Mω, which we will call the hyperdoctrine of mass problems PM. We will take
the category C to be the category with objects {1}, {1, 2}, . . . and ω, and with
functions the computable functions between them. We will define PM(ω) to be
Mω. Now, let us look at how to define PM(α) = α∗ for functions α : ω → ω.
Definition 5.3.1. Let α : ω → ω. Then α∗ : P(ωω)ω → P(ωω)ω is the
function given by
(α∗((Ai)i∈ω))n = Aα(n).
Proposition 5.3.2. Let α : ω → ω be a computable function. Then α∗ induces
a well-defined function on Mω by sending (Ai)i∈ω to α∗((Ai)i∈ω), which is in fact
a Brouwer algebra homomorphism.
Proof. We need to show that if (Ai)i∈ω ≤Mω (Bi)i∈ω, then α∗((Ai)i∈ω) ≤Mω
α∗((Bi)i∈ω). Let Φ witness that A ≤Mω B. Let Ψ be the partial Turing functional
sending n_f to Φ(α(n)_f). Then Ψ witnesses that α∗((Ai)i∈ω) ≤Mω α∗((Bi)i∈ω).
That α∗ is a Brouwer algebra homomorphism follows easily from the fact that the
operations on Mω are component-wise. 
Next, we will show that for every computable α we have that α∗ has both
upper and lower adjoints, which will certainly suffice to satisfy condition (iv) of
Definition 5.1.1.
Proposition 5.3.3. Let α : ω → ω be a computable function. Then α∗ :
Mω →Mω has an upper adjoint ∃α and a lower adjoint ∀α.
Proof. Let us first consider the upper adjoint. We define:
(∃α((Ai)i∈ω))m = {n_f | f ∈ An ∧ α(n) = m}.
Then ∃α is a well-defined function on Mω. Namely, assume (Ai)i∈ω ≤Mω (Bi)i∈ω,
say through Φ. Let Ψ be the partial functional sending m_n_h to n_Φ(n_h),
then Ψ witnesses that ∃α((Ai)i∈ω) ≤Mω ∃α((Bi)i∈ω).
We claim: ∃α is an upper adjoint for α∗, i.e. α∗((Ai)i∈ω) ≤Mω (Bi)i∈ω if
and only if (Ai)i∈ω ≤Mω ∃α((Bi)i∈ω). First, let us assume that α∗((Ai)i∈ω) ≤Mω
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(Bi)i∈ω; say through Φ. Let Ψ be the functional sending j_i_h to Φ(i_h). We claim:
for every m ∈ ω, Ψ(m_(∃α((Bi)i∈ω))m) ⊆ Am. Indeed, let n_f ∈ (∃α((Bi)i∈ω))m.
Then α(n) = m and f ∈ Bn. Thus, per choice of Φ we know that
Ψ(m_n_f) = Φ(n_f) ∈ α∗((Ai)i∈ω)n = Aα(n) = Am.
Conversely, assume (Ai)i∈ω ≤Mω ∃α((Bi)i∈ω); say through Ψ. Let Φ be the
functional sending i_h to Ψ(α(i)_i_h). Let n ∈ ω. We claim:
Φ(n_Bn) ⊆ (α∗((Ai)i∈ω))n = Aα(n).
Indeed, let f ∈ Bn. Then n_f ∈ (∃α((Bi)i∈ω))α(n). Thus:
Φ(n_f) = Ψ(α(n)_n_f) ∈ Aα(n).
Next, we consider the lower adjoint. We define:
(∀α((Ai)i∈ω))m =
{⊕
n∈ω
fn | ∀n((α(n) = m ∧ fn ∈ An) ∨ (α(n) 6= m ∧ fn = 0))
}
.
Then ∀α is a well-defined function onMω, as can be proven in a similar way as for
∃α. We claim that it is a lower adjoint for α∗, i.e. (Ai)i∈ω ≤Mω α∗((Bi)i∈ω) if and
only if ∀α((Ai)i∈ω) ≤Mω (Bi)i∈ω.
First, assume (Ai)i∈ω ≤Mω α∗((Bi)i∈ω), say through Φ. Let m ∈ ω and let
g ∈ Bm. Now let
f =
⊕
n∈ω
fn
where fn = Φ(n
_g) if α(n) = m, and fn = 0 otherwise. Note that, if α(n) = m,
then g ∈ Bm = (α∗((Bi)i∈ω))n, so Φ(n_g) ∈ An. Thus, f ∈ (∀α(ha))m. Note that
this reduction is uniform in g and m, so ∀α((Ai)i∈ω) ≤Mω (Bi)i∈ω.
Conversely, assume ∀α((Ai)i∈ω) ≤Mω (Bi)i∈ω, say through Ψ. Let n ∈ ω and
let g ∈ α∗((Bi)i∈ω)n = Bα(n). Then Ψ(α(n)_g) ∈ (∀α((Ai)i∈ω))α(n). Since clearly
α(n) = α(n), it follows that Ψ(α(n)_g)[n] ∈ An. Again this reduction is uniform
in n and g, so (Ai)i∈ω ≤Mω α∗((Bi)i∈ω). 
Remark 5.3.4. Note that, if α : ω → ω is is the projection to the first
coordinate (i.e. the function mapping 〈n,m〉 to n), then
∀α((Ai)i∈ω) ≡Mω
({⊕
m∈ω
fm | fm ∈ A〈i,m〉
})
i∈ω
.
We will tacitly identify these two. Similarly,
∃α((Ai)i∈ω) ≡Mω
({
m_fm | fm ∈ A〈i,m〉
})
i∈ω .
We now generalise this notion to include all the functions in our category C.
We will define PM({1, . . . , n}) to be the n-fold product Mn.
Definition 5.3.5. Let X,Y ∈ {{1}, {1, 2}, . . . } ∪ {ω}. Let α : X → Y be
computable. Then α∗ : PM(Y )→ PM(X) is the function given by
α∗((A))i = Aα(i).
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Proposition 5.3.6. The functions from Definition 5.3.5 are well-defined
Brouwer algebra homomorphisms.
Proof. As in Proposition 5.3.2. 
Proposition 5.3.7. Let X,Y ∈ {{1}, {1, 2}, . . . } ∪ {ω} and let α : X → Y be
computable.Then α∗ has both upper and lower adjoints.
Proof. As in Proposition 5.3.3. 
Thus, everything we have done above leads us to the following definition.
Definition 5.3.8. Let C be the category with objects {1}, {1, 2}, . . . and ω
and functions the computable functions between them. Let PM be the functor
sending a finite set {1, . . . , n} to Mn, ω to Mω and α to α∗. We call this the
hyperdoctrine of mass problems.
We now verify that the remaining conditions of Definition 5.1.1 hold for PM.
Theorem 5.3.9. The functor PM from Definition 5.3.8 is a first-order hyper-
doctrine.
Proof. First note that C is closed under all n-fold products, because ωn is
isomorphic to ω through some fixed computable function 〈a1, . . . , an〉, and similarly
{1, . . . ,m}n is isomorphic to {1, . . . ,mn}.
We now verify the conditions from Definition 5.1.1. Condition (i) follows from
Proposition 5.2.3. Condition (ii) follows from Proposition 5.3.6. For condition (iii),
use the fact that diagonal morphisms are computable together with Proposition
5.3.7. From the same theorem we know that the projections have lower and upper
adjoints. Thus, we only need to verify that the Beck-Chevalley condition holds for
them to verify condition (iv). Consider the diagram
PM(Γ′ ×X)
(s×1X)∗
//
(∃x)Γ′

PM(Γ×X)
(∃x)Γ

PM(Γ′)
s∗
// PM(Γ),
we need to show that it commutes.
We have:
((∃x)Γ((s× 1X)∗((Ai)i∈Γ′×X)))n = {m_〈n,m〉_f | f ∈ A〈s(n),m〉}
and
(s∗((∃x)Γ′((Ai)i∈Γ′×X)))n = {〈s(n),m〉_m_f | f ∈ A〈s(n),m〉}
by Remark 5.3.4. Then
s∗((∃x)Γ′((Ai)i∈Γ×X)) ≤Mω ((∃x)Γ((s× 1X)∗((Ai)i∈Γ×X)))
through the functional sending i_k_〈n,m〉_f to 〈s(n),m〉_m_f , and the opposite
inequality holds through the functional sending n_〈l,m〉_k_f to m_〈n,m〉_f .
Next, consider
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PM(Γ′ ×X)
(s×1X)∗
//
(∀x)Γ′

PM(Γ×X)
(∀x)Γ

PM(Γ′)
s∗
// PM(Γ),
we need to show that this also commutes.
Again by Remark 5.3.4 we have:
((∀x)Γ((s× 1X)∗((Ai)i∈Γ′×X)))n =
{⊕
m∈ω
fm | fm ∈ A〈s(n),m〉
}
= (s∗((∀x)Γ′((Ai)i∈Γ′×X)))n,
as desired. 
For future reference, we state the following lemma which directly follows from
the formula for the upper adjoint given in the proof of Proposition 5.3.3.
Lemma 5.3.10. For any X, the equality =X in PM is given by:
(=X)〈n,m〉 =
{
ωω if n = m
∅ otherwise.
Proof. From the formula given for the upper adjoint in the proof of Propos-
ition 5.3.3, and the definition of =X in a first-order hyperdoctrine in Definition
5.1.1. 
Finally, let us give an easy example of a structure in PM. More examples will
follow in the next sections.
Example 5.3.11. Consider the language consisting of a constant 0, a unary
function S and binary functions + and ·. We define a structure M in PM. Let the
universe M be ω. Take the interpretation to be the standard model, i.e. J0K = 0,JSK(n) = S(n), J+K(n,m) = n + m and J·K(n,m) = n · m. Then the sentences
which hold in M are exactly those which have a computable realiser in Kleene’s
second realisability model, see Kleene and Vesley [56, p. 96].
Thus, the hyperdoctrine of mass problems can be seen as an extension of
Kleene’s second realisability model with computable realisers. There is also a
topos which can be seen as an extension of this model, namely the Kleene–Vesley
topos, see e.g. van Oosten [89]. However, this topos does not follow Kolmogorov’s
philosophy that the interpretation of the universal quantifier should be uniform
in the variable. On the other hand, a topos can interpret much more than just
first-order logic.
Note that our category C only contains countable sets. On one hand this
could be seen as a restriction, but on the other hand this should not come as a
surprise since we are dealing with computability. That it is not that much of a
restriction is illustrated by the rich literature on computable model theory dealing
with computable, countable models.
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5.4. Theory of the hyperdoctrine of mass problems
Given a first-order language Σ, we wonder what the theory of PM is. In
particular, we want to know: is the theory of PM equal to first-order intuitionistic
logic IQC? To this, the answer is ‘no’ in general: it is well-known that the weak
law of the excluded middle ¬ϕ ∨ ¬¬ϕ holds in the Medvedev lattice; therefore
¬ϕ ∨ ¬¬ϕ holds for sentences in PM. However, recall from Theorem 2.1.13 that
for the Medvedev lattice Skvortsova has shown that there is an A ∈M such that
Th(M/A) = IPC. Thus, Skortsova’s result tells us that there is a principal factor
of the Medvedev lattice which captures exactly intuitionistic propositional logic.
There is a natural way to extend principal factors to the hyperdoctrine of mass
problems: given A in M, let PM/A be as in Definition 5.3.8, but with M replaced
by M/A, and Mω replaced by Mω/(A,A, . . . ). It is directly verified that PM/A
is also a first-order hyperdoctrine. Thus, there is a first-order analogue to the
problem studied by Skortsova in the propositional case: is there an A ∈M such
that the sentences that hold in PM/A are exactly those that are deducible in IQC?
First, note that equality is always decidable (i.e. ∀x, y(x = y ∨ ¬x = y) holds)
by the analogue of Lemma 5.3.10 (with ωω replaced by A). So, can we get the
theory to equal IQC plus decidable equality? Surprisingly, the answer turns out to
be ‘no’ in general. Recall that for a poset X and x, y ∈ X with x ≤ y we have that
the interval [x, y]X denotes the set of elements z ∈ X with x ≤ z ≤ y. If B is a
Brouwer algebra then so is [x, y]B, with lattice operations as in B and implication
given by
u→[x,y]B v = (u→B v)⊕ x.
If x = 0, this gives us exactly the factor B/y.
We can use this to introduce a specific kind of intervals in the hyperdoctrine
of mass problems.
Definition 5.4.1. Let A,B ∈ M. Then the interval [B,A]PM is the first-
order hyperdoctrine defined as in Definition 5.3.8, but withM replaced by [B,A]M,
and Mω replaced by [(B,B, . . . ), (A,A, . . . )]Mω .
It can be directly verified that this is a first-order hyperdoctrine; if one is not
convinced this also follows from the more general Theorem 5.4.5 below.
The axiom schema CD, consisting of all formulas of the form ∀z(ϕ(z) ∨ ψ)→
∀z(ϕ(z)) ∨ ψ, has been studied because it characterises the Kripke frames with
constant domain. Our first counterexample is based on the fact that a specific
instance of this schema holds in every structure in an interval of M with finite
universe.
Proposition 5.4.2. Consider the language consisting of one nullary relation
R, one unary relation S and equality. Then in every structure in every interval
[B,A]PM the formula
∀x, y, z(x = y ∨ x = z ∨ y = z) ∧ ∀z(S(z) ∨R)→ ∀z(S(z)) ∨R
holds. However, this formula is not in IQC.
Proof. Let M be a structure in [B,A]PM . Note that by the analogue of
Lemma 5.3.10 we know that if ∀x, y, z(x = y ∨ x = z ∨ y = z) does not hold,
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then it gets interpreted as A and then the formula certainly holds. However,
∀x, y, z(x = y ∨ x = z ∨ y = z) can only hold if M has at most two elements. Let
us first assume M has two elements. Let f be an element of J∀z(S(z) ∨R)K. Then
f = f1 ⊕ f2, with f1 ∈ JS(z) ∨ RK1 and f2 ∈ JS(z) ∨ RK2.1 There are two cases:
either both f1 and f2 start with a 0 and we can compute an element of J∀zS(z)K,
or one of them starts with a 1 in which case we can compute an element of JRK.
Since the reduction is uniform in f , we see thatJ∀z(S(z) ∨R)K ≥M J∀z(S(z)) ∨RK,
and thus the formula given in the statement of the proposition holds. If M has
only one element, a similar proof yields the same result.
To show that the formula is not in IQC, consider the following Kripke frame:
a b
0 .
Let K0 have universe {1} and let Ka,Kb have universe {1, 2}. Let S(1) be true
everywhere, let S(2) be true only at a and let R be true only at b. Then K is a
Kripke model refuting the formula in the statement of the proposition. 
Note that the schema CD can be refuted in PM, as long as we allow models over
infinite structures: namely, let ϕ(z) = S(z) and ψ(z) = R. We build a structure
M with ω as universe. Let A be computably independent. Let JSKn = A[n+1]
and let JRK = A[0]. Towards a contradiction, assume CD holds in this structure
and let Φ witness J∀z(S(z) ∨R)K ≥M J∀z(S(z)) ∨RK. Now the function f given
by f [n] = 0_A[n+1] is in J∀z(S(z) ∨R)K, so Φ(f) ∈ J∀z(S(z)) ∨RK. Because A is
computably independent f cannot compute A[0], so Φ(f)(0) = 0. Let u be the use
of this computation and let g be the function such that g[n] = f [n] for n ≤ u and
g[n] = A[0] for n > u. Then Φ(g)(0) = 0 so g computes A[u+1], contradicting A
being computably independent.
Thus, one might object to our counterexample for being too unnatural by
restricting the universe to be finite. However, the next example shows that even
without this restriction we can find a counterexample.
Proposition 5.4.3. Consider the language consisting of a unary relations R.
Then in every structure in every interval [B,A]PM the formula
(∀x(S(x) ∨ ¬S(x)) ∧ ¬∀x(¬S(x)))→ ∃x(¬¬S(x)).
holds. However, this formula is not in IQC.
Proof. Towards a contradiction, assume M is some structure satisfying the
formula. Let f ∈ J∀x(S(x)∨¬S(x))K and let g ∈ J¬∀x(¬S(x))K. If for every n ∈M
we have f [n](0) = 1 then f computes an element of J∀x¬S(x)K, which together
with g computes an element of the top element A so then we are done. Otherwise
1Note that JS(z) ∨RK ∈M2, so JS(z) ∨RK1 and JS(z) ∨RK2 denote the first respectively
second component.
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we can compute from f some n ∈M with f [n](0) = 0. Let f˜ be f [n] without the
first bit. Let e be an index for the functional sending (k_h1)⊕ h2 to Φk(h2 ⊕ h1).
Then if k_h1 ∈ J¬S(x)Kn we have
Φe((k
_h1)⊕ f˜) = Φk(f˜ ⊕ h1) ∈ A,
so e_f˜ ∈ J¬¬S(x)Kn. Therefore n_e_f˜ ∈ J∃x(¬¬S(x))K. SoJ∀x(S(x) ∨ ¬S(x))K⊕ J¬∀x(¬S(x))K ≥Mω J∃x(¬¬S(x))K.
To show that the formula is not in IQC, consider the following Kripke frame:
a
0 .
Let K0 have universe {1} and let Ka have universe {1, 2}. Let S(1) be false
everywhere and let S(2) be true only at a. Then K is a Kripke model refuting the
formula in the statement of the proposition. 
What the last theorem really says is not that our approach is hopeless, but that
instead of looking at intervals [B,A]PM , we should look at more general intervals.
Right now we are taking the bottom element B to be the same for each i ∈ ω.
Compare this with what happens if in a Kripke model we take the domain at
each point to be the same: then CD holds in the Kripke model. Proposition 5.4.2
should therefore not come as a surprise (although it is surprising that the full
schema can be refuted). Instead, we should allow Bi to vary (subject to some
constraints); roughly speaking Bi then expresses the problem of ‘showing that i
exists’ or ‘constructing i’. This motivates the next definition.
Definition 5.4.4. Let A ∈M and (Bi)i≥−1 ∈Mω be such that
(A,A, . . . ) ≥Mω (Bi)i∈ω ≥Mω (B−1, . . . ,B−1)
and such that Bi 6≥M A for all i ≥ −1. We define the interval [(Bi)i≥−1,A]PM as fol-
lows. Let C be the category with as objects {{1, . . . ,m}n | n,m ∈ ω}∪{ω, ω2, . . . }.
Let the functions in C be the computable functions α which additionally satisfy that
By ≥M Bα(y) for all y ∈ dom(α) uniformly in y, where we define B(y1,...,yn) to be
By1 ⊕ . . .Byn . Then [(Bi)i≥−1,A]PM consists of the functor P sending {1, . . . ,m}n
to the Brouwer algebra
[
(Ba1 ⊕ . . .Ban)(a1,...,an)∈{1,...,m}n , (A,A, . . . )
]
Mmn , send-
ing ωn to the Brouwer algebra [(Ba1 ⊕ . . .Ban)〈a1,...,an〉∈ω, (A,A, . . . ,A)]Mω and
sending every function α : Y → Z to PM(α) ⊕ (Bi)i∈Y , where we implicitly
identify ωn with ω and {1, . . . ,m}n with {1, . . . ,mn} through some fixed bijection
〈a1, . . . , an〉.
Theorem 5.4.5. The interval [(Bi)i≥−1,A]PM is a first-order hyperdoctrine.
Proof. First, note that the base category C is closed under n-fold products:
indeed, the n-fold product of Y is just Y n, and the projections are computable
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functions satisfying the extra requirement. Furthermore, if α1, . . . , αn : Y → Z are
in C, then (α1, . . . , αn) : Y
n → Z in in C because for all y1, . . . , yn ∈ Y we have
B(y1,...,yn) = By1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Byn ≥M Bα(y1) · · · ⊕ Bα(yn) = B(α1,...,αn)(y1,...,yn),
with reductions uniform in y1, . . . , yn. Finally, for each α in C we have that
PM(α) ⊕ 0P(Y ) is a Brouwer algebra homomorphism: that joins and meets are
preserved follows by distributivity, that the top element is preserved follows directly
from (A,A, . . . ) ≥Mω (Bi)i∈ω ≥M (B−1, . . . ,B−1) and that the bottom element
is preserved follows from the assumption that By ≥M Bα(y) for all y ∈ dom(α)
uniformly in y. That implication is preserved is more work: let α : X → Y .
Throughout the remainder of the proof we will implicitly identify ωn with ω and
{1, . . . ,m}n with {1, . . . ,mn} through some fixed bijection 〈a1, . . . , an〉. Now:
((PM(α)((Ci)i∈Y ))j ⊕ Bj)→[Bj ,A]M ((PM(α)((Di)i∈Y ))j ⊕ Bj)
= ((Cα(j) ⊕ Bj)→ (Dα(j) ⊕ Bj))⊕ Bj
≡M (Cα(j) → Dα(j))⊕ Bj
= (PM(α)((Ci)i∈Y → (Di)i∈Y ))j ⊕ Bj ,
with uniform reductions.
Thus, we need to verify that the product projections have adjoints; in fact,
we will show that every morphism α in the base category C has adjoints. Let
α : X → Y . We claim: PM(α) ⊕ (Bi)i∈X has as an upper adjoint ∃α and as a
lower adjoint the map sending (Ci)i∈X to ∀α((Bi →M Ci)i∈X)⊕ (Bi)i∈Y , where ∃α
and ∀α are as in Proposition 5.3.3. Indeed, we have:
(Di)i∈Y ≤Mω ∃α((Ci)i∈X)⇔ (Dα(i))i∈X ≤Mω (Ci)i∈X
and because (Ci)i∈X ∈ [(Bi)i∈X , (A,A, . . . )]Mω :
⇔ (Bi)i∈X ⊕ (Dα(i))i∈X ≤Mω (Ci)i∈X ⇔ PM(α)((Di)i∈Y )⊕ (Bi)i∈X ≤Mω (Ci)i∈X .
Similarly, for ∀ we have:
∀α((Bi →M Ci)i∈X)⊕ (Bi)i∈Y ≤Mω (Di)i∈Y
⇔∀α((Bi →M Ci)i∈X) ≤Mω (Di)i∈Y
⇔(Bi →M Ci)i∈X ≤Mω (Dα(i))i∈X
⇔(Ci)i∈X ≤Mω (Bi ⊕Dα(i))i∈X
⇔(Ci)i∈X ≤Mω PM(α)((Di)i∈Y )⊕ (Bi)i∈X .
Finally, we need to verify that [(Bi)i≥−1,A]PM satisfies the Beck-Chevalley
condition. We have (writing α∗ for the image of the morphism α under the functor
for [(Bi)i≥−1,A]PM):
((∃x)Γ((s× 1X)∗((Ci)i∈Γ′×X)))n = {m_〈n,m〉_f | f ∈ C(s(n),m) ⊕ Bn ⊕ Bm}
and
(s∗((∃x)Γ′((Ci)i∈Γ′×X)))n = {〈s(n),m〉_m_f | f ∈ C(s(n),m) ⊕ Bn ⊕ Bs(n)}.
As in the proof of Theorem 5.3.9 we have
s∗((∃x)Γ′((Ci)i∈Γ′×X)) ≤Mω ((∃x)Γ((s× 1X)∗((Ci)i∈Γ′×X))).
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The opposite inequality is also almost the same as in the proof of Theorem 5.3.9,
except that we now need to use that C(s(n),m) uniformly computes an element of
B(s(n),m) and hence of Bm.
For the other part of the Beck-Chevalley condition we have:
(((∀x)Γ((Bi)i∈Γ′×X → (s× 1X)∗((Ci)i∈Γ′×X)))⊕ (Bi)i∈Γ)n
=
{⊕
m∈X
fm | fm ∈ Bn ⊕ Bm →
(Bn ⊕ Bm ⊕ C(s(n),m))
}
⊕ Bn
≡M
{⊕
m∈X
fm | fm ∈ Bm → C(s(n),m)
}
⊕ Bn.
Now, using the fact that Bs(n) uniformly reduces to Bn:
≡M
{⊕
m∈X
fm | fm ∈ (Bs(n) ⊕ Bm)→ C(s(n),m)
}
⊕ Bs(n) ⊕ Bn
= (s∗((∀x)Γ′((Bi)i∈Γ′×X → (Ci)i∈Γ′×X)⊕ (Bi)i∈Γ′))n,
as desired. 
In Propositions 5.6.8 and 5.6.9 below we will show that we can refute the
formulas from Propositions 5.4.2 and 5.4.3 in these more general intervals. Next,
let us rephrase Lemma 5.3.10 for our intervals.
Lemma 5.4.6. Given any X in the base category C of [(Bi)i≥−1,A]PM , let 0X
and 1X be the bottom respectively top elements of the Brouwer algebra corresponding
to X. Then the equality =X in [(Bi)i≥−1,A]PM is given by:
(=X)〈n,m〉 =
{
0X if n = m
1X otherwise.
Proof. From the formula given for the upper adjoint in the proof of Theorem
5.4.5, and the definition of =X in a first-order hyperdoctrine in Definition 5.1.1. 
As a final remark, note that we cannot vary A (i.e. make intervals of the form
[(Bi)i≥−1, (Ai)i≥−1]PM): if we did, then to make α∗ into a homomorphism we
would need to meet with Ai. While joining with Bi was not a problem, if we meet
with Ai the implication will in general not be preserved.
5.5. Heyting arithmetic in the hyperdoctrine of mass problems
In the previous section we introduced the general intervals [(Bi)i≥−1,A]PM .
However, it turns out that even these intervals cannot capture every theory in IQC,
which we will show by looking at models of Heyting arithmetic. Our approach is
based on the following classical result about computable classical models of Peano
arithmetic.
Theorem 5.5.1. (Tennenbaum [116]) There is no computable non-standard
model of Peano arithmetic.
56 5. FIRST-ORDER LOGIC IN THE MEDVEDEV LATTICE
Proof. (Sketch) Let A,B be two c.e. sets which are computably inseparable
and for which PA proves that they are disjoint (e.g. take A = {e ∈ ω | {e}(e)↓ = 0}
and B = {e ∈ ω | {e}(e)↓ = 1}). Let ϕ(e) = ∃sϕ′(e, s) define A and let ψ(e) =
∃sψ′(e, s) define B, where ϕ,ψ are ∆00-formulas which are monotone in s. Now
consider the following formulas:
α1 = ∀e, s∀s′ ≥ s((ϕ′(e, s)→ ϕ′(e, s′)) ∧ (ψ′(e, s)→ ψ′(e, s′)))
α2 = ∀e, s(¬(ϕ′(e, s) ∧ ψ′(e, s)))
α3 = ∀n, p∃!a, b(b < p ∧ ap+ b = n)
α4 = ∀n∃m∀e < n(ϕ′(e, n)↔ ∃a < n(ape = m)),
where pe denotes the eth prime.
These are all provable in PA. The first formula tells us that ϕ′ and ψ′ are
monotone in s. The second formula expresses that A and B are disjoint. The third
formula says that the Euclidean algorithm holds. The last formula tells us that for
every n, we can code the elements of A[n]∩ [0, n) as a single number. We can prove
this inductively, by letting m be the product of those pe such that e ∈ A[n]∩ [0, n).
Thus, every non-standard model of Peano arithmetic also satisfies these for-
mulas. Towards a contradiction, let M be a computable non-standard model of
PA. Let n ∈ M be a non-standard element, i.e. n > k for every standard k. Let
m ∈M be such that
M |= ∀e < n(ϕ′(e, n)↔ ∃a < n.ape = m).
If e ∈ A, then ϕ′(e, s) holds in the standard model for large enough standard
s, and since M is a model of Q and ϕ′ is ∆00 we see that also M |= ϕ′(e, s) for
large enough standard s. By monotonicity, we therefore have M |= ϕ′(e, n). Thus,
M |= ∃a < n.ape = m.
Conversely, if e ∈ B, then M |= ψ′(e, s) for large enough standard s, so by
monotonicity we see that M |= ψ′(e, n). Therefore, M |= ¬ϕ′(e, n) by α2. Thus,
M |= ¬(∃a < n.ape = m). So, the set C = {e ∈ ω |M |= ∃a, b < n.apSe(0) = m}
separates A and B.
However, C is also computable: because the Euclidean algorithm holds in M,
we know that there exist unique a, b with b < pSe(0) such that apSe(0) + b = m.
Since M is computable we can find those a and b computably. Now e is in C if
and only if b = 0. This contradicts A and B being computably separable. 
When looking at models of arithmetic, we often use that fairly basic systems
(like Robinson’s Q) already represent the computable functions (a fact which we
used in the proof of Tennenbaum’s theorem above). In other words, this tells us
that there is not much leeway to change the truth of ∆01-statements. The next
two lemmas show that in a language without any relations except equality (like
arithmetic), as long as our formulas are ∆01, their truth value in the hyperdoctrine
of mass problems is essentially classical; in other words, there is also no leeway to
make their truth non-classical.
Lemma 5.5.2. Let Σ be a language without relations (except possibly equal-
ity). Let [(Bi)i≥−1,A]PM be an interval and let M be a structure for Σ in
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[(Bi)i≥−1,A]PM . Let ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) be a ∆00-formula and let a1, . . . , an ∈M . Then
we have either
Jϕ(x1, . . . , xn)K〈a1,...,an〉 ≡M B−1 ⊕ Ba1 ⊕ · · · ⊕Ban
or Jϕ(x1, . . . , xn)K〈a1,...,an〉 ≡M A,
with the first holding if and only if ϕ(a1, . . . , an) holds classically in the classical
model induced by M (i.e. the classical model with universe M and functions as in
M).
Furthermore, it is decidable which of the two cases holds, and the reduction is
uniform in a1, . . . , an.
Proof. We prove this by induction on the structure of ϕ.
• ϕ is of the form t(x1, . . . , xn) = s(x1, . . . , xn): by Lemma 5.4.6 we know
that Jt(x1, . . . , xn) = s(x1, . . . , xn)K〈a1,...,an〉 is either B−1⊕Ba1⊕· · ·⊕Ban
or A, with the first holding if and only if t(a1, . . . , an) = s(a1, . . . , an)
holds classically. Since all functions are computable and equality is true
equality, it is decidable which of the two cases holds.
• ϕ is of the form ψ(x1, . . . , xn) ∧ χ(x1, . . . , xn): there are three cases:
– If both Jψ(x1, . . . , xn)K〈a1,...,an〉 and Jχ(x1, . . . , xn)K〈a1,...,an〉 are equi-
valent to B−1 ⊕ Ba1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Ban , then Jϕ(x1, . . . , xn)K〈a1,...,an〉 ≡M
B−1 ⊕ Ba1 ⊕ · · · ⊕Ban ,
– If Jψ(x1, . . . , xn)K〈a1,...,an〉 ≡M A, then Jϕ(x1, . . . , xn)K〈a1,...,an〉 ≡M
A by sending f ⊕ g to f ,
– If Jχ(x1, . . . , xn)K〈a1,...,an〉 ≡M A, then Jϕ(x1, . . . , xn)K〈a1,...,an〉 ≡M
A by sending f ⊕ g to g.
This case distinction is decidable because the induction hypothesis tells
us that the truth of ψ and χ is decidable.
• ϕ is of the form ψ(x1, . . . , xn)→ χ(x1, . . . , xn): this follows directly from
the fact that, in any Brouwer algebra with top element 1 and bottom
element 0, we have 0→ 1 = 1 and 0→ 0 = 1→ 1 = 1→ 0 = 0. The case
distinction is again decidable by the induction hypothesis.
The other cases are similar. 
Lemma 5.5.3. Let Σ,A, (Bi)i≥−1 and M be as in Lemma 5.5.2. Let T be
some theory satisfied which is satisfied by M, i.e. JψKM = B−1 for every ψ ∈ T .
Let ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) be a formula which is ∆
0
1 over T and let a1, . . . , an ∈M . Then
either Jϕ(x1, . . . , xn)K〈a1,...,an〉 ≡M B−1 ⊕ Ba1 ⊕ . . .Ban
or Jϕ(x1, . . . , xn)K〈a1,...,an〉 ≡M A,
with the first holding if and only if ϕ(a1, . . . , an) holds classically in M.
Furthermore, it is decidable which of the two cases holds, and the reduction is
uniform in a1, . . . , an.
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Proof. Let
ϕ⇔ ∀y1, . . . , ymψ(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , ym)⇔ ∃y1, . . . , ymχ(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , ym),
where ψ and χ are ∆00-formulas. Then by soundness (see Proposition 5.1.10) we
know that
(10)J∀y1, . . . , ymψ(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , ym)K ≡Mω J∃y1, . . . , ymχ(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , ym)K.
Let a1, . . . , an ∈M . We claim: there are some b1, . . . , bm such that either
(11) Jψ(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , ym)K〈a1,...,an,b1,...,bm〉 ≡M A
or
(12)Jχ(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , ym)K〈a1,...,an,b1,...,bm〉 ≡M Ba1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Ban ⊕ Bb1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Bbm .
Indeed, otherwise we see from Lemma 5.5.2 and some easy calculations thatJ∀y1, . . . , ymψ(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , ym)K〈a1,...,an〉 ≡M B−1 ⊕ Ba1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Ban
and J∃y1, . . . , ymχ(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , ym)K〈a1,...,an〉 ≡M A,
which contradicts (10).
Thus, again by Lemma 5.5.2, we can find b1, . . . , bm computably such that
either (11) or (12) holds. First, if (11) holds, then it can be directly verified thatJ∀y1, . . . , ymψ(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , ym)K〈a1,...,an〉 ≡M A,
while if (12) holds, then it can be directly verified thatJ∃y1, . . . , ymχ(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , ym)K〈a1,...,an〉 ≡M B−1 ⊕ Ba1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Ban ,
with all the reductions uniform in a1, . . . , an. 
Next, we slightly extend this to Π01-formulas and Σ
0
1-formulas, although at the
cost of dropping the uniformity.
Lemma 5.5.4. Let Σ,A, (Bi)i≥−1 and M be as in Lemma 5.5.2 above. Let
ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) be a Π
0
1-formula or a Σ
0
1-formula and let a1, . . . , an ∈M . Then we
have either Jϕ(x1, . . . , xn)K〈a1,...,an〉 ≡M B−1 ⊕ Ba1 ⊕ . . .Ban
or Jϕ(x1, . . . , xn)K〈a1,...,an〉 ≡M A,
with the first holding if and only if ϕ(a1, . . . , an) holds classically in M.
2
Proof. Let ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) = ∀y1, . . . , ymψ(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , yn) with ψ a
∆00-formula. First, let us assume ϕ(a1, . . . , an) holds classically. Thus, for all
b1, . . . , bm ∈M we know that ψ(a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bm) holds classically. By Lemma
2However, unlike the previous two lemmas, the reductions need not be uniform in a1, . . . , an.
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5.5.2 we then know that ψ(a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bm) gets interpreted as Ba1 ⊕ · · · ⊕
Ban ⊕ Bb1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Bbm (by a reduction uniform in b1, . . . , bm). Now note thatJϕK〈a1,...,an〉
≡M
⊕
〈b1,...,bm〉∈ω
(
(Ba1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Ban ⊕ Bb1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Bbm)
→M Jψ(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , ym)K〈a1,...,an,b1,...,bm〉)
⊕ (B−1 ⊕ Ba1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Ban)
≡M B−1 ⊕ Ba1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Ban .
Now, let us assume ϕ(a1, . . . , an) does not hold classically. Let b1, . . . , bm ∈M
be such that ψ(a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bm) does not hold classically. By Lemma 5.5.2
we know that ψ(a1, . . . , an, b1 . . . , bm) gets interpreted as A. Then it is directly
checked that in fact Jϕ(x1, . . . , xn)K〈a1,...,an〉 ≥M A,
as desired.
The proof for Σ01-formulas ϕ is similar. 
Now, we will prove an analogue of Theorem 5.5.1 for the hyperdoctrine of mass
problems.
Theorem 5.5.5. Let Σ be the language of arithmetic (i.e. the language consist-
ing of a function symbol for every primitive recursive function, and equality). There
is a finite theory T ⊃ Q derivable in HA such that for every interval [(Bi)i≥−1,A]PM
and every classically true Π01-sentence or Σ
0
1-sentence χ we have that every structure
M in [(Bi)i≥−1,A]PM satisfies
∧
T → χ. In particular this holds for χ = Con(PA)
and so for the language of arithmetic we have Th ([(Bi)i≥−1,A]PM) 6= IQC.
Proof. Our proof is inspired by the proof of Theorem 5.5.1 given above. Let
A, B, ϕ′ and ψ′ as in that proof. We first define a theory T ′ which consists of Q
together with the formulas
∀e, s∀s′ ≥ s((ϕ′(e, s)→ ϕ′(e, s′)) ∧ (ψ′(e, s)→ ψ′(e, s′)))
∀n, s(¬ϕ′(n, s) ∧ ψ′(n, s))
∀n, p∃!a, b(b < p ∧ ap+ b = n)
∀n∃m∀k, s < n(ϕ′(k, s)↔ ∃a, b < n.apk = m).
Then T ′ is deducible in Peano arithmetic; in particular it holds in the standard
model. Note that T ′ is equivalent to a Π02-formula. Furthermore, note that there
are computable Skolem functions (for example, take the function mapping n to the
least witness). Thus, we can get rid of the existential quantifiers; for example, we
can replace
∀n, p∃a, b(b < p ∧ ap+ b = n)
by
∀n, p(g(n, p) < p ∧ f(n, p)p+ g(n, p) = n)
where f is the symbol representing the primitive recursive function sending (n, p)
to n divided by p, and g is the symbol representing the primitive recursive function
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sending (n, p) to the remainder of the division of n by p. We can also turn Q into
a Π01-theory using the predecessor function.
So, let T consist of a Π01-formula which is equivalent to T
′, together with Π01
defining axioms for the finitely many computable functions we used. Then T is
certainly deducible in PA, but it is also deducible in HA because every Π02-sentence
which is in PA in also in HA, see e.g. Troelstra and van Dalen [121, Proposition
3.5].
Now, if J∧T K ≡M A, we are done. We may therefore assume this is not the
case. Then, by Lemma 5.5.4 we see that T holds classically in M. Therefore T ′
also holds classically in M, and by the proof of Theorem 5.5.1 we see that M is
classically the standard model. Therefore χ holds classically in M so we see by
Lemma 5.5.4 that JχK ≡M B−1. 
5.6. Decidable frames
In the last section we saw that even in our intervals [(Bi)i≥−1,A]PM we cannot
generally obtain IQC. However, note that Heyting arithmetic, like Peano arithmetic
is undecidable. We therefore wonder: what happens if we look at decidable theories?
In the classical case, we know that every decidable theory has a decidable model.
The intuitionistic case was studied by Gabbay [32] and Ishihara, Khoussainov and
Nerode [44, 45], culminating in the following result.
Definition 5.6.1. A Kripke model is decidable if the underlying Kripke frame
is computable, the universe at every node is computable and the forcing relation
w  ϕ(a1, . . . , an)
is computable.
Definition 5.6.2. A theory is decidable if its deductive closure is computable
and equality is decidable, i.e.
∀x, y(x = y ∨ ¬x = y)
holds.
Theorem 5.6.3. ([44, Theorem 5.1]) Every decidable theory T has a decidable
Kripke model, i.e. a decidable Kripke model whose theory is exactly the set of
sentences deducible from T .3
Our next result shows how to encode such decidable Kripke models in intervals
of the hyperdoctrine of mass problems. Unfortunately we do not know how to deal
with arbitrary decidable Kripke frames; instead we have to restrict to those without
infinite ascending chains. As we will see later in this section, this nonetheless still
proves to be useful.
3In [44] this result is stated for first-order languages without equality and function symbols.
However, we can apply the original result to the language with an additional binary predicate R
representing equality and to the theory T ′ consisting of T extended with the equality axioms.
Using this equality we can now also represent functions by relations in the usual way.
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Theorem 5.6.4. Let K be a decidable Kripke model which is based on a Kripke
frame without infinite ascending chains. Then there is an interval [(Bi)i≥−1,A]PM
and a structure M in [(Bi)i≥−1,A]PM such that the theory of M is exactly the
theory of K.
Furthermore, if we allow infinite ascending chains, then this still holds for the
fragments of the theories without universal quantifiers.
Proof. Let T = {t0, t1, . . . } be a computable representation of the poset T
on which K is based. Let f0, f1, . . . be an antichain in the Turing degrees and let
D = {g | ∃i(g ≤T fi)}. Consider the collection V = {C({fi | i ∈ I} ∪ D) | I ⊆ ω}.
By Theorem 4.1.3, this is a sub-implicative semilattice of [C({fi | i ∈ ω})∪D,D]M.
We will use the mass problems C({fi | i 6= j} ∪ D to represent the points tj of the
Kripke frame T . If T were finite, we would only have to consider a finite sub-upper
semilattice of V , and by Skvortsova [106, Lemma 2] the meet-closure of this would
be exactly the Brouwer algebra of upwards closed subsets of T . However, since
in our case T might be infinite, we need to suitably generalise this to arbitrary
‘meets’.
Let us now describe how to do this. First, we define A:
A = {k1_k2_
(
C({fi | i 6∈ {k1, k2}}) ∪ D
) | tk1 and tk2 are incomparable)}
if T is not a chain, and A = D otherwise. The idea behind A is that if tk1 and tk2
are incomparable in T , then there should be no mass problem representing a point
above their representations.
Now, let U be the collection of upwards closed subsets of T . We then define
the map α : U →M by:
α(Y ) =
⋃
{j_ ((C({fi | i 6= j}) ∪ D)⊗A) | tj ∈ Y },
and α(∅) = A. Now let B−1 = α(T ) and let Bi = α(Zi), where Zi is the set of
nodes where i is in the domain of K. Then α : U → [B−1,A] as a function; we are
not yet claiming that it preserves the Brouwer algebra structure. We will prove a
stronger result for a suitable sub-collection of U below.
First, let us show that α is injective. Indeed, assume α(Y ) ≤M α(Z). We
will show that Y ⊇ Z. By applying Lemma 5.6.5 below twice we then have
that for every j with tj ∈ Z there exists a k with tk ∈ Y such that either
C({fi | i 6= k}) ∪ D ≤M C({fi | i 6= j}) ∪ D or A ≤M C({fi | i 6= j}) ∪ D. In the
first case, towards a contradiction let us assume that k 6= j. Then fk computes
an element of C({fi | i 6= j}) ∪ D and therefore fk ∈ C({fi | i 6= k}) ∪ D since the
latter is upwards closed. However, this contradicts the fact that the fi form an
antichain in the Turing degrees. Thus, k = j and therefore tj ∈ Y .
In the latter case, we have that C({fi | i 6∈ {k1, k2})∪D ≤M C({fi | i 6= j})∪D
for some k1, k2 ∈ ω for which tk1 and tk2 are incomparable. Without loss of
generality, let us assume that k1 6= j. Then, reasoning as above, we see that
fk1 ∈ C({fi | i 6∈ {k1, k2}) ∪ D, a contradiction.
For ease of notation, let us assume the union of the universes of K is ω; the
general case follows in the same way. Let M be the structure with functions as in
K, and let the interpretation of a relation JR(x1, . . . , xn)K〈a1,...,an〉 be α(Y ), where
Y is exactly the set of nodes where R(a1, . . . , an) holds in K.
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We show that M is as desired. To this end, we claim: for every formula
ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) and every sequence a1, . . . , an,Jϕ(x1, . . . , xn)K〈a1,...,an〉 ≡M α(Y ),
where Y is exactly the set of nodes where a1, . . . , an are all in the domain and
ϕ(a1, . . . , an) holds in the Kripke model K. Furthermore, we claim that this
reduction is uniform in a1, . . . , an and in ϕ. We prove this by induction on the
structure of ϕ. First, if ϕ is atomic, this follows directly from the choice of the
valuations, from the fact that K is decidable and from Lemma 5.4.6.
Next, let us consider ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) = ψ(x1, . . . , xn) ∨ χ(x1, . . . , xn). Let U be
the set of nodes where ψ(a1, . . . , an) holds in K and similarly let V be the set of
nodes where χ(a1, . . . , an) holds. By induction hypothesis and by the definition of
the interpretation of ∨ we have
Jψ(x1, . . . , xn) ∨ χ(x1, . . . , xn)K〈a1,...,an〉
≡M α(U)⊗ α(V )
=
⋃
{j_ ((C({fi | i 6= j}) ∪ D)⊗A) | tj ∈ U}
⊗
⋃
{j_ ((C({fi | i 6= j}) ∪ D)⊗A) | tj ∈ V }.
We need to show that this is equivalent to
α(Y ) =
⋃
{j_ ((C({fi | i 6= j}) ∪ D)⊗A) | tj ∈ Y },
where Y is the set of nodes where ϕ(a1, . . . , an) holds. First, let j
_f ∈ α(Y ). Then
ϕ(a1, . . . , an) holds at tj . Thus, by the definition of truth in Kripke frames, we
know that at least one of ψ(a1, . . . , an) and χ(a1, . . . , an) holds in tj , and because
our frame is decidable we can compute which of them holds. So, send j_f to 0_j_f
if ψ(a1, . . . , an) holds, and to 1
_j_f otherwise. Thus, α(U) ⊗ α(V ) ≤M α(Y ).
Conversely, if either ψ(a1, . . . , an) or χ(a1, . . . , an) holds then ϕ(a1, . . . , an) holds,
so the functional sending i_j_f to j_f witnesses that α(Y ) ≤M α(U)⊗ α(V ).
The proof for conjunction is similar. Next, let us consider implication. So, let
ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) = ψ(x1, . . . , xn) → χ(x1, . . . , xn). Let U be the set of nodes where
ψ(a1, . . . , an) holds in K, let V be the set of nodes where χ(a1, . . . , an) holds and
let Y be the set of nodes where ϕ(a1, . . . , an) holds. By induction hypothesis, we
know that
Jϕ(x1, . . . , xn)K〈a1,...,an〉
≡M α(U)→[B(a1,...,an),A] α(V ).
First, note that α(Y ) ≥M α(U) →[B(a1,...,an),A] α(V ) is equivalent to α(Y ) ⊕
α(U) ≥M α(V ). So, let k_h ∈ α(Y ) and j_g ∈ α(U). Then tk ∈ Y , h ∈(
C({fi | i 6= k}) ∪ D
) ⊗ A, tj ∈ U and g ∈ (C({fi | i 6= j}) ∪ D) ⊗ A. We need
to uniformly compute from this some m ∈ ω with tm ∈ Y and an element of(
C({fi | i 6∈ pm}) ∪ D
) ⊗ A. First, if either the first bit of h or g is 1, then h
respectively g computes an element of A. So, we may assume this is not the case.
Then there are i1 6= j and i2 6= k such that g ≥T fi1 and h ≥T fi2 . If i1 6= i2 then
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h⊕ g ∈ D, and if i1 = i2 then h⊕ g ∈ C({fi | i 6∈ {k, j}}). So, we have
h⊕ g ∈ C({fi | i 6∈ {k, j}}) ∪ D.
There are now two cases: if tk and tj are incomparable then k
_j_(h ⊕ g) ∈ A.
Otherwise, compute m ∈ {k, j} such that tm = max(tk, tj). Then, because tk ∈ Y
and tj ∈ U , we know that tm ∈ V and that h⊕ g ∈ C({fi | i 6= m}) ∪ D, which is
exactly what we needed. Since this is all uniform we therefore see
α(Y ) ≥M Jϕ(x1, . . . , xn)K〈a1,...,an〉.
Conversely, take any element
(e_g)⊕ h ∈ (α(U)→M α(V ))⊕ B(a1,...,an) = α(U)→[B〈a1,...,an〉,A] α(V ).
We need to compute an element of α(Y ). Let Z be the collection of nodes where
a1, . . . , an are all in the domain. Then h computes some element h˜ ∈ α(Z), as
follows from the definition of B(a1,...,an) and the fact that we have already proven
the claim for conjunctions applied to Jx1 = x1 ∧ · · · ∧ xn = xnK〈a1,...,an〉. If the
second bit of h˜ is 1, then h˜ computes an element of A and therefore also computes
an element of α(Y ). So, we may assume it is 0. Let k = h˜(0). First compute if
ϕ(a1, . . . , an) holds in K at the node tk; if so, we know that h˜ ∈ α(Y ) so we are
done. Otherwise, there must be a node tk˜ (above tk) such that tk˜ ∈ U but tk˜ 6∈ V .
Let σ be the least string such that Φ(e)
(
g ⊕
(
k˜_0_σ
))
(0)↓ and such that
Φ(e)
(
g ⊕
(
k˜_0_σ
))
(1)↓ and let m = Φe
(
g ⊕
(
k˜_0_σ
))
(0) (such a σ much
exist, since there is some initial segment of k˜_0_fk˜+1 ∈ α(U) for which this must
halt by choice of g and e). Then we see, by choice of g and e that tm ∈ V and that
{g} ⊕ C
({
fi | i 6= k˜
})
≥M {g} ⊕
(
σ_C
({
fi | i 6= k˜
}))
≥M
(
C({fi | i 6= m}) ∪ D
)⊗A.
In fact, since the value at 1 has also already been decided by choice of σ, we even
get that either
{g} ⊕ C
({
fi | i 6= k˜
})
≥M A
or
{g} ⊕ C
({
fi | i 6= k˜
})
≥M C({fi | i 6= m}) ∪ D.
In the first case, we are clearly done. Otherwise, we claim: g⊕h˜ ∈ C({fi | i 6= m)∪D.
We distinguish several cases:
• If h˜ ∈ D, then g ⊕ h˜ ≥T h˜ ∈ D and D is upwards closed.
• Otherwise, h˜ ≥T fi for some i 6= k. If i 6= k˜, then we have just seen that
g ⊕ h˜ computes an element of C({fi | i 6= m}) ∪ D. Since the latter is
upwards closed, we see that g ⊕ h˜ ∈ C({fi | i 6= m}) ∪ D.
• If h˜ ≥T fk˜, then g ⊕ h˜ ≥T h˜ ∈ C({fi | i 6= m): after all, tm ∈ V while
tk˜ 6∈ V , so k˜ 6= m.
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Thus, g ⊕ h˜ uniformly computes an element of α(Y ), which is what we needed to
show.
Now, let us consider the quantifiers. So, let ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) = ∀yψ(x1, . . . , xn, y).
For every b ∈ ω, let Ub be the set of nodes where ψ(a1, . . . , an, b) holds in K, and
likewise let Y be the set of nodes where ϕ(a1, . . . , an) holds. We need to show thatJϕ(x1, . . . , xn)K〈a1,...,an〉 ≡M α(Y ).
By definition of the interpretation of the universal quantifier and the induction
hypothesis, we know that
Jϕ(x1, . . . , xn)K〈a1,...,an〉 ≡M
(⊕
b∈ω
B(a1,...,an,b) →M α(Ub)
)
⊕ Ba1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Ban
=
⊕
b∈ω
B(a1,...,an,b) →[B(a1,...,an),A]M α(Ub).
Let Zb be the set of nodes where a1, . . . , an and b are in the domain, and let Z be
the set of nodes where a1, . . . , an are in the domain. Then we get in the same way
as above:
≡M
⊕
b∈ω
α(Zb)→[B(a1,...,an),A]M α(Ub).
Finally, let us introduce new predicates Rb(x1, . . . , xn), which are defined to hold
in K if ϕ(x1, . . . , xn, b) holds in K, and let us introduce new nullary predicates
Sb which are defined to hold when all of a1, . . . , an and b are in the domain.
Then, applying the fact that we have already proven the claim for implications toJSb → RbK〈a1,...,an〉, we get
≡M
⊕
b∈ω
α((Zb → Ub) ∩ Z).
We now claim that this is equivalent to α(Y ). We have Y ⊆ (Zb → Ub) ∩ Z by the
definition of truth in Kripke frames, which suffices to prove that⊕
b∈ω
α((Zb → Ub) ∩ Z) ≤M α(Y ).
Conversely, let ⊕
b∈ω
gb ∈
⊕
b∈ω
α((Zb → Ub) ∩ Z).
We show how to compute an element of α(Y ) from this. If the second bit of g0
is 1, then h computes an element of A; thus, assume it is 0. Let m0 = g0(0).
First compute if ϕ(a1, . . . , an) holds in K at the node γ(tm0); if so, we know that
g0 ∈ α(Y ) so we are done. Therefore, we may assume this is not the case. So,
we can compute a b1 ∈ ω such that tm0 6∈ Zb1 → Ub1 by the definition of truth in
Kripke frames. Now consider gb1 . If the second bit of gb1 is 1, then gb1 computes an
element of A so we are done. Otherwise, let m1 = gb1(0). Then tm1 ∈ Zb1 → Ub1
and gb1 ∈ C(fi | i 6= m1) ∪ D. Then m1 6≤ m0 because tm0 6∈ Zb1 → Ub1 . If m1
is incomparable with m0, then m0
_m1
_(gb1 ⊕ h) ∈ A so we are done. Thus, the
only remaining case is when m1 > m0.
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Iterating this argument, if it does not terminate after finitely many steps, we
obtain a sequence m0 < m1 < m2 < . . . . However, we assumed that our Kripke
frame does not contain any infinite ascending chains, so the algorithm has to
terminate after finitely many steps. Thus,⊕
b∈ω
α((Zb → Ub) ∩ Z) ≥M α(Y ).
We note that this is the only place in the proof where we use the assumption about
infinite ascending chains.
Finally, we consider the existential quantifier. To this end, let ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) =
∃yψ(x1, . . . , xn, y). Let Ub and Z be as for the universal quantifier. Then the
induction hypothesis tells us that
Jϕ(x1, . . . , xn)K〈a1,...,an〉 ≡M⋃{b_α(Yb) | b ∈ ω}.
First, since Yb ⊆ Z, we certainly have that α(Z) ≤M
⋃{b_α(Yb) | b ∈ ω}.
Conversely, let j_f ∈ α(Z). Then f ∈ (C(fi | i 6= j) ∪ D)⊗A and tj ∈ Z. Thus,
there is some b ∈ ω such that ψ(a1, . . . , an, b) holds, and therefore by induction
hypothesis j_f ∈ α(Yb). Furthermore, since K is decidable we can compute such a
b. Thus, α(Z) ≥M
⋃{b_α(Yb) | b ∈ ω}, which completes the proof of the claim.
Thus, by the claim we have that, for any sentence ϕ, that JϕK = α(Y ), where
Y is the set of nodes where ϕ holds in the Kripke model K. Furthermore, α is
injective so α(Y ) = B−1 if and only if Y = T . So, ϕ holds in M if and only if
Y = T if and only if ϕ holds in K, which is what we needed to show.
For the second part of the theorem, note that we only used the assumption
about infinite ascending chains in the part of the proof dealing with the universal
quantifier. 
Lemma 5.6.5. Let C ⊆ ωω be non-empty and upwards closed under Turing
reducibility, let Ei ⊆ ωω and let
⋃{i_Ei} ≤M C. Then there is an i ∈ ω such that
Ei ≤M C.
Proof. Let Φe(C) ⊆
⋃{i_Ei}. Let σ be the least string such that Φe(σ)(0)↓.
Such a string must exist, because C is non-empty. Let i = Φe(σ)(0). Then:
C ≥M σ_C ≥M Ei,
as desired. 
Our proof relativises if our language does not contain function symbols, which
gives us the following result.
Theorem 5.6.6. Let K be a Kripke model for a language without function
symbols which is based on a Kripke frame without infinite ascending chains. Then
there is an interval [(Bi)i≥−1,A]PM and a structure M in [(Bi)i≥−1,A]PM such
that the theory of M is exactly the theory of K.
Furthermore, if we allow infinite ascending chains, then this still holds for the
fragment of the theories without universal quantifiers.
66 5. FIRST-ORDER LOGIC IN THE MEDVEDEV LATTICE
Proof. Let h be such that K is h-decidable. We relativise the construction in
the proof of Theorem 5.6.4 to h. We let all definitions be as in that proof, except
where mentioned otherwise. This time we let fi be an antichain over h, i.e. for all
i 6= j we have fi⊕h 6≥T fj . We change the definition of D into {g | ∃i(g ≤T fi⊕h)}
We let
A = {(k1_k2_ (C({fi | i 6∈ {k1, k2}}) ∪ D))⊕ h | tk1 and tk2 are incomparable}
if T is not a chain, and let A = D⊕ h otherwise. We let β(Y ) = α(Y )⊕{h} for all
Y ∈ U . Then β is still injective. Indeed, let us assume β(Y ) ≤M β(Z); we will show
that Y ⊇ Z. By applying Lemma 5.6.7 below we see that for every j with tj ∈ Z
there exists a k with tk ∈ Y such that either
(
C({fi | i 6= k}) ∪ D
) ⊕ {h} ≤M(
C({fi | i 6= j}) ∪ D
) ⊕ {h} or A ≤M (C({fi | i 6= j}) ∪ D) ⊕ {h}. If the first
holds, let us assume that k 6= j; we will derive a contradiction from this. Then
fk ∈ C({fi | i 6= j}) ∪ D and therefore fk ⊕ h ∈ C({fi | i 6= k}) ∪ D since this set
is upwards closed. However, we know that the fi form an antichain over h in the
Turing degrees, which is a contradiction. So, k = j and therefore tj ∈ Y .
In the second case, we have that
C({fi | i 6∈ {k1, k2}) ∪ D ≤M
(
C({fi | i 6= j}) ∪ D
)⊕ {h}
for some k1, k2 ∈ ω for which tk1 and tk2 are incomparable. Without loss of
generality, we may assume that k1 6= j. Then, in the same way as above, we see
that fk1 ⊕ h ∈ C({fi | i 6∈ {k1, k2}) ∪ D which is again a contradiction.
We let B−1 = β(T ) and we let Bi = β(Zi), where Zi is the set of nodes where
i is in the domain of K. We claim: for every formula ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) and every
sequence a1, . . . , an, Jϕ(x1, . . . , xn)K〈a1,...,an〉 ≡M β(Y ),
where Y is exactly the set of nodes where a1, . . . , an are all in the domain and
ϕ(a1, . . . , an) holds in the Kripke model K. The proof is the same as before,
except that this time we use that all mass problems we deal with are above
B−1 = α(T )⊕ {h} and hence uniformly compute h. Thus, we can still decide all
the properties about K which we need during the proof. 
Lemma 5.6.7. Let C ⊆ ωω be non-empty and upwards closed under Turing
reducibility, let Ei ⊆ ωω, let h ∈ ωω and let
⋃{i_Ei} ≤M C ⊕ {h}. Then there is
an i ∈ ω such that Ei ≤M C.
Proof. Let Φe(C) ⊆
⋃{i_Ei}. Let σ be the least string such that Φe(σ ⊕
h)(0)↓. Such a string must exist, because C is non-empty. Let i = Φe(σ ⊕ h)(0).
Then:
C ⊕ h ≥M (σ_C)⊕ h ≥M Ei,
as desired. 
We will now use Theorem 5.6.6 to show that we can refute the formulas
discussed in section 5.4.
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Proposition 5.6.8. There is an interval [(Bi)i≥−1,A]PM and a structure M
in [(Bi)i≥−1,A]PM such that M refutes the formula
∀x, y, z(x = y ∨ x = z ∨ y = z) ∧ ∀z(S(z) ∨R)→ ∀z(S(z)) ∨R
from Proposition 5.4.2.
Proof. As shown in the proof of Proposition 5.4.2 there is a finite Kripke
frame refuting the formula. Now apply Theorem 5.6.6. 
Proposition 5.6.9. There is an interval [(Bi)i≥−1,A]PM and a structure M
in [(Bi)i≥−1,A]PM such that M refutes the formula
(∀x(S(x) ∨ ¬S(x)) ∧ ¬∀x(¬S(x)))→ ∃x(¬¬S(x)).
from Proposition 5.4.3.
Proof. In the proof of Proposition 5.4.3 we showed that there is a finite
Kripke frame refuting the given formula. So, the claim follows from Theorem
5.6.6. 
Thus, moving to the more general intervals [(Bi)i≥−1,A]PM did allow us to
refute more formulas. Let us next note that Theorem 5.5.5 really depends on the
fact that we chose the language of arithmetic to contain function symbols.
Proposition 5.6.10. Let Σ be the language of arithmetic, but formulated with
relations instead of with function symbols. Let T be derivable in PA and let χ be a
Π01-sentence or Σ
0
1-sentence which is not derivable in PA. Then there is an interval
[(Bi)i≥−1,A]PM and a structure M in [(Bi)i≥−1,A]PM refuting
∧
T → χ.
Proof. Let K be a classical model refuting
∧
T → χ, which can be seen as a
Kripke model on a frame consisting of one point. Now apply Theorem 5.6.6. 
Finally, let us consider the schema ∀x¬¬ϕ(x) → ¬¬∀xϕ(x), called Double
Negation Shift (DNS). It is known that this schema characterises exactly the Kripke
frames for which every node is below a maximal node (see Gabbay [33]), so in
particular it holds in every Kripke frame without infinite chains. We will show
that we can refute it in an interval of the hyperdoctrine of mass problems, even
though Theorem 5.6.6 does not apply.
Proposition 5.6.11. Let Σ be the language containing one unary relation R.
There is an interval [(Bi)i≥−1,A]PM and a structure M in [(Bi)i≥−1,A]PM such
that M refutes ∀x¬¬R(x)→ ¬¬∀xR(x).
Proof. We let K be the Kripke model based on the Kripke frame (ω,<),
where n is in the domain at m if and only if m ≥ n, and R(n) holds at m if and
only if m > n. Let everything be as in the proof of Theorem 5.6.4, except we
change the definition of A into:⋃{(
C ({fi | i 6∈ X}) ∪ D
)⊕X | X ∈ 2ω is infinite} ,
where by X being infinite we mean that the subset X ⊆ ω represented by X is
infinite. We claim: α is still injective under this modified definition of A. Indeed,
assume that
A ≤M C({fi | i 6= j}) ∪ D,
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say through Φe; we need to show that this still yields a contradiction. Let σ be the
least string such that the right half of Φe(σ) has a 1 at a position different from
j, say at position k; such a σ must exist since Φe(fj+1) ∈ A. Then Φe(σ_fk) ∈
C({fi | i 6= k}) ∪ D, which is a contradiction.
All the other parts of the proof of Theorem 5.6.4 now go through as long
as we look at formulas not containing existential quantifiers. Since ∀x¬¬R(x) is
intuitionistically equivalent to ¬∃x¬R(x), we therefore see thatJ∀x¬¬R(x)K ≡M B−1.
We claim: J¬∀x(R(x))K ≡M B−1, which is enough to prove the proposition. Note
that J∀x(R(x))K ≡M B−1⊕⊕m∈ω(Bm →M Bm+1). By introducing new predicates
Sm which hold if and only if m is in the domain and looking at JSm → Sm+1K, we
therefore get that J∀x(R(x))K ≡M⊕m∈ω Bm+1.
We claim that from every element g ∈⊕m∈ω Bm+1 we can uniformly compute
an element of A. In fact, we show how to uniformly compute from g a sequence
k0 < k1 < . . . such that g ∈ C({fi | i 6= kj}) ∪ D for every j ∈ ω; then if we let
X = {kj | j ∈ ω} we have g ⊕ X ∈
(
C({fi | i 6∈ X) ∪ D
) ⊕ X ⊆ A. For ease of
notation let k−1 = 0. We show how to compute ki+1 if ki is given. There are two
possibilities:
• The second bit of g[ki] is 0: take ki+1 to be the first bit of g[ki]; then
ki+1 > ki by the definition of Bki+1.
• The second bit of g[ki] is 1: then g[ki] computes an element of A and
therefore computes infinitely many j such that g[ki] ∈ C({fi | i 6= j})∪D,
so take ki+1 to be such a j which is greater than ki. 
We do not know how to combine the proof of the last Proposition with the
proofs of Theorems 5.6.4 and 5.6.6, because it makes essential use of the fact that
the formula is refuted in a model on a frame which is a chain, and of the fact that
the subformulas containing universal quantifiers hold either everywhere or nowhere
in this model. So, we solved part of the following question, but the definitive
answer is still open.
Question 5.6.12. For which theories T is there an interval [(Bi)i≥−1,A]PM
and a structure M in [(Bi)i≥−1,A]PM such that the theory of M is exactly T?
Part II
Algorithmic Randomness and
Genericity

CHAPTER 6
Effective Genericity and Differentiability
This chapter is based on Kuyper and Terwijn [69].
6.1. Introduction
The notion of 1-genericity is an effective notion of genericity from computability
theory that has been studied extensively, see e.g. Jockusch [14], or the textbooks
Odifreddi [88] and Downey and Hirschfeldt [25]. 1-Genericity, or Σ01-genericity
in full, can be defined using computably enumerable (c.e.) sets of strings as
forcing conditions. This notion captures a certain type of effective finite extension
constructions that is common in computability theory. In this chapter we give a
characterisation of 1-genericity in terms of familiar notions from computable analysis.
This complements recent results by Brattka, Miller, and Nies [11] that characterise
various notions of algorithmic randomness in terms of computable analysis. For
example, in [11] it was proven (building on earlier work by Demuth [22]) that an
element x ∈ [0, 1] is Martin-Lo¨f random if and only if every computable function
of bounded variation is differentiable at x. Note that the notion of Martin-Lo¨f
randomness, which one could also call Σ01-randomness, is the measure-theoretic
counterpart of the topological notion of 1-genericity.
The main result of this paper is as follows.
Theorem 6.1.1. A real x ∈ [0, 1] is 1-generic if and only if every differentiable
computable function f : [0, 1]→ R has continuous derivative at x.
The two implications of this theorem will be proven in Theorems 6.4.3 and
6.5.2. Note that by “differentiable computable function” we mean a computable
function that is classically differentiable, so that in particular the derivative need
not be continuous.
Our result can be seen an effectivisation of a result by Bruckner and Leonard.
Theorem 6.1.2. (Bruckner and Leonard [13, p. 27]) A set A ⊆ R is the set
of discontinuities of a derivative if and only if A is a meager Σ02 set.
One might expect that, in analogy to Theorem 6.1.1, n times differentiable
computable functions would characterise n-genericity. However, in section 6.7
we show that 1-genericity is also equivalent to the nth derivative of any n times
differentiable computable function being continuous at x. In section 6.8 we consider
differentiable polynomial time computable functions and show that again these
characterise 1-genericity.
First, let us recall some relevant definitions. For a string σ ∈ 2<ω, we have
[σ] = {x ∈ 2ω : σ ⊆ x} .
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The product topology on 2ω, sometimes called the tree topology, or the finite
information topology, has all sets of the form [σ] as basic open sets. For a set
A ⊆ 2<ω, we let
[A] =
⋃
σ∈A
[σ].
Thus every set A of finite strings defines an open subset of 2ω. A subset of 2ω is
a Σ01 class, or effectively open, if it is of the form [A], with A ⊆ 2<ω computably
enumerable (c.e.). A set is a Π01 class, or effectively closed, if it is the complement
of a Σ01 class. Thus Σ
0
1 and Π
0
1 classes form the first levels of the effective Borel
hierarchy. As usual, the levels of the classical Borel hierarchy are denoted by
boldface symbols Σ0n and Π
0
n. These notions are defined in the same way for [0, 1],
using rational intervals as basic opens. We denote the interior of a set V ⊆ 2ω by
Int(V ).
6.2. 1-Genericity
First, let us recall what it means for an element x ∈ 2ω to be 1-generic. We
will then discuss 1-genericity for elements of [0, 1]. A discussion of the properties
of arithmetically generic and 1-generic sets can be found in Jockusch [14]. The
“forcing-free” formulation of genericity we use here is due to Posner, see [14, p115].
Given a sequence x ∈ 2ω and a set A ⊆ 2<ω, we say that x meets A if there
exists σ v x such that σ ∈ A; equivalently, if x ∈ [A]. The set A is dense along x
if for every σ v x there is an extension τ w σ such that [τ ] ⊆ [A]; equivalently, if x
is in the closure of the open set [A]. Thus, rephrasing Definition 3.2.1, an element
x ∈ 2ω is 1-generic if x meets every c.e. set A ⊆ 2<ω that is dense along x.
We now reformulate the definition of 1-genericity into a form that will be
convenient in what follows. This formulation is also better suited for the discussion
of generic real numbers (as opposed to infinite strings).
Lemma 6.2.1. Let A ⊆ 2<ω and let V = 2ω \ [A]. Then A is dense along x if
and only if x is not in the interior of V . Therefore, A is dense along x and x does
not meet A if and only if x ∈ V \ Int(V ).
Proof. Note that A is dense along x if and only if every open set containing
x has non-empty intersection with [A]. Thus, A is dense along x if and only if
every open set disjoint from [A] does not contain x. However, the open sets disjoint
from [A] are exactly the open sets contained in V , of which Int(V ) is the largest.
Thus A is dense along x if and only if Int(V ) does not contain x. 
Corollary 6.2.2. For any x ∈ 2ω we have that x is 1-generic if and only if
for every Π01 class V ⊆ 2ω we have x 6∈ V \ Int(V ).
One of the reasons this is interesting to mention explicitly is because a typical
example of a nowhere dense set is a closed set with its interior removed, and the
Π01 sets are the simplest type of closed sets. Thus, the Corollary 6.2.2 says that x
is 1-generic if it is not in any of the simple, typical nowhere dense sets. This way
of looking at 1-generic sets complements the usual motivation of 1-genericity by
forcing, and it also allows one to easily compare 1-genericity with weak 1-genericity
(since x is weakly 1-generic if it is not in any Π01-class with empty interior, see [25]).
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With this equivalence in mind, we can now also define what it means for an
element of [0, 1] to be 1-generic.
Definition 6.2.3. Let x ∈ [0, 1]. We say that x is 1-generic if for every Π01
class V ⊆ [0, 1] we have x 6∈ V \ Int(V ).
There is a natural ‘almost-homeomorphism’ between 2ω and [0, 1]: given an
infinite sequence x ∈ 2ω we have 0.x ∈ [0, 1] (interpreting the sequence as a
decimal expansion in binary), and conversely given y ∈ [0, 1] we can take the binary
expansion of y containing infinitely many 0s, which gives us an element of 2ω. Note
that the problem of non-unique expansions only occurs for rationals, which are not
1-generic anyway. It is thus natural to ask if the notions of 1-genericity in these
two spaces correspond via this mapping. The next proposition says this is indeed
the case.
Proposition 6.2.4. For any irrational x ∈ [0, 1] we have that x is 1-generic
if and only if its (unique) binary expansion is 1-generic in 2ω.
Proof. Let 2ω− be the set of infinite binary sequences which contain infinitely
many 0s and infinitely many 1s. Then the ‘almost-homeomorphism’ given above in
fact restricts to a homeomorphism to 2ω− and [0, 1]−, where [0, 1]− is [0, 1] without
the dyadic rationals. Therefore, 1-genericity on 2ω− and [0, 1]− (which are defined
as in Definition 6.2.3) coincide.
Note that 2ω− is dense in 2
ω and that [0, 1]− is dense in [0, 1]. Thus, it is enough
if we can show that if Y ⊆ X is such that Y is dense in X, then 1-genericity on
X and Y coincide for elements y ∈ Y . Given a Π01 class V ⊆ X, let W = V ∩ Y .
Then W is a Π01 class in Y . Conversely, every Π
0
1 class W ⊆ Y is of the form
W = V ∩ Y by definition of the induced topology.
We claim that IntX(V ) ∩ Y = IntY (W ). Clearly, IntX(V ) ∩ Y ⊆ IntY (W ).
Conversely, if we let IntY (W ) = U ∩ Y for some open U ⊆ X, then U ⊆ IntX(V ∪
(X \ Y )). Towards a contradiction, assume that U ∩ (X \ V ) 6= ∅, then this is a
non-empty open set. However, we also have U ∩ (X \V ) ⊆ X \Y , which contradicts
the fact that Y is dense in X. Thus, we see that U ⊆ V , and therefore U ⊆ IntX(V ).
So, IntX(V ) ∩ Y = IntY (W ).
So, we see that y 6∈ V \IntX(V ) if and only if y 6∈W \IntY (W ). This completes
the proof. 
6.3. Effective Baire class 1 functions
In this section we will discuss what it means for a function to be of effective
Baire class 1, and discuss some of the basic properties of these functions. First,
let us recall what it means for a function on the reals to be computable. Our
definitions follow Moschovakis [83].
Definition 6.3.1. Let f : [0, 1]→ R. We say that f is computable if for every
basic open set U we have that f−1(U) is Σ01 uniformly in U , i.e. if there exists
a computable function α : Q × Q → ω such that for all q, r ∈ Q we have that
f−1((q, r)) is equal to the Σ01 class given by the index α(q, r).
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Definition 6.3.1 is equivalent to the formulation with computable functionals,
see e.g. the discussion in Pour-El and Richards [96].
Functions of effective Baire class 1 are obtained by weakening the above
definition as follows.
Definition 6.3.2. A function f : [0, 1]→ R is of effective Baire class 1 if for
every basic open set U we have that f−1(U) is Σ02 uniformly in U .
Replacing Σ02 by Σ
0
2 in the above definition, we obtain what is known as a
function of (non-effective) Baire class 1. Before we give an important example of an
effective Baire class 1 function, let us first consider the following proposition, which
gives an equivalent condition for a function to be of effective Baire class 1. This
proposition mirrors the classical proposition by Lebesgue, Hausdorff and Banach
which says that a function is of Baire class 1 if and only if it is a pointwise limit
of continuous functions, see e.g. Kechris [50, p. 192]. (This does not hold for all
Polish spaces; it holds for f : X → Y if either X is zero-dimensional or Y = R.)
Proposition 6.3.3. Let f : [0, 1]→ R. The following are equivalent:
(i) f is of effective Baire class 1,
(ii) f is the pointwise limit of a uniform sequence of computable functions, i.e.
there exists a sequence f0, f1, . . . of functions from [0, 1] to R converging
pointwise to f and a computable function α : ω ×Q×Q→ ω such that for
all q, r ∈ Q and all n ∈ ω we have that f−1n ((q, r)) is equal to the Σ01 class
given by the index α(n, q, r).
Proof. (ii) → (i): Let f0, f1, . . . be a sequence of uniformly computable
functions converging to f and let U be any basic open set. Then U =
⋃
i∈ω,Vi⊆U Vi,
where V0, V1, . . . is a computable enumeration of the closed intervals with rational
endpoints. We claim:
f−1(U) =
⋃
Vi⊆U
⋃
n∈ω
⋂
m≥n
f−1m (Vi),
which is clearly Σ02 uniformly in U .
To prove the claim, let x ∈ f−1(U). Then f(x) ∈ U , so there exists Vi ⊆ U
such that f(x) ∈ Int(Vi), say (f(x)− ε, f(x) + ε) ⊆ Vi. Let n ∈ ω be such that for
every m ≥ n we have that |fm(x)− f(x)| < ε. Then for every m ≥ n we have that
x ∈ f−1m (Vi), which proves the first inclusion.
Conversely, let n ∈ ω, Vi ⊆ U and x ∈
⋂
m≥n f
−1
m (Vi). Then for every m ≥ n we
have fm(x) ∈ Vi, and since Vi is closed we then also have f(x) = limm→∞ fm(x) ∈
Vi ⊆ U , which completes the proof of the claim.
(i) → (ii): This follows by effectivising Kechris [50, Theorem 24.10]; this result
is also mentioned (without proof) in Moschovakis [83, Exercise 3.E.14]. Since
this implication is not used anywhere in this thesis, we will not go into further
detail. 
Using this proposition, we can now give an important example of effective
Baire class 1 functions: derivatives of computable functions. This also explains our
interest in them.
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Corollary 6.3.4. Let f : [0, 1]→ R be a differentiable computable function.
Then f ′ is of effective Baire class 1.
Proof. Let fn(x) = 2
n(f(x+ 2−n)− f(x)). To account for the problem that
for x+2−n > 1 the value f(x+2−n) is not defined, we let f(y) = −f(2−y)+2f(1)
for y > 1 (i.e. we flip and mirror f on [1, 2]). Then the sequence f0, f1, . . . is
uniformly computable and converges pointwise to f ′, so f ′ is of effective Baire
class 1 by Proposition 6.3.3. 
6.4. Continuity of Baire class 1 functions
At the basis of this section lies the following important classical result.
Theorem 6.4.1. (Baire) Let f : [0, 1]→ R be of (non-effective) Baire class 1.
Then the points of discontinuity of f form a meagre Σ02 set.
Proof. See Kechris [50, Theorem 24.14] or Oxtoby [90, Theorem 7.3]. 
We will now effectivise this result.
Theorem 6.4.2. Let f : [0, 1] → R be of effective Baire class 1. Then f is
continuous at every 1-generic point.
Proof. We effectivise the proof from Kechris [50, Theorem 24.14]. Let
U0, U1, . . . be an effective enumeration of the basic open sets. Now f is con-
tinuous at x if and only if the inverse image of every neighbourhood of f(x) is a
neighbourhood of x. Thus, f is discontinuous at x if and only if there exists an
open set U containing f(x) such that every open set contained in f−1(U) does not
contain x. Hence
{x ∈ [0, 1] | f is discontinous at x} =
⋃
n∈ω
f−1(Un) \ Int(f−1(Un)).
Now, let x be such that f is discontinuous at x and let n be such that
x ∈ f−1(Un) \ Int(f−1(Un)). Because f is of effective Baire class 1, we know that
f−1(Un) is Σ02. So, let f
−1(Un) =
⋃
i∈ω Vi, where each Vi is Π
0
1. Then it is directly
verified that
f−1(Un) \ Int(f−1(Un)) ⊆
⋃
i∈ω
(Vi \ Int(Vi)).
Let i be such that x ∈ Vi \ Int(Vi). Then x is not 1-generic by Definition 6.2.3. 
Combining this result with the fact that derivatives of computable functions
are of effective Baire class 1, we get the first implication of Theorem 6.1.1 as a
consequence.
Theorem 6.4.3. If f : [0, 1] → R is a computable function, then f ′ is
continuous at every 1-generic real.
Proof. From Corollary 6.3.4 and Theorem 6.4.2. 
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6.5. Functions discontinuous at non-1-generics
In this section we will prove the second implication of Theorem 6.1.1. To this
end, we will build, for each Π01 class V , a Volterra-style differentiable computable
function whose derivative will fail to be continuous at the points whose non-1-
genericity is witnessed by V . We have to be careful in order to make this function
computable.
Theorem 6.5.1. Let V be a Π01 class. Then there exists a differentiable
computable function f : [0, 1] → R such that f ′ is discontinuous at every x ∈
V \ Int(V ).
Proof. In the construction of f below, we first define auxiliary functions g
and h.
Construction. We define an auxiliary function g, with the property that g is
differentiable and computable, and g′ is continuous on (0, 1) and discontinuous at
0 and 1.
Define the function h on [0, 1] by h(0) = 0 and
h(x) = x2 sin(
1
x2
)
for x > 0. Then h is computable and differentiable, with derivative h′(0) = 0 and
h′(x) = 2x sin(
1
x2
)− 2 1
x
cos(
1
x2
)
when x > 0. Note that h′ is discontinuous at x = 0. Fix a computable x0 ∈ (0, 12 ]
such that h′(x0) = 0. Such an x0 exists, because h′ has isolated roots, and isolated
roots of computable functions are computable. Now define g on [0, 1] by
g(x) =

0 if x = 0
h(x) if x ∈ (0, x0]
h(x0) if x ∈ [x0, 1− x0]
h(1− x) if x ∈ [1− x0, 1)
0 if x = 1.
Then g is a differentiable computable function, with derivative
g′(x) =

0 if x = 0
h′(x) if x ∈ (0, x0]
0 if x ∈ [x0, 1− x0]
−h′(1− x) if x ∈ [1− x0, 1)
0 if x = 1.
In particular, we see that g′ is continuous exactly on (0, 1). We will use g to
construct f .
For the given Π01 class V , let U = [0, 1] \ V , and fix computable enumerations
q0, q1, . . . and r0, r1, . . . of rational numbers in [0, 1] such that U =
⋃
n∈ω[qn, rn]
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and such that the (qn, rn) are pairwise disjoint. We will construct f as a sum of a
sequence f0, f1, . . . of uniformly computable functions. We define fn by:
(13) fn(x) =

0 if x ∈ [0, qn]
rn − qn
2n
g
(
x− qn
rn − qn
)
if x ∈ [qn, rn]
0 if x ∈ [rn, 1].
Finally, we let f =
∑∞
n=0 fn.
Verification. We first show that f is computable. To this end, first observe
that each fn is supported on (qn, rn), and therefore the supports of the different
fn are disjoint. Furthermore, each fn is bounded by 2
−n.
Let (a, b) be a basic open subset of R. We distinguish two cases. First, assume
0 6∈ (a, b). We assume a > 0, the case b < 0 is proven in a similar way. Let n ∈ ω
be such that 2−n < a. Then, since the supports of the fm are disjoint, and each
fm is bounded by 2
−m, we have
f−1((a, b)) = (f0 + · · ·+ fn)−1((a, b)),
which is Σ01 because a finite sum of computable functions is computable.
In the second case, we have 0 ∈ (a, b). Let n be such that |a|, |b| ≥ 2−n. Then,
again because the supports of the fm are disjoint, we see that if x is not in the
support of any fm for m ≤ n then certainly f(x) ∈ (a, b). Therefore we have
f−1((a, b)) = (f0 + · · ·+ fn)−1((a, b)) ∪
⋂
m≤n
([0, 1] \ [qm, rm]),
which is also Σ01. It is clear that the case distinction is uniformly computable, so it
follows that f is computable.
Next, we check that f is differentiable. We first note that every fn is differenti-
able, because g is differentiable. Let x ∈ [0, 1]. We distinguish two cases. First, if x
is in some (qn, rn) then it is immediate that f is differentiable at x with derivative
f ′n(x), because the intervals (qn, rn) are disjoint. Next, we consider the case where
x is not in any interval (qn, rn). Note that in this case we have f(x) = 0. Fix
m ∈ ω. Then we have:
lim
y→x
∣∣∣∣ f(y)y − x
∣∣∣∣ ≤ limy→x
∣∣∣∣ (f0 + · · ·+ fm)(y)y − x
∣∣∣∣+ limy→x
∣∣∣∣ (fm+1 + fm+2 + . . . )(y)y − x
∣∣∣∣ .
Because f0 + · · ·+ fm is differentiable at x with derivative 0, this is equal to:
lim
y→x
∣∣∣∣ (fm+1 + fm+2 + . . . )(y)y − x
∣∣∣∣ .(14)
To show that this limit is 0, we will prove that it is bounded by 12m(1−x0) for
every m. Let y ∈ [0, 1] be distinct from x. Let us assume that x < y; the other
case is proven in the same way. If y is not in any (qn, rn) for n ≥ m + 1 then
(fm+1 + fm+2 + . . . )(y) = 0. Otherwise, there is exactly one such n. Then:∣∣∣∣ (fm+1 + fm+2 + . . . )(y)y − x
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣fn(y)y − x
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣∣ fn(y)y − qn
∣∣∣∣ ,
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where the last inequality follows from the fact that x does not lie in (qn, rn). We
distinguish three cases. First, if z = y−qnrn−qn ∈ (0, x0], then∣∣∣∣ fn(y)y − qn
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣2−n(rn − qn)g(z)y − qn
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣2−nz sin(z−2)∣∣ ≤ 2−n ≤ 12m(1− x0) .
Next, if z ∈ [x0, 1− x0] (which is non-empty because x0 ≤ 12 ), then∣∣∣∣ fn(y)y − qn
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2−n(rn − qn)x20y − qn = 2
−nx20
z
≤ x02−n ≤ 1
2m(1− x0)
where we use the fact that z ≥ x0. Finally, if z ∈ [1− x0, 1], then∣∣∣∣ fn(y)y − qn
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣2−n(rn − qn)h(1− z)y − qn
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 12nz ≤ 12n(1− x0) ≤ 12m(1− x0) .
Combining this with (14) we see that limy→x
∣∣∣ f(y)y−x ∣∣∣ ≤ 12m(1−x0) . Since m was
arbitrary this shows that f is differentiable at x, with derivative f ′(x) = 0.
Finally, we need to verify that f ′ is discontinuous at x for all x ∈ V \ Int(V ).
Therefore, let x ∈ V \ Int(V ). Then every open set W containing x has non-empty
intersection W ∩U (recall that U = [0, 1]\V ), but this intersection does not contain
x. We have shown above that f ′(x) = 0. We will show that for every open interval
I containing x there is a point y ∈ I such that f ′(y) ≤ −1, which clearly shows
that f ′ cannot be continuous at x. Fix an open interval I containing x. Then
I ∩ U 6= ∅, so there is an n ∈ ω such that I ∩ [qn, rn] is non-empty. Note that
I contains x and therefore I cannot be a subinterval of [qn, rn]. Therefore there
exists a qn < s < ri such that either [qn, s) ⊆ I or (s, rn] ⊆ I. We will assume the
first case; the second case is proven in a similar way.
Note that on [qn, s) the function f
′ is equal to f ′n. For y ∈ (qn, s) we thus have:
f ′(y) = 2−ng′((y − qn)/(rn − qn)).
So, we need to show that there is a y ∈ (qn, s) such that g′((y−qn)/(rn−qn)) ≤ −2n,
or equivalently, that there is a z ∈ (0, (s− qn)/(rn − qn)) such that g′(z) ≤ −2n.
Without loss of generality, (s − qn)/(rn − qn) < x0. Let k ≥ n be such that
2−k ≤ s−qnrn−qn . Then:
g′
(
1/
(
2k
√
pi
))
=
1
2k−1
√
pi
sin(22kpi)− 2k+1√pi cos(22kpi)
= −2k+1√pi ≤ −2k ≤ −2n.
This completes the verification. 
Theorem 6.5.2. If x ∈ [0, 1] is such that every differentiable computable
function f : [0, 1]→ R has continuous derivative at x, then x is 1-generic.
Proof. If x is not 1-generic, then there is a Π01 class V such that x ∈ V \Int(V ).
Applying Theorem 6.5.1 to V gives a differentiable computable function f for which
f ′ is discontinuous at x. 
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6.6. n-Genericity
The notion of 1-genericity corresponds to the first level of the arithmetical
hierarchy. Higher genericity notions can be defined using forcing conditions from
higher levels of the arithmetical hierarchy. As for 1-genericity, an equivalent
formulation can be given as follows, see Jockusch [14]:
Definition 6.6.1. An element x ∈ 2ω is n-generic if x meets every Σ0n set of
strings A ⊆ 2<ω that is dense along x.
As usual, let ∅′ denote the halting set, and let ∅(n) denote the n-th jump. Since
a Σ0n set of strings is the same as a Σ
0
1 set of strings relative to ∅(n−1), a set is
n-generic if and only if it is 1-generic relative to ∅(n−1).
Corollary 6.2.2 relativises to:
Proposition 6.6.2. For any x ∈ 2ω we have that x is n-generic if and only
if for every Π0,∅
(n−1)
1 class V ⊆ 2ω we have x 6∈ V \ Int(V ).
Note that in general a Π0,∅
(n−1)
1 class in 2
ω is not the same as a Π0n class, since
the latter need not even be closed. (And even if one assumes that the class is
closed the notions are not the same, see [25, p76].)
Given this equivalence, we can now generalise Definition 6.2.3 to:
Definition 6.6.3. Let x ∈ [0, 1]. We say that x is n-generic if for every
Π0,∅
(n−1)
1 class V ⊆ [0, 1] we have x 6∈ V \ Int(V ).
Further justification for this definition comes from the fact that Proposition 6.2.4
relativises: An irrational x ∈ [0, 1] is n-generic according to Definition 6.6.3 if and
only if its binary expansion is n-generic in 2ω.
It is straightforward to check that the results of all the previous sections
relativise to an arbitrary oracle A. This gives the following relativised version of
Theorem 6.1.1:
Theorem 6.6.4. A real x ∈ [0, 1] is 1-generic relative to A if and only if for
every differentiable A-computable function f : [0, 1]→ R, f ′ is continuous at x.
Taking A = ∅(n−1), this immediately gives the following characterisation of
n-genericity:
Corollary 6.6.5. A real x ∈ [0, 1] is n-generic if and only if for every
differentiable ∅(n−1)-computable function f : [0, 1]→ R, f ′ is continuous at x.
Also, taking all n together, we see that a real x is arithmetically generic if and
only if every differentiable arithmetical function has continuous derivative at x.
6.7. Multiply differentiable functions
We have characterised 1-genericity using the continuity of the derivatives of
(once) differentiable computable functions. One might wonder: what kind of
effective genericity for x corresponds to every twice differentiable, computable
function having continuous second derivative at x? Or, more generally, what
corresponds to every n times differentiable, computable function having continuous
80 6. EFFECTIVE GENERICITY AND DIFFERENTIABILITY
nth derivative at x? It turns out that the answer is always 1-genericity. To show
this we will need the following proposition, which essentially tells us that the case
for n > 2 collapses to the case n = 2.
Proposition 6.7.1. Let f : [0, 1]→ R be computable and twice continuously
differentiable. Then f ′ is computable.
Proof. See e.g. Pour-El and Richards [96, Theorem 1.2]. 
If the second derivative of a computable function exists, it is easy to see that
it is of effective Baire class 2 (i.e. a pointwise limit of a computable sequence
of functions of effective Baire class 1), by similar arguments as in the proof of
Corollary 6.3.4 However, using the following proposition we can easily see that the
second derivative of a computable function is in fact of effective Baire class 1.
Proposition 6.7.2. Let f : [0, 1]→ R be twice differentiable. Then
f ′′(x) = lim
h→0
f(x+ h) + f(x− h)− 2f(x)
h2
.
Proof. See e.g. Rudin [99, p. 115]. 
Theorem 6.7.3. Fix n ≥ 1. Then a real x ∈ [0, 1] is 1-generic if and only if
every n times differentiable, computable function f : [0, 1]→ R has continuous nth
derivative at x.
Proof. For n = 1 this is exactly Theorem 6.1.1. So, we may assume n ≥ 2.
First, if x ∈ [0, 1] is not 1-generic, then by Theorem 6.1.1 there is a differentiable,
computable function g : [0, 1] → R such that g′ is not continuous at x. Now let
h1 = g and let hi be a computable antiderivative of hi−1 for 2 ≤ i ≤ n (which
exists by Ko [57, Theorem 5.29]). Then, if we let f = hn, we see that f is an n
times differentiable, computable function such that f (n) is discontinuous at x.
Conversely, if f is an n times differentiable, computable function, then f (n−2) is
computable by Proposition 6.7.1. So, f (n) is of effective Baire class 1 by Proposition
6.7.2. Thus, if f (n) is discontinuous at x, then x is not 1-generic by Theorem
6.4.2. 
6.8. Complexity-theoretic considerations
In this section we discuss polynomial time computable real functions. The
theory of these functions is developed in Ko [57], to which we refer the reader for
the basic results and definitions. Briefly, a function f : [0, 1] → R is polynomial
time computable if for any x ∈ [0, 1] we can compute an approximate value of f(x)
to within an error of 2−n in time nk for some constant k.
Most of the common functions from analysis, such as rational functions and
the trigonometric functions, as well as their inverses, are all polynomial time
computable, see e.g. Brent [12] and Weihrauch [124]. Also, the polynomial time
computable functions are closed under composition. With this knowledge, it is not
difficult to see that the construction of the function f in section 6.5 can be modified
to yield a polynomial time computable function, rather than just a computable one.
For this it is also needed that the complement of the Π01 class V from Theorem 6.5.1
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can be represented by a polynomial time computable set of strings. This is similar
to the fact that every non-empty computably enumerable set is the range of a
polynomial time computable function, simply by sufficiently slowing down the
enumeration. Since the enumeration of U = [0, 1] \ V in the proof of Theorem 6.5.1
is now slower, the definition of fn in (13) has to be adapted by replacing 2
n by
2t(n), where t(n) is the stage at which the interval (qn, rn) is enumerated into U .
This modification ensures that the functions fn are uniformly polynomial time
computable, so that also the function f =
∑∞
n=0 fn, is polynomial time computable.
Thus we obtain the following strengthening of Theorem 6.5.1:
Theorem 6.8.1. Let V be a Π01 class. Then there exists a differentiable
polynomial time computable function f : [0, 1]→ R such that f ′ is discontinuous at
every x ∈ V \ Int(V ).
We now have the following variant of Theorem 6.1.1:
Theorem 6.8.2. A real x ∈ [0, 1] is 1-generic if and only if for every differ-
entiable polynomial time computable function f : [0, 1] → R, f ′ is continuous at
x.
Proof. The “only if” direction is immediate from Theorem 6.1.1. For the “if”
direction; if x is not 1-generic, then there is a Π01 class V such that x ∈ V \ Int(V ).
Theorem 6.8.1 then gives a differentiable polynomial time computable function f
for which f ′ is discontinuous at x. 

CHAPTER 7
Coarse Reducibility and Algorithmic Randomness
This chapter is based on Hirschfeldt, Jockusch, Kuyper and Schupp [38].
7.1. Introduction
There are many natural problems with high worst-case complexity that are
nevertheless easy to solve in most instances. The notion of “generic-case complexity”
was introduced by Kapovich, Myasnikov, Schupp, and Shpilrain [48] as a notion
that is more tractable than average-case complexity but still allows a somewhat
nuanced analysis of such problems. That paper also introduced the idea of generic
computability, which captures the idea of having a partial algorithm that correctly
computes A(n) for “almost all” n, while never giving an incorrect answer. Jockusch
and Schupp [15] began the general computability-theoretic investigation of generic
computability and also defined the idea of coarse computability, which captures
the idea of having a total algorithm that always answers and may make mistakes,
but correctly computes A(n) for “almost all” n. We are here concerned with this
latter concept. We first need a good notion of “almost all” natural numbers.
Definition 7.1.1. Let A ⊆ ω. The density of A below n, denoted by ρn(A),
is |An|n . The upper density ρ(A) of A is lim supn ρn(A). The lower density ρ(A)
of A is lim infn ρn(A). If ρ(A) = ρ(A) then we call this quantity the density of A,
and denote it by ρ(A).
We say that D is a coarse description of X if ρ(D4X) = 0, where 4 denotes
symmetric difference. A set X is coarsely computable if it has a computable coarse
description.
This idea leads to natural notions of reducibility.
Definition 7.1.2. We say that Y is uniformly coarsely reducible to X, and
write Y ≤uc X, if there is a Turing functional Φ such that if D is a coarse description
of X, then ΦD is a coarse description of Y . This reducibility induces an equivalence
relation ≡uc on 2ω. We call the equivalence class of X under this relation the
uniform coarse degree of X.
Uniform coarse reducibility, generic reducibility (defined in [15]), and several
related reducibilities have been termed notions of robust information coding by
Dzhafarov and Igusa [27]. Work on such notions has mainly focused on their
uniform versions. (One exception is a result on non-uniform ii-reducibility in
Hirschfeldt and Jockusch [37].) However, their non-uniform versions also seem to
be of interest. In particular, we will work with the following non-uniform version
of coarse reducibility.
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Definition 7.1.3. We say that Y is non-uniformly coarsely reducible to X,
and write Y ≤nc X, if every coarse description of X computes a coarse description
of Y . This reducibility induces an equivalence relation ≡nc on 2ω. We call the
equivalence class of X under this relation the non-uniform coarse degree of X.
Note that the coarsely computable sets form the least degree in both the uniform
and non-uniform coarse degrees. Uniform coarse reducibility clearly implies non-
uniform coarse reducibility. We will show in the next section that, as one might
expect, the converse fails. The development of the theory of notions of robust
information coding and related concepts have led to interactions with computability
theory (as in Jockusch and Schupp [15]; Downey, Jockusch and Schupp [24];
and Downey, Jockusch, McNicholl and Schupp [23]), reverse mathematics (as in
Dzhafarov and Igusa [27] and Hirschfeldt and Jockusch [37]), and algorithmic
randomness (as in Astor [3]).
In this chapter, we investigate connections between coarse reducibility and
algorithmic randomness. In section 7.2, we describe natural embeddings of the
Turing degrees into the uniform and non-uniform coarse degrees, and discuss some
of their basic properties. In section 7.3, we show that no weakly 2-random set can
be in the images of these embeddings by showing that if X is weakly 2-random
and A is non-computable, then there is some coarse description of X that does not
compute A. More generally, we show that if X is 1-random and A is computable
from every coarse description of X, then A is K-trivial. Our main tool is a kind
of compactness theorem for cone-avoiding descriptions. We also show that there
do exist non-computable sets computable from every coarse description of some
1-random set, but that not all K-trivial sets have this property. In section 7.4,
we give further examples of classes of sets that cannot be in the images of our
embeddings. In section 7.5, we show that if two sets are relatively weakly 3-random
then their coarse degrees form a minimal pair, in both the uniform and non-uniform
cases, but that, at least for the non-uniform coarse degrees, the same is not true of
every pair of relatively 2-random sets. These results are analogous to the fact that,
for the Turing degrees, two relatively weakly 2-random sets always form a minimal
pair, but two relatively 1-random sets may not. In section 7.6, we conclude with a
few open questions.
For S ⊆ 2<ω, we write JSK for the open subset of 2ω generated by S, that is,JSK = {X : ∃n (X  n ∈ S)}. We denote the uniform measure on 2ω by µ.
7.2. Coarsenings and embeddings of the Turing degrees
We can embed the Turing degrees into both the uniform and non-uniform coarse
degrees, and our first connection between coarse computability and algorithmic
randomness comes from considering such embeddings. While there may be several
ways to define such embeddings, a natural way to proceed is to define a map
C : 2ω → 2ω such that C(A) contains the same information as A, but coded in a
“coarsely robust” way. That is, we would like C(A) to be computable from A, and
A to be computable from any coarse description of C(A).
In the case of the uniform coarse degrees, one might think that the latter
reduction should be uniform, but that condition would be too strong: if ΓD = A
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for every coarse description D of C(A) then Γσ(n)↓ ⇒ Γσ(n) = A(n) (since every
string can be extended to a coarse description of C(A)), which, together with the
fact that for each n there is a σ such that Γσ(n)↓, implies that A is computable.
Thus we relax the uniformity condition slightly in the following definition.
Definition 7.2.1. A map C : 2ω → 2ω is a coarsening if for each A we have
C(A) ≤T A, and for each coarse description D of C(A), we have A ≤T D. A
coarsening C is uniform if there is a binary Turing functional Γ with the following
properties for every coarse description D of C(A):
1. ΓD is total.
2. Let As(n) = Γ
D(n, s). Then As = A for cofinitely many s.
Proposition 7.2.2. Let C and F be coarsenings and A and B be sets. Then
1. B ≤T A if and only if C(B) ≤nc C(A),
2. If C is uniform then B ≤T A if and only if C(B) ≤uc C(A),
3. C(A) ≡nc F(A), and
4. If C and F are both uniform then C(A) ≡uc F(A).
Proof. 1. Suppose that C(B) ≤nc C(A). Then C(A) computes a coarse
description D1 of C(B). Thus B ≤T D1 ≤T C(A) ≤T A.
Now suppose that B ≤T A and let D2 be a coarse description of C(A). Then
C(B) ≤T B ≤T A ≤T D2. Thus C(B) ≤nc C(A).
2. Suppose that C is uniform and that B ≤T A. Let D2 be a coarse description
of C(A). Let As be as in Definition 7.2.1, with D = D2. Then C(B) ≤T B ≤T A,
so let Φ be such that ΦA = C(B). Let X ≤T D2 be defined as follows. Given
n, search for an s > n such that ΦAs(n)↓ and let X(n) = ΦAs(n). (Note that
such an s must exist.) Then X(n) = ΦA(n) = C(B)(n) for almost all n, so X is
a coarse description of C(B). Since X is obtained uniformly from D2, we have
C(B) ≤uc C(A). The converse follows immediately from 1.
3. Let D3 be a coarse description of F(A). Then C(A) ≤T A ≤T D3. Thus
C(A) ≤nc F(A). By symmetry, C(A) ≡nc F(A).
4. If F is uniform then the same argument as in the proof of 2 shows that we
can obtain a coarse description of C(A) uniformly from D3, whence C(A) ≤uc F(A).
If C is also uniform then C(A) ≡uc F(A) by symmetry. 
Thus uniform coarsenings all induce the same natural embeddings. It remains to
show that uniform coarsenings exist. One example is given by Dzhafarov and Igusa
[27]. We give a similar example. Let In = [n!, (n+ 1)!) and let I(A) =
⋃
n∈A In;
this map first appeared in Jockusch and Schupp [15]. Clearly I(A) ≤T A, and it is
easy to check that if D is a coarse description of I(A) then D computes A. Thus
I is a coarsening.
To construct a uniform coarsening, let H(A) = {〈n, i〉 : n ∈ A ∧ i ∈ ω}
and define E(A) = I(H(A)). The notation E denotes this particular coarsening
throughout this chapter.
Proposition 7.2.3. The map E is a uniform coarsening.
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Proof. Clearly E(A) ≤T A. Now let D be a coarse description of E(A). Let
G = {m : |D ∩ Im| > |Im|2 } and let As = {n : 〈n, s〉 ∈ G}. Then G =∗ H(A), so
As = A for all but finitely many s, and the As are obtained uniformly from D. 
A first natural question is whether uniform coarse reducibility and non-uniform
coarse reducibility are indeed different. We give a positive answer by showing
that, unlike in the non-uniform case, the mappings E and I are not equivalent
up to uniform coarse reducibility. Recall that a set X is autoreducible if there
exists a Turing functional Φ such that for every n ∈ ω we have ΦX\{n}(n) = X(n).
Equivalently, we could require that Φ not ask whether its input belongs to its
oracle. We now introduce a ∆02-version of this notion.
Definition 7.2.4. A set X is jump-autoreducible if there exists a Turing
functional Φ such that for every n ∈ ω we have Φ(X\{n})′(n) = X(n).
Proposition 7.2.5. Let X be such that E(X) ≤uc I(X). Then X is jump-
autoreducible.
Proof. We must give a procedure for computing X(n) from (X \{n})′ that is
uniform in X. Given an oracle for X \ {n}, we can uniformly compute I(X \ {n}).
Now I(X \ {n}) =∗ I(X), so I(X \ {n}) is a coarse description of I(X). Since
E(X) ≤uc I(X) by assumption, from I(X \{n}) we can uniformly compute a coarse
description D of E(X). Since E is a uniform coarsening by Proposition 7.2.3, from
D we can uniformly obtain sets A0, A1, . . . with As = X for all sufficiently large s.
Composing these various reductions, from X \ {n} we can uniformly compute sets
A0, A1, . . . with As = X for all sufficiently large s. Then from (X \ {n})′ we can
uniformly compute limsAs(n) = X(n), as needed. 
We will now show that 2-generic sets are not jump-autoreducible, which will
give us a first example separating uniform coarse reducibility and non-uniform
coarse reducibility. For this we first show that no 1-generic set is autoreducible,
which is an easy exercise.
Proposition 7.2.6. If X is 1-generic, then X is not autoreducible.
Proof. Suppose for the sake of a contradiction that X is 1-generic and is
autoreducible via Φ. For a string σ, let σ−1(i) be the set of n such that σ(n) = i.
If τ is a binary string, let τ \ {n} be the unique binary string µ of the same
length such that µ−1(1) = τ−1(1) \ {n}. Let S be the set of strings τ such that
Φτ\{n}(n)↓ 6= τ(n)↓ for some n. Then S is a c.e. set of strings and X does not
meet S. Since X is 1-generic, there is a string σ ≺ X that has no extension in S.
Let n = |σ|, and let τ  σ be a string such that Φτ\{n}(n)↓. Such a string τ exists
because σ ≺ X and Φ witnesses that X is autoreducible. Furthermore, we may
assume that τ(n) 6= Φτ\{n}, since changing the value of τ(n) does not affect any of
the conditions in the choice of τ . Hence τ is an extension of σ and τ ∈ S, which is
the desired contradiction. 
Proposition 7.2.7. If X is 2-generic, then X is not jump-autoreducible.
Proof. Since X is 2-generic, X is 1-generic relative to ∅′. Hence, by relativ-
ising the proof of the previous proposition to ∅′, we see that X is not autoreducible
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relative to ∅′. However, the class of 1-generic sets is uniformly GL1, i.e., there exists
a single Turing functional Ψ such that for every 1-generic X we have ΨX⊕∅
′
= X ′,
as can be verified by looking at the usual proof that every 1-generic is GL1 (see [14,
Lemma 2.6]). Of course, if X is 1-generic, then X \ {n} is also 1-generic for every
n. Thus from an oracle for (X \ {n})⊕ ∅′ we can uniformly compute (X \ {n})′.
Now, if X is jump-autoreducible, from (X \ {n})′ we can uniformly compute
X(n). Composing these reductions shows that X(n) is uniformly computable from
(X \ {n})⊕ ∅′, which contradicts our previous remark that X is not autoreducible
relative to ∅′. 
Corollary 7.2.8. If X is 2-generic, then E(X) ≤nc I(X) but E(X) uc I(X).
Proof. We know that E(X) ≤nc I(X) from Proposition 7.2.2. The fact that
E(X) uc I(X) follows from Propositions 7.2.5 and 7.2.7. 
It is natural to ask whether the same result holds for 2-random sets. In the
proof above we used the fact that the 2-generic sets are uniformly GL1. For 2-
random sets this fact is almost true, as expressed by the following lemma. The proof
is adapted from Monin [82], where a generalisation for higher levels of randomness
is proved. Let U0, U1, . . . be a fixed universal Martin-Lo¨f test relative to ∅′. The
2-randomness deficiency of a 2-random X is the least c such that X /∈ Uc.
Lemma 7.2.9. There is a Turing functional Θ such that, for a 2-random X
and an upper bound b on the 2-randomness deficiency of X, we have ΘX⊕∅
′,b = X ′.
Proof. Let Ve = {Z : e ∈ Z ′}. The Ve are uniformly Σ01 classes, so we can
define a function f ≤T ∅′ such that µ(Ve \ Ve[f(e, i)]) < 2−i for all e and i. Then
each sequence Ve \Ve[f(e, 0)],Ve \Ve[f(e, 1)], . . . is an ∅′-Martin Lo¨f test, and from
b we can compute a number m such that if X is 2-random and b bounds the
2-randomness deficiency of X, then X /∈ Ve \ Ve[f(e,m)]. Then X ∈ Ve if and only
if X ∈ Ve[f(e,m)], which we can verify (X ⊕ ∅′)-computably. 
Proposition 7.2.10. If X is 2-random, then X is not jump-autoreducible.
Proof. Because X is 2-random, it is not autoreducible relative to ∅′, as can be
seen by relativising the proof of Figueira, Miller and Nies [29] that no 1-random set
is autoreducible. To obtain a contradiction, assume that X is jump-autoreducible
through some functional Φ. It can be directly verified that there is a computable
function f such that f(n) bounds the randomness deficiency of X \ {n}. Now let
ΨY⊕∅
′
(n) = ΦΘ
Y⊕∅′,f(n)
(n). Then X is autoreducible relative to ∅′ through Ψ, a
contradiction. 
Corollary 7.2.11. If X is 2-random, then E(X) ≤nc I(X) but E(X) uc
I(X).
Although we will not discuss generic reducibility after this section, it is worth
noting that our maps E and I also allow us to distinguish generic reducibility from
its non-uniform analogue. Let us briefly review the relevant definitions from [15].
A generic description of a set A is a partial function that agrees with A where
defined, and whose domain has density 1. A set A is generically reducible to a
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set B, written A ≤g B, if there is an enumeration operator W such that if Φ is a
generic description of B, then W graph(Φ) is the graph of a generic description of
A. We can define the notion of non-uniform generic reducibility in a similar way:
A ≤ng B if for every generic description Φ of B, there is a generic description Ψ of
A such that graph(Ψ) is enumeration reducible to graph(Φ).
It is easy to see that E(X) ≤ng I(X) for all X. On the other hand, we have
the following fact.
Proposition 7.2.12. If E(X) ≤g I(X) then X is autoreducible.
Proof. Let In be as in the definition of I. Suppose that W witnesses that
E(X) ≤g I(X). We can assume that WZ is the graph of a partial function for
every oracle Z. Define a Turing functional Θ as follows. Given an oracle Y and an
input n, let Φ(k) = Y (m) if k ∈ Im and m 6= n, and let Φ(k)↑ if k ∈ In. Let Ψ be
the partial function with graph W graph(Φ). Search for an i and a k ∈ I〈n,i〉 such
that Ψ(k)↓. If such numbers are found then let ΘY (n) = Ψ(k). If Y = X \ {n}
then Φ is a generic description of I(X), so Ψ is a generic description of E(X), and
hence ΘY (n)↓ = X(n). Thus X is autoreducible. 
We finish this section by showing that, for both the uniform and the non-
uniform coarse degrees, coarsenings of the appropriate type preserve joins but do
not always preserve existing meets.
Proposition 7.2.13. Let C be a coarsening. Then C(A⊕B) is the least upper
bound of C(A) and C(B) in the non-uniform coarse degrees. The same holds for
the uniform coarse degrees if C is a uniform coarsening.
Proof. By Proposition 7.2.2 we know that C(A ⊕ B) is an upper bound
for C(A) and C(B) in both the uniform and non-uniform coarse degrees. Let us
show that it is the least upper bound. If C(A), C(B) ≤nc G then every coarse
description D of G computes both A and B, so D ≥T A⊕B ≥T C(A⊕B). Thus
G ≥nc C(A⊕B).
Finally, assume that C is a uniform coarsening and let C(A), C(B) ≤uc G. Let
Φ be a Turing functional such that ΦA⊕B = C(A⊕B). Every coarse description H
of G uniformly computes coarse descriptions D1 of C(A) and D2 of C(B). Since C is
uniform, there are Turing functionals Γ and ∆ such that, letting As(n) = Γ
D1(n, s)
and Bs(n) = Γ
D2(n, s), we have that A⊕B = As⊕Bs for all sufficiently large s. Let
E be defined as follows. Given n, search for an s ≥ n such that ΦAs⊕Bs(n)↓, and let
E(n) = ΦAs⊕Bs(n). If n is sufficiently large, then E(n) = ΦA⊕B(n) = C(A⊕B)(n),
so E is a coarse description of C(A⊕B). Since E is obtained uniformly from H,
we have that C(A⊕B) ≤uc G. 
Lemma 7.2.14. Let C be a uniform coarsening and let Y ≤T X. Then
Y ≤uc C(X).
Proof. Let Φ be a Turing functional such that ΦX = Y . Let D be a coarse
description of C(X) and let As be as in Definition 7.2.1. Now define G(n) to be
the value of ΦAs(n) for the least pair 〈s, t〉 such that s ≥ n and ΦAs(n)[t]↓. Then
G =∗ Y , so G is a coarse description of Y . 
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Proposition 7.2.15. Let C be a coarsening. Then C does not always preserve
existing meets in the non-uniform coarse degrees. The same holds for the uniform
coarse degrees if C is a uniform coarsening.
Proof. Let X,Y be relatively 2-random and ∆03. Then X and Y form a
minimal pair in the Turing degrees, while X and Y do not form a minimal pair
in the non-uniform coarse degrees by Theorem 7.5.6 below. Since every coarse
description of C(X) computes X we see that C(X) ≥nc X and C(Y ) ≥nc Y .
Therefore C(X) and C(Y ) also do not form a minimal pair in the non-uniform
coarse degrees.
Next, let C be a uniform coarsening. We have seen above that there exists
some A ≤nc C(X), C(Y ) that is not coarsely computable. Then A ≤T X,Y , so
A ≤uc C(X), C(Y ) by the previous lemma. Thus, C(X) and C(Y ) do not form a
minimal pair in the uniform coarse degrees. 
7.3. Randomness, K-triviality and robust information coding
It is reasonable to expect that the embeddings induced by E (or equivalently,
by any uniform coarsening) are not surjective. Indeed, if E(A) ≤uc X then the
information represented by A is coded into X in a fairly redundant way. If A is
non-computable, it should follow that X cannot be random. As we will see, we
can make this intuition precise.
Definition 7.3.1. Let Xc be the set of all A such that A is computable from
every coarse description of X.
We will show that if X is weakly 2-random then Xc = 0, and hence E(A) nc X
for all non-computable A (since every coarse description of E(A) computes A).
Since no 1-random set can be coarsely computable, it will follow that X 6≡nc E(B)
and X 6≡uc E(B) for all B. We will first prove the following theorem. Let K be the
class of K-trivial sets. (See [25] or [86] for more on K-triviality.)
Theorem 7.3.2. If X is 1-random then Xc ⊆ K.
By Downey, Nies, Weber and Yu [26], if X is weakly 2-random then it cannot
compute any non-computable ∆02 sets. Since K ⊂ ∆02, our desired result follows
from Theorem 7.3.2.
Corollary 7.3.3. If X is weakly 2-random then Xc = 0, and hence E(A) nc
X for all noncomputable A. In particular, in both the uniform and non-uniform
coarse degrees, the degree of X is not in the image of the embedding induced by E.
To prove Theorem 7.3.2, we use the fact, established by Hirschfeldt, Nies and
Stephan [40], that A is K-trivial if and only if A is a base for 1-randomness, that
is, A is computable in a set that is 1-random relative to A. The basic idea is to
show that if X is 1-random and A ∈ Xc, then for each k > 1 there is a way to
partition X into k many “slices” X0, . . . , Xk−1 such that for each i < k, we have
A ≤T X0 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Xi−1 ⊕ Xi+1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Xk−1 (where the right-hand side of this
inequality denotes X1⊕· · ·⊕Xk−1 when i = 0 and X0⊕· · ·⊕Xk−2 when i = k−1).
It will then follow by van Lambalgen’s Theorem (which will be discussed below)
that each Xi is 1-random relative to X0⊕ · · ·⊕Xi−1⊕Xi+1⊕ · · ·⊕Xk−1⊕A, and
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hence, again by van Lambalgen’s Theorem, that X is 1-random relative to A. Since
A ∈ Xc implies that A ≤T X, we will conclude that A is a base for 1-randomness,
and hence is K-trivial. We begin with some notation for certain partitions of X.
Definition 7.3.4. Let X ⊆ ω. For an infinite subset Z = {z0 < z1 < · · · } of
ω, let X  Z = {n : zn ∈ X}. For k > 1 and i < k, define
Xki = X  {n : n ≡ i mod k} and Xk6=i = X  {n : n 6≡ i mod k}.
Note that Xk6=i ≡T X \ {n : n ≡ i mod k} and ρ(X4(X \ {n : n ≡ i mod k})) ≤ 1k .
Van Lambalgen’s Theorem [71] states that Y ⊕ Z is 1-random if and only if Y
and Z are relatively 1-random. The proof of this theorem shows, more generally,
that if Z is computable, infinite, and coinfinite, then X is 1-random if and only
if X  Z and X  Z are relatively 1-random. Relativising this fact and applying
induction, we get the following version of van Lambalgen’s Theorem.
Theorem 7.3.5. (van Lambalgen [71]) The following are equivalent for all
sets X and A, and all k > 1.
1. X is 1-random relative to A.
2. For each i < k, the set Xki is 1-random relative to X
k
6=i ⊕A.
The last ingredient we need for the proof of Theorem 7.3.2 is a kind of
compactness principle, which will also be used to yield further results in the next
section, and is of independent interest given its connection with the following
concept defined in [39].
Definition 7.3.6. Let r ∈ [0, 1]. A set X is coarsely computable at density r
if there is a computable set C such that ρ(X4C) ≤1−r. The coarse computability
bound of X is
γ(X) = sup{r : X is coarsely computable at density r}.
As noted in [39], there are sets X such that γ(X) = 1 but X is not coarsely
computable. In other words, there is no principle of “compactness of computable
coarse descriptions” principle. (Although Miller (see [39, Theorem 5.8]) showed
that one can in fact recover such a principle by adding a further effectivity condition
to the requirement that γ(X) = 1.) The following theorem shows that if we replace
“computable” by “cone-avoiding”, the situation is different.
Theorem 7.3.7. Let A and X be arbitrary sets. Suppose that for each ε > 0
there is a set Dε such that ρ(X4Dε) ≤ ε and A T Dε. Then there is a coarse
description D of X such that A T D.
Proof. The basic idea is that, given a Turing functional Φ and a string σ
that is “close to” X, we can extend σ to a string τ that is “close to” X such
that ΦD 6= A for all D extending τ that are “close to” X. We can take τ to be
any string “close to” X such that, for some n, either Φτ (n)↓ 6= A(n) or Φγ(n)↑
for all γ extending τ that are “close to” X. If no such τ exists, we can obtain a
contradiction by arguing that A ≤T Dε for sufficiently small ε, since with an oracle
for Dε we have access to many strings that are “close to” Dε and hence to X, by
the triangle inequality for Hamming distance. In the above discussion the meaning
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of “close to” is different in different contexts, but the precise version will be given
below. Further, as the construction proceeds, the meaning of “close to” becomes so
stringent that we guarantee that ρ(X4D) = 0. We now specify the formal details.
We obtain D as
⋃
e σe, where σe ∈ 2<ω and σ0 ( σ1 ( · · · . In order to ensure
that ρ(X4D) = 0, we require that for all e and all m in the interval [|σe|, |σe+1|],
either D and X agree on the interval [|σe|,m) or ρm(X4D) ≤ 2−|σe|, with the
latter true for m = |σe+1|. This condition implies that ρm(X4D) ≤ 2−|σe| for all
m ∈ [|σe+1|, |σe+2|], and hence that ρ(X4D) = 0.
Let σ and τ be strings and let ε be a positive real number. Call τ an ε-good
extension of σ if τ properly extends σ and for all m ∈ [|σ|, |τ |], either X and τ
agree on [|σ|,m) or ρm(τ4X) ≤ ε, with the latter true for m = |τ |. In line with
the previous paragraph, we require that σe+1 be a 2
−|σe|-good extension of σe for
all e.
At stage 0, let σ0 be the empty string. At stage e + 1, we are given σe and
choose σe+1 as follows so as to force that A 6= ΦDe . Let ε = 2−|σe|.
Case 1. There is a number n and a string τ that is an ε-good extension of σe
such that Φτe (n)↓ 6= A(n). Let σe+1 be such a τ .
Case 2. Case 1 does not hold and there is a number n and a string β that
is an ε-good extension of σe such that |β| ≥ |σe| + 2 and Φτe (n)↑ for all ε4 -good
extensions τ of β. Let σe+1 be such a β.
We claim that either Case 1 or Case 2 applies. Suppose not. Let D ε
5
be as in
the hypothesis of the lemma, so that ρ(X4D ε
5
) ≤ ε5 and A T D ε5 . Let c ≥ |σe|+2
be sufficiently large so that ρm(X4D ε5 ) ≤ ε4 for all m ≥ c and σe has an ε4 -good
extension β of length c. Note that the string obtained from σe by appending a
sufficiently long segment of X starting with X(|σe|) is an ε4 -good extension of σe,
so such a β exists, and we assume it is obtained in this manner.
We now obtain a contradiction by showing that A ≤T D ε5 . To calculate
A(n) search for a string γ extending β such that Φγe (n)↓, say with use u, and
ρm(D ε54γ) ≤ ε2 for all m ∈ [c, u). We first check that such a string γ exists. Since
Case 2 does not hold, there is a string τ that is an ε4 -good extension of β such that
Φτe (n)↓. We claim that τ meets the criteria to serve as γ. We need only check that
ρm(D ε54τ) ≤ ε2 for all m ∈ [c, u). Fix m ∈ [c, u). Then
ρm(D ε54τ) ≤ ρm(D ε54X) + ρm(X4τ) ≤
ε
4
+
ε
4
=
ε
2
.
Next we claim that γ is an ε-good extension of σe. The string γ extends σe
since it extends β, and β extends σe. Let m ∈ [|σe, |γ|] be given. If m < c, then γ
and X agree on the interval [|σe|,m) because β and X agree on this interval and γ
extends β. Now suppose that m ≥ c. Then
ρm(γ4X) ≤ ρm(γ4D ε5 ) + ρm(D ε54X) ≤
ε
2
+
ε
4
< ε.
Since γ is an ε-good extension of σe for which Φ
γ
e (n)↓, and Case 1 does not hold,
we conclude that Φγe (n) = A(n). The search for γ can be carried out computably
in D ε
5
, so we conclude that A ≤T D ε5 , contradicting our choice of D ε5 . (Although
β cannot be computed from D ε
5
, we may use it in our computation of A(n) since
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it is a fixed string which does not depend on n.) This contradiction shows that
Case 1 or Case 2 must apply.
Let D =
⋃
n σn. Then ρ(D4X) = 0, and A T D since Case 1 or Case 2
applies at every stage. 
Proof of Theorem 7.3.2. Let A ∈ Xc. By Theorem 7.3.7, there is an ε > 0
such that A ≤T Dε whenever ρ(X4Dε) ≤ ε. Let k be an integer such that k > 1ε .
As noted in Definition 7.3.4, Xk6=i is Turing equivalent to such a Dε for each i < k,
so we have A ≤T Xk6=i for all i < k. By the unrelativised form of Theorem 7.3.5,
each Xki is 1-random relative to X
k
6=i, and hence relative to X
k
6=i⊕A ≡T Xk6=i. Again
by Theorem 7.3.5, X is 1-random relative to A. But A ≤T X, so A is a base for
1-randomness, and hence is K-trivial. 
Weak 2-randomness is exactly the level of randomness necessary to obtain
Corollary 7.3.3 directly from Theorem 7.3.2, because, as shown in [26], if a 1-
random set is not weakly 2-random, then it computes a non-computable c.e. set.
The corollary itself does hold of some 1-random sets that are not weakly 2-random,
because if it holds of X then it also holds of any Y such that ρ(Y4X) = 0. (For
example, let X be 2-random and let Y be obtained from X by letting Y (2n) = Ω(n)
(where Ω is Chaitin’s halting probability) for all n and letting Y (k) = X(k) for all
other k. By van Lambalgen’s Theorem, Y is 1-random, but it computes Ω, and
hence is not weakly 2-random.)
Nevertheless, Corollary 7.3.3 does not hold of all 1-random sets, as we now
show.
Definition 7.3.8. Let W0,W1, . . . be an effective listing of the c.e. sets. A
set A is promptly simple if it is c.e. and coinfinite, and there exist a computable
function f and a computable enumeration A[0], A[1], . . . of A such that for each
e, if We is infinite then there are n and s for which n ∈ We[s] \We[s − 1] and
n ∈ A[f(s)]. Note that every promptly simple set is non-computable.
We will show that if X ≤T ∅′ is 1-random then Xc contains a promptly simple
set, and there is a promptly simple set A such that E(A) ≤nc X. (We do not know
whether we can improve the last statement to E(A) ≤uc X.) In fact, we will obtain
a considerably stronger result by first proving a generalisation of the fact, due to
Hirschfeldt and Miller (see [25, Theorem 7.2.11]), that if T is a Σ03 class of measure
0, then there is a non-computable c.e. set that is computable from each 1-random
element of T .
For a binary relation P (Y,Z) between elements of 2ω, let P (Y ) = {Z :
P (Y,Z)}.
Theorem 7.3.9. Let S0,S1, . . . be uniformly Π02 classes of measure 0, and let
P0(Y,Z), P1(Y,Z), . . . be uniformly Π
0
1 relations. Let D be the class of all Y for
which there are numbers k,m and a 1-random set Z such that Z ∈ Pk(Y ) ⊆ Sm.
Then there is a promptly simple set A such that A ≤T Y for every Y ∈ D.
Proof. Let (Vmn )m,n∈ω be uniformly Σ01 classes such that Sm =
⋂
n Vmn . We
may assume that Vm0 ⊇ Vm1 ⊇ · · · for all m. For each m, we have µ(
⋂
n Vnm) =
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µ(Sm) = 0, so limn µ(Vmn ) = 0 for each m. Let Θ be a computable relation such
that Pk(Y,Z) ≡ ∀lΘ(k, Y  l, Z  l).
Define A as follows. At each stage s, if there is an e < s such that no numbers
have entered A for the sake of e yet, and an n > 2e such that n ∈We[s] \We[s− 1]
and µ(Vmn [s]) ≤ 2−e for all m < e, then for the least such e, put the least
corresponding n into A. We say that n enters A for the sake of e.
Clearly, A is c.e. and coinfinite, since at most e many numbers less than 2e ever
enter A. Suppose that We is infinite. Let t > e be a stage such that all numbers
that will ever enter A for the sake of any i < e are in A[t]. There must be an s ≥ t
and an n > 2e such that n ∈We[s] \We[s− 1] and µ(Vmn [s]) ≤ 2−e for all m < e.
Then the least such n enters A for the sake of e at stage s unless another number
has already entered A for the sake of e. It follows that A is promptly simple.
Now suppose that Y ∈ D. Let the numbers k,m and the 1-random set Z be
such that Z ∈ Pk(Y ) ⊆ Sm. Let B ≤T Y be defined as follows. Given n, let
Dns = {X : (∀l ≤ s) Θ(k, Y  l,X  l)} \ Vmn [s].
Then Dn0 ⊇ Dn1 ⊇ · · · . Furthermore, if X ∈
⋂
sDns then Pk(Y,X) and X /∈ Vmn .
Since Pk(Y ) ⊆ Sm ⊆ Vmn , it follows that X /∈ Pk(Y ), which is a contradiction.
Thus
⋂
sDns = ∅. Since the Dns are nested closed sets, it follows that there is an s
such that Dns = ∅. Let sn be the least such s (which we can find using Y ) and let
B(n) = A(n)[sn]. Note that B ⊆ A.
Let T = {Vmn [s] : n enters A at stage s}. We can think of T as a uniform
singly-indexed sequence of Σ01 sets since m is fixed and for each n there is at most
one s such that Vmn [s] ∈ T . For each e, there is at most one n that enters A for
the sake of e, and the sum of the measures of the Vmn [s] such that n enters A at
stage s for the sake of some e > m is bounded by
∑
e 2
−e, which is finite. Thus T
is a Solovay test, and hence Z is in only finitely many elements of T . So for all
but finitely many n, if n enters A at stage s then Z /∈ Vmn [s]. Then Z ∈ Dns , so
sn > s. Hence, for all such n, we have that B(n) = A(n)[sn] = 1. Thus B =
∗ A,
so A ≡T B ≤T Y . 
Note that the result of Hirschfeldt and Miller mentioned above follows from
this theorem by starting with a Σ03 class S =
⋂
m Sm of measure 0 and letting each
Pk be the identity relation.
Corollary 7.3.10. Let X ≤T ∅′ be 1-random. There is a promptly simple set
A such that if ρ(D4X) < 14 then A ≤T D. In particular, Xc contains a promptly
simple set, and there is a promptly simple set A such that E(A) ≤nc X.
Proof. Say that sets Y and Z are r-close from m on if whenever m < n, the
Hamming distance between Y  n and Z  n (i.e., the number of bits on which
these two strings differ) is at most rn.
Let Sm be the class of all Z such that X and Z are 12 -close from m on. Since
X is ∆02, the Sm are uniformly Π02 classes. Furthermore, if X and Z are 12 -close
from m on for some m, then Z cannot be 1-random relative to X (by the same
argument that shows that if C is 1-random then there must be infinitely many n
such that C  n has more 1’s than 0’s), so µ(Sm) = 0 for all m. Let Pm(Y, Z) hold
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if and only if Y and Z are 14 -close from m on. The Pm are clearly uniformly Π
0
1
relations.
Thus the hypotheses of Theorem 7.3.9 are satisfied. Let A be as in that theorem.
Suppose that ρ(D4X) < 14 . Then there is an m such that D and X are 14 -close
from m on. If D and Z are 14 -close from m on, then by the triangle inequality for
Hamming distance, X and Z are 12 -close from m on. Thus X ∈ Pm(D) ⊆ Sm, so
A ≤T D. 
After learning about Corollary 7.3.10, Nies [85] gave a different but closely
connected proof of this result, which works even for X of positive effective Hausdorff
dimension, as long as we sufficiently decrease the bound 14 . However, even for X of
effective Hausdorff dimension 1 his bound is much worse, namely 120 .
Maass, Shore and Stob [75, Corollary 1.6] showed that if A and B are promptly
simple then there is a promptly simple set G such that G ≤T A and G ≤T B. Thus
we have the following extension of Kucˇera’s result [61] that two ∆02 1-random sets
cannot form a minimal pair, which will also be useful below.
Corollary 7.3.11. Let X0, X1 ≤T ∅′ be 1-random. There is a promptly
simple set A such that if ρ(D4Xi) < 14 for some i ∈ {0, 1} then A ≤T D.
It is easy to adapt the proof of Corollary 7.3.10 to give a direct proof of
Corollary 7.3.11, and indeed of the fact that for any uniformly ∅′-computable
family X0, X1, . . . of 1-random sets, there is a promptly simple set A such that if
ρ(D4Xi) < 14 for some i then A ≤T D. (We let S〈i,m〉 be the class of all Z such
that Xi and Z are
1
2 -close from m on, and the rest of the proof is essentially as
before.)
Given the many (and often surprising) characterisations of K-triviality, it is
natural to ask whether there is a converse to Theorem 7.3.2 stating that if A is K-
trivial then A ∈ Xc for some 1-random X. We now show that is not the case, using
a recent result of Bienvenu, Greenberg, Kucˇera, Nies, and Turetsky [8]. There are
many notions of randomness tests in the theory of algorithmic randomness. Some,
like Martin-Lo¨f tests, correspond to significant levels of algorithmic randomness,
while other, less obviously natural ones have nevertheless become important tools
in the development of this theory. Balanced tests belong to the latter class.
Definition 7.3.12. Let W0,W1, . . . ⊆ 2ω be an effective list of all Σ01 classes.
A balanced test is a sequence (Un)n∈ω of Σ01 classes such that there is a computable
binary function f with the following properties.
1. |{s : f(n, s+ 1) 6= f(n, s)}| ≤ O(2n),
2. ∀n Un =Wlims f(n,s), and
3. ∀n ∀s µ(Wf(n,s)) ≤ 2−n.
For σ ∈ 2<ω and X ∈ 2ω, we write σX for the element of 2ω obtained by
concatenating σ and X.
Theorem 7.3.13. (Bienvenu, Greenberg, Kucˇera, Nies and Turetsky [8]) There
are a K-trivial set A and a balanced test (Un)n∈ω such that if A ≤T X then there
is a string σ with σX ∈ ⋂n Un.
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We will also use the following measure-theoretic fact.
Theorem 7.3.14. (Loomis and Whitney [74]) Let S ⊆ 2ω be open, and let k ∈
ω. For i < k, let pii(S) = {Y k6=i : Y ∈ S}. Then µ(S)k−1 ≤ µ(pi0(S)) · · ·µ(pik−1(S)).
Our result will follow from the following lemma.
Lemma 7.3.15. Let X be 1-random, let k > 1, and let (Un)n∈ω be a balanced
test. There is an i < k such that Xk6=i /∈
⋂
n Un.
Proof. Assume for a contradiction that Xk6=i ∈
⋂
n Un for all i < k. Let
Sn,s = {Y : ∀i < k (Y k6=i ∈ Un[s])}
and let Sn =
⋃
s Sn,s. By Theorem 7.3.14, µ(Sn,s)k−1 ≤ µ(Un[s])k, so µ(Sn) ≤
O(2n)2−
nk
k−1 = O(2−
n
k−1 ), and hence
∑
n µ(Sn) < ∞. Thus {Sn : n ∈ ω} is a
Solovay test. However, X ∈ ⋂n Sn, so we have a contradiction. 
Theorem 7.3.16. There is a K-trivial set A such that A /∈ Xc for all 1-random
X.
Proof. Let A and (Un)n∈ω be as in Theorem 7.3.13. Let X be 1-random.
By Theorem 7.3.7, it is enough to fix k > 1 and show that there is an i < k such
that A T Xk6=i. Assume for a contradiction that A ≤T Xk6=i for all i < k. Then
there are σ0, . . . , σk−1 such that σiXk6=i ∈
⋂
n Un for all i < k. Let m = maxi<k |σi|
and let Vn = {Y : ∃i < k (σiY ∈ Un+k+m)}. It is easy to check that (Vn)n∈ω is a
balanced test, and Xk6=i ∈
⋂
n Vn for all i < k, which contradicts Lemma 7.3.15. 
7.4. Further applications of cone-avoiding compactness
We can use Theorem 7.3.7 to give an analogue to Corollary 7.3.3 for effective
genericity. In this case, 1-genericity is sufficient, as it is straightforward to show that
if X is 1-generic relative to A and A is non-computable, then A T X (i.e., unlike
the case for 1-randomness, there are no non-computable bases for 1-genericity),
and that no 1-generic set can be coarsely computable. The other ingredient we
need to replicate the argument we gave in the case of effective randomness is a
version of van Lambalgen’s Theorem for 1-genericity. This result was established
by Yu [126, Proposition 2.2]. Relativising his theorem and applying induction as
in the case of Theorem 7.3.5, we obtain the following fact.
Theorem 7.4.1. (Yu [126]) The following are equivalent for all sets X and A,
and all k > 1.
1. X is 1-generic relative to A.
2. For each i < k, the set Xki is 1-generic relative to X
k
6=i ⊕A.
Now we can establish the following analogue to Corollary 7.3.3.
Theorem 7.4.2. If X is 1-generic then Xc = 0, and hence E(A) nc X for
all non-computable A. In particular, in both the uniform and non-uniform coarse
degrees, the degree of X is not in the image of the embedding induced by E.
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Proof. Let A ∈ Xc. As in the proof of Theorem 7.3.2, there is a k such that
A ≤T Xk6=i for all i < k. By the unrelativised form of Theorem 7.4.1, each Xki
is 1-generic relative to Xk6=i, and hence relative to X
k
6=i ⊕ A ≡T Xk6=i. Again by
Theorem 7.4.1, X is 1-generic relative to A. But A ≤T X, so A is computable. 
Igusa (personal communication) has also found the following application of
Theorem 7.3.7. We say that X is generically computable if there is a partial
computable function ϕ such that ϕ(n) = X(n) for all n in the domain of ϕ, and
the domain of ϕ has density 1. Jockusch and Schupp [15, Theorem 2.26] showed
that there are generically computable sets that are not coarsely computable, but
by Lemma 1.7 in [39], if X is generically computable then γ(X) = 1, where γ is
the coarse computability bound from Definition 7.3.6.
Theorem 7.4.3. (Igusa, personal communication) If γ(X) = 1 then Xc = 0,
and hence E(A) nc X for all non-computable A. Thus, if γ(X) = 1 and X is not
coarsely computable then in both the uniform and non-uniform coarse degrees, the
degree of X is not in the image of the embedding induced by E. In particular, the
above holds when X is generically computable but not coarsely computable.
Proof. Suppose that γ(X) = 1 and A is not computable. If ε > 0 then there
is a computable set C such that ρ(X4C) < ε. Since C is computable, A T C.
By Theorem 7.3.7, A /∈ Xc. 
7.5. Minimal pairs in the uniform and non-uniform coarse degrees
For any degree structure that acts as a measure of information content, it is
reasonable to expect that if two sets are sufficiently random relative to each other,
then their degrees form a minimal pair. For the Turing degrees, it is not difficult
to show that if Y is not computable and X is weakly 2-random relative to Y , then
the degrees of X and Y form a minimal pair. On the other hand, Kucˇera [61]
showed that if X,Y ≤T ∅′ are both 1-random, then there is a non-computable set
A ≤T X,Y , so there are relatively 1-random sets whose degrees do not form a
minimal pair. As we will see, the situation for the non-uniform coarse degrees is
similar, but “one jump up”.
For an interval I, let ρI(X) =
|X∩I|
|I| .
Lemma 7.5.1. Let Jk = [2
k − 1, 2k+1 − 1). Then ρ(X) = 0 if and only if
limk ρJk(X) = 0.
Proof. First suppose that lim supk ρJk(X) > 0. Since |Jk| = 2k, we have
ρ(X) ≥ lim supk ρ2k+1−1(X) ≥ lim supk ρJk (X)2 > 0.
Now suppose that lim supk ρJk(X) = 0. Fix ε > 0. If m is sufficiently large,
k ≥ m, and n ∈ Jk, then
|X ∩ [0, n)| ≤ |X ∩ [0, 2k+1 − 1)| ≤
m−1∑
i=0
|Ji|+
k∑
i=m
ε
2
|Ji|.
If k is sufficiently large then this sum is less than ε(2k − 1), whence ρn(X) <
ε(2k−1)
n ≤ εnn = ε. Thus lim supn ρn(X) ≤ ε. Since ε is arbitrary, lim supn ρn(X) =
0. 
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Theorem 7.5.2. If A is not coarsely computable and X is weakly 3-random
relative to A, then there is no X-computable coarse description of A. In particular,
A nc X.
Proof. Suppose that ΦX is a coarse description of A and let
P = {Y : ΦY is a coarse description of A}.
Then Y ∈ P if and only if
1. ΦY is total, which is a Π02 property, and
2. for each k there is an m such that, for all n > m, we have ρn(Φ
Y4A) < 2−k,
which is a Π0,A3 property.
Thus P is a Π0,A3 class, so it suffices to show that if A is not coarsely computable
then µ(P) = 0.
We prove the contrapositive. Suppose that µ(P) > 0. Then, by the Lebesgue
Density Theorem, there is a σ such that µ(P ∩ JσK) > 342−|σ|. It is now easy to
define a Turing functional Ψ such that the measure of the class of Y for which
ΨY is a coarse description of A is greater than 34 . Define a computable set D as
follows. Let Jk = [2
k − 1, 2k+1 − 1). For each k, wait until we find a finite set of
strings Sk such that µ(JSkK) > 34 and Ψσ converges on all of Jk for each σ ∈ Sk
(which must happen, by our choice of Ψ). Let nk be largest such that there is a set
Rk ⊆ Sk with µ(JRkK) > 12 and ρJk(Ψσ4Ψτ ) ≤ 2−nk for all σ, τ ∈ Rk. Let σ ∈ Rk
and define D  Jk = Ψσ  Jk.
We claim that D is a coarse description of A. By Lemma 7.5.1, it is enough
to show that limk ρJk(D4A) = 0. Fix n. Let Bk be the class of all Y such that
ΨY converges on all of Jk and ρJk(Ψ
Y4A) ≤ 2−n. If ΨY is a coarse description of
A then, again by Lemma 7.5.1, ρJk(Ψ
Y4A) ≤ 2−n for all sufficiently large k, so
there is an m such that µ(Bk) > 34 for each k > m, and hence µ(Bk ∩ JSkK) > 12 for
each k > m. Let Tk = {σ ∈ Sk : ρJk(Ψσ4A) ≤ 2−n}. Then JTkK = Bk ∩ JSkK, so
µ(JTkK) > 12 for each k > m. Furthermore, by the triangle inequality for Hamming
distance, ρJk(Ψ
σ4Ψτ ) ≤ 2−(n−1) for all σ, τ ∈ Tk. It follows that, for each k > m,
we have nk ≥ n− 1, and at least one element Y of Bk is in JRkK (where Rk is as in
the definition of D), which implies that
ρJk(D4A) ≤ ρJk(D4ΨY ) + ρJk(ΨY4A) ≤ 2−nk + 2−n < 2−n+2.
Since n is arbitrary, limk ρJk(D4A) = 0. 
Corollary 7.5.3. If Y is not coarsely computable and X is weakly 3-random
relative to Y , then the non-uniform coarse degrees of X and Y form a minimal
pair, and hence so do their uniform coarse degrees.
Proof. Let A ≤nc X,Y . Then Y computes a coarse description D of A. We
have D ≤nc X, and X is weakly 3-random relative to D, so by the theorem, D is
coarsely computable, and hence so is A. 
For the non-uniform coarse degrees at least, this corollary does not hold of
2-randomness in place of weak 3-randomness. To establish this fact, we use the
following complementary results. The first was proved by Downey, Jockusch and
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Schupp [24, Corollary 3.16] in unrelativised form, but it is easy to check that their
proof relativises.
Theorem 7.5.4. (Downey, Jockusch and Schupp [24]) If A is c.e., ρ(A) is
defined, and A′ ≤T D′, then D computes a coarse description of A.
Theorem 7.5.5. (Hirschfeldt, Jockusch, McNicholl and Schupp [39]) Every
nonlow c.e. degree contains a c.e. set A such that ρ(A) = 12 and A is not coarsely
computable.
Theorem 7.5.6. Let X,Y ≤T ∅′′ (which is equivalent to E(X), E(Y ) ≤nc
E(∅′′)). If X and Y are both 2-random, then there is an A ≤nc X,Y such that A
is not coarsely computable. In particular, there is a pair of relatively 2-random sets
whose non-uniform coarse degrees do not form a minimal pair.
Proof. Since X and Y are both 1-random relative to ∅′, by the relativised
form of Corollary 7.3.11 there is an ∅′-c.e. set J >T ∅′ such that for every coarse
description D of either X or Y , we have that D ⊕ ∅′ computes J , and hence so
does D′. By the Sacks Jump Inversion Theorem [102], there is a c.e. set B such
that B′ ≡T J . By Theorem 7.5.5, there is a c.e. set A ≡T B such that ρ(A) = 12
and A is not coarsely computable. Let D be a coarse description of either X or Y .
Then D′ ≥T J ≡T A′, so by Theorem 7.5.4, D computes a coarse description of
A. 
We do not know whether this theorem holds for uniform coarse reducibility.
7.6. Open questions
We finish with a few questions raised by our results.
Open Question 7.6.1. Can the bound 14 in Corollary 7.3.10 be increased?
Open Question 7.6.2. Let X ≤T ∅′ be 1-random. Must there be a non-
computable (c.e.) set A such that E(A) ≤uc X? (Recall that Corollary 7.3.10 gives
a positive answer to the non-uniform analogue to this question.) If not, then is
there any 1-random X for which such an A exists?
Open Question 7.6.3. Does Theorem 7.5.6 hold for uniform coarse reducib-
ility?
Part III
ε-Logic

CHAPTER 8
ε-Logic
As discussed in the introduction, regular first-order logic is not learnable, in
the sense that we cannot decide if a given formula ϕ holds in a model or not if we
are only allowed to take finitely many samples. In this part of the thesis we will
study ε-logic, a probability logic introduced by Terwijn [117] which turns out to
be learnable in a sense closely related to Valiant’s pac-model from computational
learning theory.
In this first introductory chapter we will introduce the background of ε-logic
and we give all the necessary definitions. Furthermore, we discuss some of the
choices we make. This chapter is mostly based on Kuyper and Terwijn [68].
8.1. ε-Logic
In this section, we will repeat the definition of the probabilistic logic from
Terwijn [117]. This logic was partly motivated by the idea of what it means to “learn”
an ordinary first-order statement ϕ from a finite amount of data from a model M
of ϕ, in a way that is similar to learning in Valiant’s pac-model [49]. In this setting,
atomic data are generated by sampling from an unknown probability distribution
D overM, and the task is to decide with a prescribed amount of certainty whether
ϕ holds in M or not. On seeing an atomic truth R(a), where R is some relation,
one knows with certainty that ∃xR(x), so that the existential quantifier retains
its classical interpretation. On the other hand, inducing a universal statement
∀xR(x) can only be done probabilistically. Thus, there is a fundamental asymmetry
between the interpretation of the existential quantifier and the interpretation of
the universal quantifier. As in the pac-model, it is important that the distribution
D is unknown, which is counterbalanced by the fact that success of the learning
task is measured using the same distribution D. (In the pac-setting this is called
“distribution-free learning”.) In [117] it was shown that ordinary first-order formulas
are pac-learnable under the appropriate probabilistic interpretation, given in the
definition below. In this thesis the focus will be on the logic, and no background
on pac-learning is required any further.
Definition 8.1.1. Let L be a first-order language, possibly containing equality,
of a countable signature. Let ϕ = ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) be a first-order formula in the
language L, and let ε ∈ [0, 1]. Furthermore, letM be a classical first-order model for
M and let D be a probability measure on the universe of M. Then we inductively
define the notion of ε-truth, denoted by (M,D) |=ε ϕ, as follows (where we leave
the parameters implicit).
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(i) For every atomic formula ϕ:
(M,D) |=ε ϕ if M |= ϕ.
(ii) We treat the logical connectives ∧ and ∨ classically, e.g.
(M,D) |=ε ϕ ∧ ψ if (M,D) |=ε ϕ and (M,D) |=ε ψ.
(iii) The existential quantifier is treated classically as well:
(M,D) |=ε ∃xϕ(x)
if there exists an a ∈M such that (M,D) |=ε ϕ(a).
(iv) The case of negation is split into sub-cases as follows:
(a) For ϕ atomic, (M,D) |=ε ¬ϕ if (M,D) 6|=ε ϕ.
(b) ¬ distributes in the classical way over ∧ and ∨, e.g.
(M,D) |=ε ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ) if (M,D) |=ε ¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ.
(c) (M,D) |=ε ¬¬ϕ if (M,D) |=ε ϕ.
(d) (M,D) |=ε ¬(ϕ→ ψ) if (M,D) |=ε ϕ ∧ ¬ψ.
(e) (M,D) |=ε ¬∃xϕ(x) if (M,D) |=ε ∀x¬ϕ(x).
(f) (M,D) |=ε ¬∀xϕ(x) if (M,D) |=ε ∃x¬ϕ(x).
(v) (M,D) |=ε ϕ→ ψ if (M,D) |=ε ¬ϕ ∨ ψ.
(vi) Finally, we define (M,D) |=ε ∀xϕ(x) if
Pr
D
[
a ∈M | (M,D) |=ε ϕ(a)
] ≥ 1− ε.
We make some remarks about the definition of ε-truth. Observe that everything
in Definition 8.1.1 is treated classically, except for the interpretation of ∀xϕ(x) in
case (vi). Instead of saying that we have (M,D) |=ε ϕ(a) for all elements a ∈M,
we merely say that it holds for “many” of the elements, where “many” depends on
the error parameter ε. The treatment of negation requires some care, since we no
longer have that (M,D) |=ε ¬ϕ implies that (M,D) 6|=ε ϕ (though the converse
still holds, see Terwijn [117, Proposition 3.1]). The clauses for the negation allow
us to push the negations down to the atomic formulas.
Note that both (M,D) |=ε ∀xϕ(x) and (M,D) |=ε ∃x¬ϕ(x) can hold, for
example if ϕ(x) holds on a set of measure one but not for all x. Thus, the logic
defined above is paraconsistent . This example also shows that for ε = 0 the notion
of ε-truth does not coincide with the classical one. Note also that even though
both ϕ and ¬ϕ may be satisfiable, they cannot both be ε-tautologies, as at most
one of them can be true in a model with only one point.
We have chosen to define ϕ→ ψ as ¬ϕ ∨ ψ. We note that this is weaker than
the classical implication. The classical definition would say that ψ holds in any
model where ϕ holds. Using an atomic inconsistency as falsum, we would thus
obtain a classical negation. Since ∃ expresses classical existence, we would then
also obtain the classical universal quantifier ∀, and our logic would become a strong
extension of classical predicate logic, which is not what we are after.
The case for ε = 1 is pathological; for example, all universal statements are
always true. We will therefore often exclude this case.
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Definition 8.1.2. Let L be a first-order language of a countable signature,
possibly containing equality, and let ε ∈ [0, 1]. Then an ε-model (M,D) for the
language L consists of a classical first-order L-modelM together with a probability
distribution D over M such that:
(15) For all formulas ϕ = ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) and all a1, . . . , an−1 ∈M, the set
{an ∈M | (M,D) |=ε ϕ(a1, . . . , an)}
is D-measurable (i.e. all definable sets of dimension 1 are measurable).
(16) All relations of arity n are Dn-measurable (including equality, if it is in
L) and all functions of arity n are measurable as functions from (Mn,Dn)
to (M,D) (where Dn denotes the n-fold product measure). In particular,
constants are D-measurable.
A probability model is a pair (M,D) that is an ε-model for every ε ∈ [0, 1].
We remark that condition (16) does not imply condition (15), because even
if a set is measurable, its image under a projection need not be measurable.
Nevertheless, the following result holds.
Proposition 8.1.3. Let ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) be a universal formula and let (M,D)
be an ε-model. Then
{(a1, . . . , an) ∈Mn | (M,D) |=ε ϕ(a1, . . . , an)}
is Dn-measurable.
Proof. First, one can use induction to prove that the lemma holds for propos-
itional formulas ψ; the base case is exactly (16). Next, let ϕ be a universal formula.
By Proposition 8.1.7 below we may assume ϕ to be in prenex normal form; say
ϕ = ∀y1 . . . ∀ymψ(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , ym). We have just argued that the set
{(a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bm) ∈Mn+m | (M,D) |=ε ψ(a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bm)}
is Dn+m-measurable. The result now follows from repeatedly applying the fact
that for any 1 ≤ i ≤ m and any Dn+m−i+1-measurable set X the function
(a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bm−i) 7→ PrD
[
bm−i+1 ∈M | (a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bm−i+1) ∈ X
]
is a Dn+m−i-measurable function, see e.g. Bogachev [10, Theorem 3.4.1]. 
The definition of ε-model is discussed in more detail in section 8.2.
Definition 8.1.4. A formula ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) is ε-satisfiable if there exists an
ε-model (M,D) and there exist a1, . . . , an ∈M such that (M,D) |=ε ϕ. Similarly,
we say that ϕ is an ε-tautology or is ε-valid (notation: |=ε ϕ) if for all probability
models (M,D) and all a1, . . . , an ∈M it holds that (M,D) |=ε ϕ(a1, . . . , an).
Example 8.1.5. Let Q be a unary predicate. Then ϕ = ∀xQ(x) ∨ ∀x¬Q(x) is
a 12 -tautology. Namely, in every probability model, either the set on which Q holds
or its complement has measure at least 12 . However, ϕ is not an ε-tautology for
ε < 12 . Furthermore, both ϕ and ¬ϕ are classically satisfiable and hence ε-satisfiable
for every ε; in particular we see that ϕ can be an ε-tautology while simultaneously
¬ϕ is ε-satisfiable.
104 8. ε-LOGIC
One might wonder why for satisfiability we only require ε-models, while for
validity we look at the slightly stronger and less elegant probability models. From
Proposition 9.2.1 and Theorem 9.2.9 below it will follow that every formula which
is ε-satisfiable in an ε-model is also satisfiable in a probability model, while we do
not know of a similar result for validity.
Example 8.1.6. Let Q be a unary predicate. Then ϕ = ∀xQ(x) ∨ ∀x¬Q(x)
is a 12 -tautology. Namely, in every
1
2 -model, either the set on which Q holds or its
complement has measure at least 12 . However, ϕ is not an ε-tautology for ε <
1
2 .
Furthermore, both ϕ and ¬ϕ are classically satisfiable and hence ε-satisfiable for
every ε; in particular we see that ϕ can be an ε-tautology while simultaneously ¬ϕ
is ε-satisfiable.
In many proofs it will be convenient to work with formulas in prenex normal
form. We may assume that formulas are in this form by the following:
Proposition 8.1.7. Terwijn [117] Every formula ϕ is semantically equivalent
to a formula ϕ′ in prenex normal form; i.e. (M,D) |=ε ϕ⇔ (M,D) |=ε ϕ′ for all
ε ∈ [0, 1] and all ε-models (M,D).
8.2. ε-Models
Our definition of ε-model slightly differs from the original definition in [117]. We
require more sets to be measurable in our ε-models than in the original definition,
where the measurability condition was included in the truth definition. However,
we need this stronger requirement on our models to be able to prove anything
worthwhile, in fact, (15) in Definition 8.1.2 is already implicit in most proofs
published in earlier papers.
We now discuss condition (16) in Definition 8.1.2. This is a natural assumption:
When we are talking about probabilities over certain predicates we may as well
require that all such probabilities exist, even if in some cases this would not be
necessary. To illustrate this point we give an example of what can happen without
it.
Example 8.2.1. The following example is based on the famous argument of
Sierpinski showing that under the continuum hypothesis CH there are unmeasurable
subsets of the real plane. Let D be a measure on the domain ω1 defined by
D(A) =
1 if A = ω1 with the exception of at mostcountably many elements,
0 if A is countable.
It is easy to check that D is a probability measure. Let < be the usual order
relation on ω1. Then we have
(ω1,D) |=0 ∀x∀y(x < y)
since for every x ∈ ω1 the vertical section {y | x < y} has D-measure 1. Similarly,
(ω1,D) 6|=0 ∀y∀x(x < y)
since for every y ∈ ω1 the horizontal section {x | x < y} has D-measure 0. Note
that the relation {(x, y) ∈ ω 21 | x < y} is not D2-measurable: Since all its vertical
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sections {y | x < y} have D-measure 1, and all its horizontal sections {x | x < y}
have D-measure 0, D2-measurability of the relation < would contradict Fubini’s
theorem. That in general universal quantifiers do not commute under a probabilistic
interpretation was already remarked in Keisler [51]. In fact, it is easy to give a
three-element example of a model M such that (M,D) |= 1
3
∀x∀yR(x, y) but not
(M,D) |= 1
3
∀y∀xR(x, y). So in this respect condition (16) does not help anyway.
We point out that the choice to impose condition (16) or not does make a difference
for the resulting probability logic: Let
lin = ∀x∀y(x ≤ y ∨ y ≤ x) ∧ ∀x∀y∀z(x ≤ y ∧ y ≤ z → x ≤ z)
be the sentence saying that ≤ is a total preorder (not necessarily antisymmetric).
Proposition 8.2.2. For every ε > 0, the sentence
ϕ = ¬lin ∨ ∃x∀y(y ≤ x)
is an ε-tautology if and only if we impose condition (16) in Definition 8.1.2.
Proof. Let ε > 0. Without (16) we can construct a counter-model for ϕ as
follows. Consider ω1 with the measure D from Example 8.2.1. Then since every
initial segment of ω1 has measure 0, clearly (ω1,D) 6|=ε ϕ.
Now suppose (16) holds. Let (M,D) be an ε-model with ε > 0. We show that ϕ
is an ε-tautology. When (M,D) |=ε ¬lin then we are done. When (M,D) 6|=ε ¬lin
then we have classically M |= lin so ≤ really is a linear preorder in M. Suppose
that
(17) ∀x Pr
D
[
y ∈M | x ≤ y] > ε.
Suppose further that
∀x0∃y ≥ x0 PrD
[
[x0, y]
] ≥ 1
2
ε
where [x0, y] is the interval between x0 and y inM. We may assume that for every
y ∈M there exists a z ∈M with z 6≤ y; otherwise y is clearly a maximal element
and we are done. Then we also have
∀x0∃y > x0 PrD
[
[x0, y]
] ≥ 1
2
ε
(where y > x0 denotes x0 ≤ y ∧ y 6≤ x0). But then we can find infinitely many
intervals [y0, y1], [y1, y2], . . . with yi < yi+1 of measure at least
1
2ε, which are
disjoint by the transitivity of ≤. This is a contradiction. So, choose x0 such that
∀y ≥ x0 PrD
[
[x0, y]
]
< 12ε and consider the set
(18)
{
(x, y) ∈M×M | x, y ≥ x0 ∧ x ≤ y
}
,
i.e. the restriction of the relation ≤ to elements greater than x0. Then, similarly as
in Example 8.2.1, all vertical sections of (18) have measure > ε and all horizontal
sections have measure < 12ε, so by Fubini’s theorem the set (18) is not D2-
measurable. But then, since (18) is the intersection of sets defined using ≤, the
relation ≤ itself is not measurable, contradicting (16). So (17) is false, and hence
there is an x ∈M such that at least 1− ε of the weight is to the left of x. Hence
(M,D) |=ε ϕ. 
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After these considerations we take the standpoint that it is natural to assume
the measurability condition (16) in Definition 8.1.2. As we will see below, for the
discussion of compactness it is useful to consider a weaker notion of ε-model, where
we drop the condition (16) from the definition:
Definition 8.2.3. If M is a first-order model and D is a probability measure
on M such that for all formulas ϕ = ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) and all a1, . . . , an−1 ∈M, the
set
{an ∈M | (M,D) |=ε ϕ(a1, . . . , an)}
is D-measurable, we say that (M,D) is a weak ε-model.
CHAPTER 9
Model Theory of ε-Logic
In this chapter we will study the model theory of ε-logic. First, in section 9.1
we show that there are satisfiable sentences that are not satisfiable in any countable
model, but we also prove a downward Lo¨wenheim–Skolem theorem for ε-logic in
which “countable” is replaced by “of cardinality of the continuum”. In section 9.2
we refine this result and show that every satisfiable sentence is in fact satisfied
by a model on the unit interval together with the Lebesgue measure. Section
9.3 continues with the problem discussed in the preceding section, by discussing
what the exact value of the Lo¨wenheim number (the smallest cardinality for which
every satisfiable sentence has a model of that cardinality) is in ε-logic. Next, in
section 9.4 we present a technical result that gives many-one reductions between
satisfiability in ε0-logic and ε1-logic for different ε0, ε1. Finally, in section 9.5 we
show that compactness fails for ε-logic, but that we can recover a weak notion of
compactness using an ultraproduct construction.
This chapter is based on Kuyper and Terwijn [68].
9.1. A downward Lo¨wenheim–Skolem theorem
In this section, we will prove a downward Lo¨wenheim–Skolem theorem for
ε-logic. We will see that it is not always possible to push the cardinality of a model
down to being countable, as in classical logic. In many ways, countable ε-models
are analogous to finite classical models, as exemplified by the following result:
Theorem 9.1.1. (Terwijn [119]) Let ϕ be a sentence. Then the following are
equivalent:
(i) ϕ classically holds in all finite classical models,
(ii) (M,D) |=ε ϕ for all ε > 0 and for all ε-models (M,D) such that M is
countable.
Definition 9.1.2. We will call a measure ν on a σ-algebra B of subsets of N
a submeasure of a measure µ on a σ-algebra A of subsets of some set M ⊇ N if for
every B ∈ B there exists an AB ∈ A such that B = AB ∩N and µ(AB) = ν(B).
To motivate this definition, let us first consider the special case where AB = B
for every B ∈ B. In this case, we have that ν(B) = µ(B) for every B ∈ B. In
other words, ν is just the restriction of the measure ν to the µ-measurable set N .
However, requiring N to be a measurable subset of M is too restrictive for the
constructions below. Our definition of submeasure also allows us to restrict µ to
certain non-µ-measurable sets N , by allowing us some freedom in the choice of the
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set AB . The precise method of constructing such submeasures N will become clear
in the proof of Theorem 9.1.6.
Definition 9.1.3. An ε-submodel of an ε-model (M,D) is an ε-model (N , E)
over the same language such that:
• N is a submodel of M in the classical sense,
• E is a submeasure of D.
We will denote this by (N , E) ⊂ε (M,D).
Definition 9.1.4. An elementary ε-submodel of an ε-model (M,D) is an
ε-submodel (N , E) such that, for all formulas ϕ = ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) and sequences
a1, . . . , an ∈ N we have:
(N , E) |=ε ϕ(a1, . . . , an)⇔ (M,D) |=ε ϕ(a1, . . . , an).
We will denote this by (N , E) ≺ε (M,D).
The next example shows that there are satisfiable sentences without any
countable model.
Example 9.1.5. Let ϕ = ∀x∀y(R(x, y)∧¬R(x, x)). Then ϕ is 0-satisfiable; for
example, take the unit interval [0, 1] equipped with the Lebesgue measure and take
R(x, y) to be x 6= y. However, ϕ does not have any countable 0-models. Namely, if
(M,D) |=0 ϕ then for almost every x ∈M the set
Bx = {y ∈M | (M,D) |=0 ¬R(x, y) ∨R(x, x)}
has measure zero. Since x ∈ Bx, the set
⋃
x∈MBx equals M, and therefore has
measure 1. But if M is countable it is also the union of countable many sets of
measure 0 and hence has measure 0, a contradiction.
Note also that ϕ is finitely ε-satisfiable (i.e. ε-satisfiable with a finite model)
for every ε > 0.
Using the reduction from Theorem 9.4.1, we now also find for every rational
ε ∈ [0, 1) a sentence ϕε which is only ε-satisfiable in uncountable models.
Example 9.1.5 shows that we cannot always find countable elementary sub-
models. However, we can find such submodels of cardinality 2ω, as we will show
next.
Theorem 9.1.6. (Downward Lo¨wenheim–Skolem theorem for ε-logic) Let L
be a countable first-order language, possibly containing equality, but not containing
function symbols. Let (M,D) be an ε-model and let X ⊆M be of cardinality at
most 2ω. Then there exists an ε-model
(N , E) ≺ε (M,D)
such that X ⊆ N and N is of cardinality at most 2ω.
Proof. We start by fixing some model-theoretic notation. For basics about
types we refer the reader to Hodges [41]. For an element x ∈ M, let tp(x/M)
denote the complete 1-type of x over M, i.e. the set of all formulas ϕ(z) in one
free variable and with parameters from M such that (M,D) |=ε ϕ(x). Clearly
the relation tp(x/M) = tp(y/M) defines an equivalence relation on M. The
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idea is to construct N by picking one element from every equivalence class of a
finer equivalence relation. We will show that we can do this in such a way that
we need at most 2ω many points. Furthermore, this finer equivalence relation
induces a natural submeasure E of D on N , which will turn (N , E) into the desired
ε-submodel.
Let R = R(x1, . . . , xn) be a relation. By Definition 8.1.2 we have that R
M is a
Dn-measurable set. We can view the construction of the product σ-algebra onMn
as an inductive process over the countable ordinals: we start with n-fold products
or boxes of D-measurable edges, for successor ordinals α + 1 we take countable
unions and intersections of elements from α (we could also take complements, but
this is not necessary) and for limit ordinals λ we take the union of sets constructed
in steps < λ. Now the product σ-algebra is exactly the union of all the sets
constructed in this way.
In particular, we see from this construction that RM can be formed using
countable unions and intersections of Cartesian products of at most countably many
D-measurable sets. This expression need not be unique — so, for each relation R,
pick one such expression t and form the set ∆R consisting of the D-measurable
sets occurring as edges of Cartesian products in this expression. Let ∆ be
⋃
R ∆R
(where the union includes equality, if it is in the language) together with {cM} for
every constant c.
Since ∆ is countable, we can fix an enumeration B0, B1, . . . of it. For each
a ∈ 2ω define
Ea =
⋂
ai=1
Bi ∩
⋂
ai=0
(M\Bi).
Then we can check that points in Ea are equivalent, in the sense that for all x, y ∈ Ea
we have that tp(x/M) = tp(y/M). Namely, first we check that for any n-ary
relation R and z1, . . . , zn−1 ∈ M, RM(x, z1, . . . , zn−1) ⇔ RM(y, z1, . . . , zn−1).
This follows by induction on the construction of RM from ∆. The equivalence
for arbitrary formulas from the 1-types then follows by induction over formulas in
prenex normal form.
From each non-empty Ea, pick one point xa, and define
N = X ∪ {xa | a ∈ 2ω}.
Clearly, N has cardinality at most 2ω. Finally, for each D-measurable A such that
(19) ∀a ∈ 2ω∀x, y ∈ Ea(x ∈ A⇔ y ∈ A),
we define E(A∩N ) = D(A). We claim that (N , E) (with relations restricted to N )
satisfies the required properties.
First, observe that E is well-defined. Namely, let A 6= C be D-measurable sets
satisfying (19), say x ∈ A and x 6∈ C. Let a ∈ 2ω be such that x ∈ Ea. Then
xa ∈ A, but xa 6∈ C. So A ∩N 6= C ∩N . Also, E is a probability measure since D
is.
Next, we prove that (N , E) ≺ε (M,D). It is clear that N is a submodel of
M and that E is a submeasure of D. We prove that (N , E) is an elementary
ε-submodel. We use formula-induction on formulas in prenex normal form to show
that, for all sequences b1, . . . , bn ∈ N and for every formula ϕ = ϕ(x1, . . . , xn), we
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have
(N , E) |=ε ϕ(b1, . . . , bn)⇔ (M,D) |=ε ϕ(b1, . . . , bn).
For propositional formulas, this is clear. For the existential case, observe that
(N , E) |=ε ∃xψ(x, b1, . . . , bn)
clearly implies that this also holds in (M,D). For the converse, assume
(M,D) |=ε ∃xψ(x, b1, . . . , bn).
Let x ∈ M be such that (M,D) |=ε ψ(x, b1, . . . , bn), and let a ∈ 2ω be such
that x ∈ Ea. Then, as explained above, x and xa are equivalent, so we also
have (M,D) |=ε ψ(xa, b1, . . . , bn). Using the induction hypothesis, we therefore
find (N , E) |=ε ψ(xa, b1, . . . , bn). Since xa ∈ N this implies that (N , E) |=ε
∃xψ(x, b1, . . . , bn).
For the universal case, let ϕ = ∀xψ(x, x1, . . . , xn). Let
B = {x ∈M | (M,D) |=ε ψ(x, b1, . . . , bn)},
C = {x ∈ N | (N , E) |=ε ψ(x, b1, . . . , bn)}.
Then by induction hypothesis we have
C = {x ∈ N | (M,D) |=ε ψ(x, b1, . . . , bn)}
= B ∩N .
From this and the fact that B satisfies (19), we see that E(C) = D(B), and hence
(M,D) |=ε ∀xψ(x, b1, . . . , bn)⇔ (N , E) |=ε ∀xψ(x, b1, . . . , bn).
This concludes the induction.
It remains to check that (N , E) is an ε-model (see Definition 8.1.2). For every
formula ϕ = ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) and every sequence a1, . . . , an−1 ∈ N we have
Bϕ := {an ∈ N | (N , E) |=ε ϕ(a1, . . . , an)}
= {an ∈M | (M,D) |=ε ϕ(a1, . . . , an)} ∩ N
and since the right-hand side is the intersection of N and a D-measurable set
satisfying (19), it follows that Bϕ is E-measurable. That relations in N are
measurable follows directly from the construction; for constants c use the fact that
{c} ∈ ∆ and therefore there exists an a ∈ 2ω such that Ea = {c}.
Thus, we see that (N , E) is an elementary ε-submodel of (M,D). 
Remark 9.1.7. The proof given above uses the full measurability condition (16)
from Definition 8.1.2. We remark that one can also prove the theorem without
using that the relations are measurable, by following the proof of Keisler [51,
Theorem 2.4.4]; in that case the language is also allowed to contain function
symbols. However, we need the proof above to be able to derive Theorem 9.2.8
below.
By varying ε, we can easily see that in fact the following strengthening of
Theorem 9.1.6 holds.
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Theorem 9.1.8. (Downward Lo¨wenheim–Skolem theorem for variable ε) Let
L be a first-order language as above. Let A ⊆ [0, 1], let (M,D) be an ε-model for
all ε ∈ A and let X ⊆M be of cardinality at most 2ω. Then there exists an ε-model
(N , E) such that (N , E) ≺ε (M,D) for all ε ∈ A, such that X ⊆ N and such that
N is of cardinality at most 2ω.
Proof. This can be shown using the same proof as for Theorem 9.1.6. 
9.2. Satisfiability and Lebesgue measure
The construction from the proof of Theorem 9.1.6 produces an unknown
probability measure on 2ω. However, we can say a bit more about the σ-algebra
of measurable sets of E in that proof: for example, that it is countably generated.
We will use this and other facts to show that every ε-satisfiable set Γ of sentences
has an ε-model on [0, 1] equipped with the Lebesgue measure. This model need
not be equivalent to the original model satisfying Γ; the new model will in general
satisfy more sentences.1
We cannot directly show that the measure space of the given model is isomorphic
to [0, 1] with the Lebesgue measure — we need to make some modifications to the
model first. As a first step, we show that each set ε-satisfiable set Γ of sentences is
satisfied in some Borel measure on the Cantor set 2ω (with the usual topology).
For this, we need the following auxiliary result.
Proposition 9.2.1. Let M be a first-order model that is a Polish space, and
let D0 be a Borel probability measure on M such that all relations and functions
are Dn0 -measurable. Then all definable sets are analytic. In particular, if we let D
be the completion of D0, then (M,D) is an ε-model for every ε ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. Since every relation is Dn0 -measurable, it is in particular Borel and
therefore analytic. We now verify that every definable set is analytic, using
induction over the number of quantifiers of a formula in prenex normal form (see
Proposition 8.1.7). Clearly, this holds for propositional formulas. For the existential
quantifier, use that projections of analytic sets are analytic (which is clear from
the definition of an analytic set, see e.g. Kechris [50, Definition 14.1]), and for the
universal quantifier, this fact is expressed by the Kondoˆ-Tugue´ theorem [60] (see
Kechris [50, Theorem 29.26]).
Since all definable sets are analytic, in particular the definable sets of di-
mension 1 are analytic and hence D-measurable (see e.g. Bogachev [10, Theorem
1.10.5]). This proves the second claim (see Definition 8.1.2). 
Proposition 9.2.2. Let L be a countable first-order language not containing
function symbols. Let Γ be an ε-satisfiable set of sentences. Then there exists an
ε-model (M,D) on 2ω which ε-satisfies Γ such that D is the completion of a Borel
measure. Furthermore, the relations in M can be chosen to be Borel.
1This can happen even if Γ is already complete, i.e. if for every sentence ϕ at least one of
ϕ ∈ Γ and ¬ϕ ∈ Γ holds: because of the paraconsistency of the logic, it could happen that both
ϕ and ¬ϕ hold in our new model, while only one of them is in Γ.
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Proof. Fix an ε-model ε-satisfying all sentences from Γ and apply The-
orem 9.1.6 (with X = ∅) to find a model (N , E). Let ∆ = {B0, B1, . . . } and Ea be
as in the proof of Theorem 9.1.6, that is,
Ea =
⋂
ai=1
Bi ∩
⋂
ai=0
(X \Bi).
By construction of N , each Ea contains at most one point of N , namely xa. So,
the function pi : N → 2ω mapping each xa ∈ N to a is injective.2
Now, define the subsets Cn ⊆ 2ω by
Cn = {a ∈ 2ω | an = 1}.
Then {Cn | n ∈ ω} generate the Borel σ-algebra of 2ω and we have pi−1(Cn) = Bn.
Thus, Cn can be seen as an enlargement of Bn.
Next, let R(x1, . . . , xn) be an n-ary relation (different from equality). Write
RN as an infinitary expression using countable unions and intersections of Cartesian
products of E-measurable sets from {B ∩N | B ∈ ∆R} (see the definition of ∆R
and E in the proof of Theorem 9.1.6); say as the expression t(B0, B1, . . . ). Then
we define RM by t(C0, C1, . . . ). Furthermore, we define each constant cM to be
pi(cN ).
Finally, define a probability measure D0 on the Borel sets of M = 2ω by
D0 = E ◦ pi−1.
Let D be the completion of D0. Then Proposition 9.2.1 tells us that (M,D) is
an ε-model. Now it is easy to see that for all propositional formulas ϕ(x1, . . . , xn)
and all x1, . . . , xn ∈ N we have that N |= ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) if and only if M |=
ϕ(pi(x1), . . . , pi(xn)). For the atomic formulas not using equality, this follows from
the definition of the relations, and for equality this follows from the injectivity
of pi. For general formulas in prenex normal form, we can now easily prove
the implication from left to right, i.e. that (N , E) |=ε ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) implies that
(M,D) |=ε ϕ(pi(x1), . . . , pi(xn)). Note that for universal quantifiers, going from
N to M, the set on which a formula holds can only increase in measure, and for
existential quantifiers, there are at least as many witnesses inM as in N . It follows
from this that in particular (M,D) satisfies Γ. 
Next, we show that we can eliminate atoms.
Definition 9.2.3. Let µ be a measure and let x be a measurable singleton.
We say that x is an atom of µ if µ({x}) > 0. The measure µ is called atomless if it
does not have any atoms.
Often a different notion of atom is used in the literature, in which an atom is
a measurable set A of strictly positive measure such that every measurable subset
of A either has measure 0 or the same measure as A. However, in Polish spaces
such as 2ω these two notions coincide, as can be seen in e.g. Aliprantis and Border
[1, Lemma 12.18].
2The idea of sending each xa to a ∈ 2ω also appears in Bogachev [10, Theorem 9.4.7], albeit
in a different context. However, there only the case in which the function pi is also surjective is
discussed, the non-surjective case being irrelevant in that context.
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Note that there are at most countably many atoms, since there can only be
finitely many atoms of measure > 1n for every n ∈ ω.
Definition 9.2.4. Let (M,D) and (N , E) be two ε-models over the same
language. Then we say that (M,D) and (N , E) are ε-elementary equivalent ,
denoted by (M,D) ≡ε (N , E), if for all sentences ϕ we have
(M,D) |=ε ϕ⇔ (N , E) |=ε ϕ.
Lemma 9.2.5. Let L be a first-order language not containing equality or
function symbols. Let (M,D) be an ε-model such that D is the completion of a
Borel measure D0. Then there exists an atomless ε-model (N , E) such that E is the
completion of a Borel measure E0 and (N , E) ≡ε (M,D). Furthermore, if M is
Polish, then so is N .
Proof. We first show how to eliminate a single atom of D0. Let x0 be an
atom, say of measure r. Let N be the disjoint union of M and [0, r]. We define
a new measure E0 on N by setting, for each D0-measurable B ⊆ M and Borel
C ⊆ [0, r],
E0(B ∪ C) = D0(B \ {x0}) + µ(C),
where µ denotes the Lebesgue measure, restricted to Borel sets. Then clearly, x0 is
no longer an atom (since it now has measure zero). The interpretation of constants
in N is simply defined by cN = cM.
Define a function pi : N →M by
pi(x) =
{
x if x ∈M ,
x0 if x ∈ [0, r].
We now define the relations on N by letting
RN (x1, . . . , xn)⇐⇒ RM(pi(x1), . . . , pi(xn))
for every relation R. To simplify notation, in the following we write ~x = x1, . . . , xn
and pi(~x) = pi(x1), . . . , pi(xn).
Let E be the completion of E0. To show that (N , E) ≡ε (M,D) we prove the
stronger assertion that for all formulas ϕ and for all ~x ∈ N ,
(20) (N , E) |=ε ϕ(~x)⇐⇒ (M,D) |=ε ϕ(pi(~x)),
so that this holds in particular for all sentences ϕ. We prove (20) by formula-
induction on ϕ in prenex normal form. We only prove the universal case; the other
cases are easy. So, let ϕ = ∀yψ(y, ~x). To prove (20) it suffices to show that
Pr
E
[
b ∈ N | (N , E) |=ε ψ(b, ~x)
]
= Pr
D
[
a ∈M | (M,D) |=ε ψ(a, pi(~x))
]
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for all ~x ∈ N . Now by induction hypothesis,
Pr
E
[
b ∈ N | (N , E) |=ε ψ(b, ~x)
]
= Pr
E
[
b ∈ N | (M,D) |=ε ψ(pi(b), pi(~x))
]
= Pr
E
[
b ∈M | (M,D) |=ε ψ(pi(b), pi(~x))
]
+ Pr
E
[
b ∈ [0, r] | (M,D) |=ε ψ(pi(b), pi(~x))
]
= Pr
D
[
a ∈M \ {x0} | (M,D) |=ε ψ(a, pi(~x))
]
+ Pr
D
[
x0 | (M,D) |=ε ψ(x0, pi(~x))
]
= Pr
D
[
a ∈M | (M,D) |=ε ψ(a, pi(~x))
]
Finally, using the remark below Definition 9.2.3, we can iterate this construction
a countable number of times, eliminating the atoms one by one. It should be clear
that the limit model exists and satisfies the theorem. 
The next theorem shows the connection between Borel measures on 2ω and
the Lebesgue measure.
Definition 9.2.6. Let (X,A, µ) and (Y,B, ν) be measure spaces. (X,A, µ)
and (Y,B, ν) are isomorphic if there exists an isomorphism from X to Y , that is, a
bijection f : X → Y such that f(A) = B and µ ◦ f−1 = ν.
Theorem 9.2.7. (Kechris [50, Theorem 17.41]) Let D be an atomless Borel
probability measure on a Polish space. Then it is isomorphic to [0, 1] with the
Lebesgue measure restricted to Borel sets.
Putting together everything we have found, we reach the theorem announced
at the beginning of this section.
Theorem 9.2.8. Let L be a countable first-order language not containing
equality or function symbols. Let Γ be an ε-satisfiable set of sentences. Then
there exists an ε-model on [0, 1] with the Lebesgue measure which ε-satisfies Γ.
Furthermore, all relations in the new ε-model can be chosen to be Borel.
Proof. By Proposition 9.2.2 we know that Γ has an ε-model (M,D) on 2ω
with D the completion of a Borel measure and with Borel relations. By Lemma 9.2.5
we may assume that M is atomless. By Theorem 9.2.7, (M,D) is isomorphic to
[0, 1] with the Lebesgue measure, by a Borel isomorphism. Note that isomorphisms
preserve ε-truth, so the induced model on [0, 1] is ε-elementary equivalent toM. 
Note that Theorem 9.2.8 fails for languages with equality, since then a sentence
such as ∃x∀y(x = y) expresses that there is an atom of measure at least 1− ε. For
languages with equality we have the following more elaborate result:
Theorem 9.2.9. Let L be a countable first-order language not containing
function symbols. Let Γ be an ε-satisfiable set of sentences. Then there exists an
ε-model (M,D) which ε-satisfies Γ such that:
(i) M is based on [0, r] ∪X for some r ∈ [0, 1] and a countable set X,
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(ii) D is the Lebesgue measure on [0, r],
(iii) all relations in M are Borel.
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 9.2.8, by Proposition 9.2.2 we know that
Γ has an ε-model (N , E) on 2ω with E the completion of a Borel measure and
with Borel relations. We can separate N into a countable set of atoms X and an
atomless part Y . Let r be the E-measure of the atomless part. If r = 0, then observe
that we can apply the classical downward Lo¨wenheim–Skolem Theorem to find a
countable submodel M of N containing X, and then (M, E M) can be easily
verified to satisfy the requirements of the theorem. If r > 0, then by Theorem 9.2.7
we know that (Y, 1rE) is isomorphic to [0, 1] with the Lebesgue measure, so (Y, E) is
isomorphic to [0, r] with the Lebesgue measure. As in Theorem 9.2.8, this induces
an ε-elementary equivalent model on [0, r] together with the atoms X. 
9.3. The Lo¨wenheim number
At this point we may ask ourselves how tight Theorem 9.1.6 is. The Lo¨wenheim
number of a logic is the smallest cardinal λ such that every satisfiable sentence has
a model of cardinality at most λ. For every ε, let λε be the Lo¨wenheim number
of ε-logic, i.e. the smallest cardinal such that every ε-satisfiable sentence has an
ε-model of cardinality at most λε. The next theorem parallels Corollary 2.4.5 in
Keisler [51]. MA is Martin’s axiom from set theory, see Kunen [62].
Theorem 9.3.1. Let ε ∈ [0, 1) be rational. For the Lo¨wenheim number λε of
ε-logic we have
(i) ℵ1 6 λε 6 2ℵ0 ,
(ii) If Martin’s axiom MA holds then λε = 2
ℵ0 .
Proof. The first part was already proven above, in Example 9.1.5 and The-
orem 9.1.6. For the second part, assume that MA holds. Let ϕ be the sentence
from Example 9.1.5. Let κ < 2ω and assume ϕ has a model of cardinality κ. We
remark that any model of ϕ has to be atomless. Therefore, if we now use the
construction from Proposition 9.2.2, we find a model (M,D) which ε-satisfies ϕ
and where D is the completion of an atomless Borel measure. Furthermore, if we
let pi and (N , E) be as in the proof of this proposition, the set pi(N ) is a set of
cardinality at most κ, so by MA it has measure 0 (see Fremlin [31, p127]). But
then
E(N ) = D ◦ pi(N ) = 0,
a contradiction. 
Theorem 9.3.1 shows that we cannot prove in the standard set-theoretic
framework of ZFC such statements as λε = ℵ1, because this is independent of
ZFC. Namely under CH we have that λε = ℵ1 by item (i), and under MA we have
λε = 2
ℵ0 by item (ii), and MA is consistent with 2ℵ0 > ℵ1, see Kunen [62, p278].
(Note that this does not exclude the possibility that λε = 2
ℵ0 could be provable
within ZFC.) So in this sense Theorem 9.1.6 is optimal.
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9.4. Reductions
In this section we discuss many-one reductions between the sets of ε-satisfiable
formulas for various ε. Recall that a many-one reduction between two sets A,B
of formulas is a computable function f such that for all formulas ϕ we have that
ϕ ∈ A if and only if f(ϕ) ∈ B. The reductions we present below are useful, e.g.
in our discussion of compactness in section 9.5, and also for complexity issues not
discussed here.
In what follows we will need to talk about satisfiability of formulas rather than
sentences. We will call a formula ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) ε-satisfiable if there is an ε-model
(M,D) and elements a1, . . . , an ∈M such that (M,D) |=ε ϕ(a1, . . . , an).
Theorem 9.4.1. Let L be a countable first-order language not containing
function symbols or equality. Then, for all rationals 0 6 ε0 6 ε1 < 1, there
exists a language L′ (also not containing function symbols or equality) such that
ε0-satisfiability in L many-one reduces to ε1-satisfiability in L′.
Proof. We can choose integers a > 0, n, and m 6 n so that ε0 = 1− am and
ε1 = 1− an , and hence mn = 1−ε11−ε0 . Let ϕ(y1, . . . , yk) be a formula in prenex normal
form (see Proposition 8.1.7). For simplicity we write ~y = y1, . . . , yk. Also, for a
function pi we let pi(~y) denote the vector pi(y1), . . . , pi(yk). We use formula-induction
to define a computable function f such that for every formula ϕ,
(21) ϕ is ε0-satisfiable if and only if f(ϕ) is ε1-satisfiable.
For propositional formulas and existential quantifiers, there is nothing to be
done and we use the identity map. Next, we consider the universal quantifiers. Let
ϕ = ∀xψ(~y, x). The idea is to introduce new unary predicates, that can be used to
vary the strength of the universal quantifier. We will make these predicates split
the model into disjoint parts. If we split it into just the right number of parts (in
this case n), then we can choose m of these parts to get just the right strength.
So, we introduce new unary predicates X1, . . . , Xn. For 1 6 i 6 n, define
Yi(x) = Xi(x) ∧
∧
j 6=i
¬Xj(x).
Then the predicates Yi define disjoint sets in any model.
We now define the sentence a-n-split by:∧
I⊆{1,...,n},#I=a
∀y
(∨
i∈I
Yi(y)
)
,
where #I denotes the cardinality of I. Then one can verify that in any model, if
the sets Xi are disjoint sets of measure exactly
1
n (and hence the same holds for
the Yi), then a-n-split is ε1-valid. Conversely, if a-n-split holds, then the sets Yi
all have measure 1n by Lemma 9.4.2 below. In particular we see that, if a-n-split
holds, then the Yi together disjointly cover a set of measure 1.
Now define f(ϕ) to be the formula
a-n-split ∧
∧
i1,...,im
∀x((Yi1(x) ∨ · · · ∨ Yim(x)) ∧ f(ψ)(~y, x))
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where the conjunction is over all subsets of size m from {1, . . . , n}. (It will be clear
from the construction that f(ψ) has the same arity as ψ.) Thus, f(ϕ) expresses
that for any choice of m of the n parts, f(ψ)(x) holds often enough when restricted
to the resulting part of the model.
We will now prove claim (21) above. For the implication from left to right, we
will prove the following strengthening:
For every formula ϕ(~y), if ϕ is ε0-satisfied in some ε0-model (M,D), then there
exists an ε1-model (N , E) together with a measure-preserving surjective measurable
function pi : N →M (i.e. for all D-measurable A we have that E(pi−1(A)) = D(A))
such that for all ~y ∈ N we have that
(N , E) |=ε1 f(ϕ)(~y) if and only if (M,D) |=ε0 ϕ(pi(~y)).
We prove this by formula-induction over the formulas in prenex normal form.
For propositional formulas, there is nothing to be done (we can simply take the
models to be equal and pi the identity). For the existential quantifier, let ϕ = ∃xψ(x)
and apply the induction hypothesis to ψ to find a model (N , E) and a mapping pi.
Then we can take the same model and mapping for ϕ, as easily follows from the
fact that pi is surjective.
Next, we consider the universal quantifier. Suppose ϕ = ∀xψ(~y, x) is ε0-
satisfied in (M,D). Use the induction hypothesis to find a model (N , E) and a
measure-preserving surjective measurable function pi : N →M such that for all
~y, x ∈ N we have that
(N , E) |=ε1 f(ψ)(~y, x) if and only if (M,D) |=ε0 ψ(pi(~y), pi(x)).
Now form the model (N ′, E ′) consisting of n copies N1, . . . ,Nn of (N , E), each
with weight 1n . That is, E ′ is the sum of n copies of 1nE . Let pi′ : N ′ → M be
the composition of the projection map σ : N ′ → N with pi. Relations in N ′ are
defined just as on N , that is, for a t-ary relation R we define RN ′(x1, . . . , xt) by
RN (σ(x1), . . . , σ(xt)). Observe that this is the same as defining RN
′
(x1, . . . , xt)
by RM(pi′(x1), . . . , pi′(xt)). We interpret constants cN
′
by embedding cN into the
first copy N1. Finally, we let each Xi be true exactly on the copy Ni.
Then pi′ is clearly surjective. To show that it is measure-preserving, it is enough
to show that σ is measure-preserving. If A is E-measurable, then σ−1(A) consists
of n disjoint copies of A, each having measure 1nE(A), so pi−1(A) has E ′-measure
exactly E(A).
Now, since (N ′, E ′) satisfies a-n-split, we see that
(22) (N ′, E ′) |=ε1 f(ψ)(~y)
is equivalent to the statement that for all 1 6 i1 < · · · < im 6 n we have
(23) Pr
E′
[
x ∈ N ′ | (N ′, E ′) |=ε1 (Yi1(x) ∨ · · · ∨ Yim(x)) ∧ f(ψ)(~y, x)
]
> 1− ε1.
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By Lemma 9.4.3 below we have that (N ′, E ′) |=ε1 f(ψ)(~y, x) if and only if (N , E) |=ε1
f(ψ)(σ(~y), σ(x)). In particular, we see for every 1 6 i 6 n that
Pr
E′
[
x ∈ N ′ | (N ′, E ′) |=ε1 Yi(x) ∧ f(ψ)(~y, x)
]
=(24)
1
n
Pr
E
[
x ∈ N | (N , E) |=ε1 f(ψ)(σ(~y), x)
]
.
It follows that (23) is equivalent to
m
n
Pr
E
[
x ∈ N | (N , E) |=ε1 f(ψ)(σ(~y), x)
]
> 1− ε1.
The induction hypothesis tells us that this is equivalent to
m
n
Pr
E
[
x ∈ N | (M,D) |=ε0 ψ(pi(σ(~y)), pi(x))
]
> 1− ε1
and since pi is surjective and measure-preserving, this is the same as
Pr
D
[
x ∈M | (M,D) |=ε0 ψ(pi(σ(~y)), x)
]
> n
m
(1− ε1) = 1− ε0.
This proves that (N ′, E ′) |=ε1 f(ϕ)(~y) if and only if (M,D) |=ε0 ϕ(pi′(~y)).
We have not yet explained why (N ′, E ′) is actually an ε1-model. However, by
Theorem 9.2.8 we may assume the relations on the original model M to be Borel,
and it is easily seen that our construction of successively making copies keeps the
relations Borel. So, from Proposition 9.2.1 we see that the models (N , E) and
(N ′, E ′) are in fact ε-models for every ε.
To prove the right to left direction of (21) we will use induction to prove the
following stronger statement:
If (M,D) is an ε1-model and ~y ∈M are such that (M,D) |=ε1 f(ϕ)(~y), then we
also have (M,D) |=ε0 ϕ(~y).3
In particular, if f(ϕ) is ε1-satisfiable, then ϕ is ε0-satisfiable. The only interesting
case is the universal case, so let ϕ = ∀xψ(~y, x). Let ~y ∈M be such that (M,D) |=ε1
f(ϕ)(~y). Assume, towards a contradiction, that (M,D) 6|=ε0 ϕ(~y). Then
Pr
D
[
x ∈M | (M,D) 6|=ε0 ψ(~y, x)
]
> ε0
and by the induction hypothesis we have
(25) Pr
D
[
x ∈M | (M,D) 6|=ε1 f(ψ)(~y, x)
]
> ε0.
But by taking those m of the Yi (say Yi1 , . . . , Yim) which have the largest intersection
with this set we find that
Pr
D
[
x ∈M | (M,D) |=ε1 (Yi1 ∨ · · · ∨ Yim) ∧ f(ψ)(~y, x)
]
<
m
n
(1− ε0) = 1− ε1
which contradicts our choice of (M,D). 
Lemma 9.4.2. Let a, n ∈ ω, a > 0, and let D be a probability measure. Let
Y1, . . . , Yn be disjoint D-measurable sets such that for all subsets I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} of
cardinality a the union
⋃
i∈I Yi has measure at least
a
n . Then all Yi have measure
exactly 1n .
3As explained above, we may assume (M,D) to be an ε0-model.
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Proof. Assume there exists 1 6 i 6 n such that Yi has measure < 1n .
Determine a sets Yi with minimal measure, say with indices from the set I. Then,
by assumption, D(⋃i∈I Yi) > an . But at least one of the Yi with i ∈ I has measure
strictly less than 1n , so also one of them needs to have measure strictly greater
than 1n . However, D(
⋃
i6∈I Yi) 6 n−an , so there is a Yj with j 6∈ I having measure
6 1n . This contradicts the minimality. So, all sets Yi have measure at least
1
n and
since they are disjoint they therefore have measure exactly 1n . 
Lemma 9.4.3. Let (N ′, E ′) and (N , E) be as in the proof of Theorem 9.4.1
above. Then for every formula ζ(x1, . . . , xt) in the language of M, for every
ε ∈ [0, 1] and all x1, . . . , xt ∈ N ′ we have that (N ′, E ′) |=ε ζ(x1, . . . , xt) if and only
if (N , E) |=ε ζ(σ(x1), . . . , σ(xt)).
Proof. By induction on the structure of the formulas in prenex normal form.
The base case holds by definition of the relations in N ′. The only interesting
induction step is the one for the universal quantifier. So, let ζ = ∀x0ζ ′(x0, . . . , xt)
and let x1, . . . , xt ∈ N ′. Using the induction hypothesis, we find that the set
A = {x0 ∈ N ′ | (N ′, E ′) |=ε ζ ′(x0, . . . , xt)} is equal to the set {x0 ∈ N ′ |
(N , E) |=ε ζ ′(σ(x0), . . . , σ(xt))}, which consists of n disjoint copies of the set
B = {x0 ∈ N | (N , E) |=ε ζ ′(x0, σ(x1), . . . , σ(xt))}; denote the copy of B living
inside Ni by Bi. Then
D(A) =
n∑
i=1
E ′(Bi) =
n∑
i=1
1
nE(B) = E(B)
from which we directly see that (N ′, E ′) |=ε ζ(x1, . . . , xt) if and only if (N , E) |=ε
ζ(σ(x1), . . . , σ(xt)). 
Next we show that we have a similar reduction in the other direction, i.e. from
a bigger ε0 to a smaller ε1.
Theorem 9.4.4. Let L be a countable first-order language not containing
function symbols or equality. Then, for all rationals 0 < ε1 6 ε0 6 1, there
exists a language L′ (also not containing function symbols or equality) such that
ε0-satisfiability in L many-one reduces to ε1-satisfiability in L′.
Proof. The proof is very similar to that of Theorem 9.4.1. There are two
main differences: the choice of the integers a, n and m, and a small difference in
the construction of f (as we shall see below). We can choose integers a, n and m
such that ε1 = 1− an and mn = ε0−ε1ε0 . The case a = 0 is trivial, so we may assume
that a > 0. We construct a many-one reduction f such that for all formulas ϕ,
ϕ is ε0-satisfiable if and only if f(ϕ) is ε1-satisfiable.
Again, we only consider the nontrivial case where ϕ is a universal formula ∀xψ(~y, x).
We define f(ϕ) to be the formula
a-n-split ∧
∧
i1,...,im
∀x(Yi1(x) ∨ · · · ∨ Yim(x) ∨ f(ψ)(~y, x))
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where the conjunction is over all subsets of size m from {1, . . . , n}. So, the essential
change from the proof of Theorem 9.4.1 is that the conjunction of Yi1(x)∨· · ·∨Yim(x)
and f(ψ)(~y, x) has become a disjunction.
The remainder of the proof is now almost the same as for Theorem 9.4.1. In
the proof for the implication from left to right, follow the proof up to equation
(22), i.e.
(N ′, E ′) |=ε1 f(ϕ)(~y).
Again this is equivalent to the statement that for all 1 6 i1 < · · · < im 6 n we
have
(26) Pr
E′
[
x ∈ N ′ | (N ′, E ′) |=ε1 Yi1(x) ∨ · · · ∨ Yim(x) ∨ f(ψ)(~y, x)
]
> 1− ε1.
Similar as before, using Lemma 9.4.3, we find that this is equivalent to
m
n
+
n−m
n
Pr
E
[
x ∈ N | (N , E) |=ε1 f(ψ)(σ(~y), x)
]
> 1− ε1.
Again, using the induction hypothesis and the fact that pi is measure-preserving
we find that this is equivalent to
Pr
D
[
x ∈M | (M,D) |=ε0 ψ(pi(σ(~y)), x)
]
> n
n−m
(
1− ε1 − m
n
)
=
ε0
ε1
(−ε0ε1 + ε1
ε0
)
= 1− ε0.
This proves that (N ′, E ′) |=ε1 f(ϕ)(~y) if and only if (M,D) |=ε0 ϕ(~y).
For the converse implication, we also need to slightly alter the proof of The-
orem 9.4.1. Assuming that (M,D) |=ε1 f(ϕ)(~y), follow the proof up to equation
(25), where we obtain
(27) Pr
D
[
x ∈M | (M,D) 6|=ε1 f(ψ)(~y, x)
]
> ε0.
Define
η = Pr
D
[
x ∈M | (M,D) |=ε1 f(ψ)(~y, x)
]
and take those m of the Yi (say Yi1 , . . . , Yim) which have the smallest intersection
with this set. Note that by (27) we have η < 1− ε0. Then we find that
Pr
D
[
x ∈M | (M,D) |=ε1 Yi1 ∨ · · · ∨ Yim ∨ f(ψ)(~y, x)
]
6 m
n
+
(
1− m
n
)
η =
ε0 − ε1
ε0
+
ε1
ε0
η
<
ε0 − ε1
ε0
+
ε1
ε0
(1− ε0) = 1− ε1.
which contradicts our choice of (M,D). Note that the last inequality holds because
ε1 6= 0. 
9.5. Compactness
We start this section with a negative result, namely that in general ε-logic is
not compact. This results holds for rational ε different from 0 and 1. The case ε = 1
is pathological, and in section 11.6 we will show that 0-logic is in fact compact.
First, we prove a technical lemma.
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Lemma 9.5.1. Let (M,D) be an ε-model, let R(x, y) be a binary relation and
let δ > 0. Then for almost all y there exists a set Cy of strictly positive measure
such that for all y′ ∈ Cy:
Pr
D
[
u ∈M | RM(u, y)↔ RM(u, y′)] > 1− δ.
Proof. It suffices to show this not for almost all y, but instead show that for
all δ′ > 0 this holds for at least D-measure 1− δ′ many y.
We first show that we can approximate the horizontal sections of RM in a
suitable way, namely that there exist a finite number U1, . . . , Un and V1, . . . , Vn of
D-measurable sets such that:
(28) Pr
D
[
y ∈M
∣∣∣PrD [u ∈M | (u, y) ∈ RM4(
n⋃
i=1
Ui × Vi
)]
6 δ
2
]
> 1− δ′.
(Here 4 denotes the symmetric difference.) To show that this is possible, determine
Ui and Vi such that
(29) Pr
D
[
RM4
( n⋃
i=1
Ui × Vi
)]
<
δδ′
2
.
Observe that such an approximation exists: this obviously holds for relations RM
that are a rectangle U × V , and the existence of an approximation is preserved
under countable unions and complements. (This is usually part of a proof of
Fubini’s theorem.)
Now assume that (28) does not hold for these Ui and Vi. Then we have
Pr
D
[
y ∈M
∣∣∣PrD [u ∈M | (u, y) ∈ RM4(
n⋃
i=1
Ui × Vi
)]
>
δ
2
]
> δ′.
But then we see that
Pr
D
[
RM4
( n⋃
i=1
Ui × Vi
)]
> δδ
′
2
by taking the integral, contradicting (29).
We now show that for almost all y there exists a set Cy of strictly positive
measure such that for all y′ ∈ Cy we have that
(30) Pr
D
[
u ∈M | (u, y) ∈
n⋃
i=1
Ui × Vi ↔ (u, y′) ∈
n⋃
i=1
Ui × Vi
]
= 1.
Note that the Vi induce a partition of M into at most 2n many disjoint parts Yj
(by choosing for each i 6 n either Vi or its complement, and intersecting these).
But each such Yj has either measure zero (so we can ignore it), or Yj has strictly
positive measure and for all y ∈ Yj we can take Cy = Yj . Then it is clear that (30)
holds.
Call the set of measure 1− δ′ elements y from (28) M′. The same argument
used to prove (30) can be applied to M′, using the partition Yj ∩M′ of M′. For
y ∈ M′ this gives the same conclusion (30), but with the extra property that
Cy ⊆M′.
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Finally, the lemma follows by combining (28) and (30): For every y ∈ M′,
by (28) its sections with RM and the approximation differ by at most δ2 . By (30)
and the previous remark there is Cy ⊆M′ of positive measure such that for every
y′ ∈ Cy the sections of y and y′ with the approximation agree almost everywhere.
Again by (28) the sections of y′ with RM and the approximation differ by at most
δ
2 . Hence the sections of y and y
′ with RM differ by at most δ2 +
δ
2 . 
Theorem 9.5.2. For every rational ε ∈ (0, 1), ε-logic is not compact, i.e. there
exists a countable set Γ of sentences such that each finite subset of Γ is ε-satisfiable,
but Γ itself is not ε-satisfiable.
Proof. The example we use is adapted from Keisler [51, Example 2.6.5]. Let
R be a binary relation. Using the reductions from Theorem 9.4.1 (observing, from
the proof of that theorem, that we can apply the reduction per quantifier), we
can form a sentence ϕn such that ϕn is ε-satisfiable if and only if there is a model
satisfying:
For almost all y (i.e. measure 1 many), there exists a set Ay of measure at least
1− 1n such that for all y′ ∈ Ay the sets By = {u | R(u, y)} and By′ = {u | R(u, y′)}
both have measure 12 , while By ∩By′ has measure 14 (in other words, the two sets
are independent sets of measure 12).
Then each ϕn has a finite ε-model, as illustrated in Figure 1 for n = 4: for
each x (displayed on the horizontal axis) we let R(x, y) hold exactly for those y
(displayed on the vertical axis) where the box has been coloured grey. If we now
take for each Ay exactly those three intervals of length
1
4 of which y is not an
element, we can directly verify that ϕn holds.
Figure 1. A model for ϕ4 on [0, 1].
However, the set {ϕn | n ∈ ω} has no ε-model. Namely, for such a model, we
would have that for almost all y, there exists a set Ay of measure 1 such that for
all y′ ∈ Ay the sets By and By′ (defined above) are independent sets of measure
1
2 . Clearly, such a model would need to be atomless and therefore cannot be
countable. But then we would have uncountably many of such independent sets By.
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Intuitively, this contradicts the fact that R is measurable in the product measure
and can therefore be formed using countable unions and countable intersections of
Cartesian products.
More formally, Lemma 9.5.1 tells us that in any ε-model with a binary relation
R, for almost all y there exists a set Cy of strictly positive measure such that for all
y′ ∈ Cy the sets By and By′ agree on a set of measure at least 78 . Since necessarily
Ay ∩ Cy = ∅ this shows that Ay cannot have measure 1. 
Next, we will present an ultraproduct construction that allows us to partially
recover compactness, which is due to Hoover and described in Keisler [51]. This
construction uses the Loeb measure from nonstandard analysis, which is due to
Loeb [73]. The same construction as in Keisler is also described (for a different
logic) in Bageri and Pourmahdian [4], however, there the Loeb measure is not
explicitly mentioned and the only appearance of nonstandard analysis is in taking
the standard part of some element. Below we will describe the construction without
resorting to nonstandard analysis. To be able to define the measure, we need the
notion of a limit over an ultrafilter. This notion corresponds to taking the standard
part of a nonstandard real number.
We refer the reader to Hodges [41] for an explanation of the notions of ultrafilter
and ultraproduct.
Definition 9.5.3. Let U be an ultrafilter over ω and let a0, a1, · · · ∈ R. Then
a limit of the sequence a0, a1, . . . over the ultrafilter U , or a U-limit, is an r ∈ R
such that for all ε > 0 we have {i ∈ ω | |ai − r| < ε} ∈ U . We will denote such a
limit by limU ai.
Proposition 9.5.4. Limits over ultrafilters are unique. Furthermore, for any
bounded sequence and every ultrafilter U , the limit of the sequence over U exists.
Proof. First assume that we have an ultrafilter U over ω and a sequence
a0, a1, . . . in R that has two distinct limits r0 and r1. Then the sets{
i ∈ ω | |ai − r0| < 12 |r0 − r1|
}
and {
i ∈ ω | |ai − r1| < 12 |r0 − r1|
}
are disjoint elements of U ; so, ∅ ∈ U , which contradicts U being a proper filter.
Now, assume the sequence a0, a1, . . . is bounded; without loss of generality we
may assume that it is a sequence in [0, 1]. We will inductively define a decreasing
chain [bn, cn] of intervals such that for all n ∈ ω we have {i ∈ ω | ai ∈ [bn, cn]} ∈ U .
First we let [a0, b0] = [0, 1]. Next, if {i ∈ ω | ai ∈ [bn, cn]} ∈ U , then either{
i ∈ ω | ai ∈
[
bn,
bn+cn
2
]} ∈ U
or {
i ∈ ω | ai ∈
[
bn+cn
2 , cn
]} ∈ U .
Choose one of these two intervals to be [bn+1, cn+1].
Now there exists a unique point r ∈ ⋂n∈ω[bn, cn], and it is easily verified that
this is the limit of the sequence. 
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Using these limits over ultrafilters, we show how to define a probability measure
on an ultraproduct of measure spaces. As mentioned above, this construction is
essentially due to Loeb [73], but we describe it on ultraproducts instead of using
nonstandard analysis.
Definition 9.5.5. Let U be a non-principal ultrafilter on ω and let D0,D1, . . .
be a sequence of finitely additive probability measures over sets X0, X1, . . . . Then
we let
∏
i∈ωXi/U denote the ultraproduct, and for a sequence a = a0, a1, . . .
with ai ∈ Xi we let [a] denote the element of
∏
i∈ωXi/U corresponding to the
equivalence class of the sequence a0, a1, . . . .
For each sequence A = A0, A1, . . . with each Ai a Di-measurable set we will
call the set
[A] =
{
[a] ∈
∏
i∈ω
Xi/U | {i ∈ ω | ai ∈ Ai} ∈ U
}
a basic measurable set. If we let ∆ be the collection of all basic measurable sets,
then we define the ultraproduct measure to be the unique measure E on σ(∆) such
that for all basic measurable sets:
Pr
E
([A]) = lim
U
Pr
Di
(Ai).
Note that E is a σ-additive measure, even if the Di are only finitely additive.
Proposition 9.5.6. The ultraproduct measure exists and is well-defined.
Proof. We need to verify that E , as defined on the Boolean algebra of basic
measurable sets, satisfies the conditions of Carathe´odory’s extension theorem (see
e.g. Bogachev [10, Theorem 1.5.6]). Thus, we need to show that, for any disjoint
sequence [A0], [A1], . . . of non-empty basic measurable sets such that
⋃
j∈ω[A
j ] is
a basic measurable set, we have that
Pr
E
( ⋃
j∈ω
[Aj ]
)
=
∑
j∈ω
Pr
E
([Aj ]).
In fact, we will show that if the [Aj ] are disjoint and non-empty, then
⋃
j∈ω[A
j ] is
never a basic measurable set.
Namely, let [Aj ] be as above and assume
⋃
j∈ω[A
j ] is a basic measurable set.
Without loss of generality, we may assume that
⋃
j∈ω[A
j ] =
∏
i∈ωXi/U . We
will construct an element of
∏
i∈ωXi/U which is not in
⋃
j∈ω[A
j ], which is a
contradiction. Observe that, because all the [Aj ] are disjoint and non-empty, the
set
⋃n
j=0[A
j ] will always be a proper subset of
∏
i∈ωXi/U . So, for each n ∈ ω, fix
[xn] 6∈ ⋃nj=0[Aj ]. For every m ∈ ω, let Im ∈ U be the set {i ∈ ω | xmi 6∈ ⋃mj=0Aji}.
Furthermore, let kn ∈ ω be the biggest m 6 n such that n ∈ Im, and let it be 0 if
no such m 6 n exists.
Now define xi as x
ki
i . We claim that [x] 6∈
⋃
j∈ω[A
j ]. Namely, let m ∈ ω. Then,
for every n > m with n ∈ Im we have kn > m, so we see that xn 6∈
⋃m
j=0A
j
n. In
particular, we see that xn 6∈ Amn for every n ∈ Im \{0, 1, . . . , n−1}. However, since
U is non-principal, this set is in U , so we see [x] 6∈ [Am]. 
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We can now define a model on the ultraproduct in the usual way, however, we
cannot guarantee that this is an ε-model, since we will see that we merely know
that all definable subsets of M of arity 1 are measurable. We thus only obtain a
weak ε-model (see Definition 8.2.3). To even achieve this, we need to extend the
measure to all subsets of the model first, at the cost of moving to a finitely additive
measure. The final measure that we obtain is still σ-additive though.
Theorem 9.5.7. (Tarski) Every finitely additive measure D on a Boolean
algebra of subsets of X can be extended to a finitely additive measure D′ on the
power set P(X).
Proof. See Birkhoff [9, p. 185]. 
Definition 9.5.8. Let ε ∈ [0, 1], let U be a non-principal ultrafilter over ω and
let (M0,D0), (M1,D1), . . . be a sequence of finitely additive weak ε-models, where
each Di is defined on all of P(Mi) (e.g. using Theorem 9.5.7). We then define the
ultraproduct of this sequence, which we will denote by
∏
i∈ω(Mi,Di)/U , to be the
classical ultraproduct of the models Mi, equipped with the ultraproduct measure.
More precisely, we define it to be the model having as universe
∏
i∈ωMi/U , where
for each relation R(x1, . . . , xn) we define the relation on
∏
i∈ω(Mi,Di)/U by
R([a1], . . . , [an])⇔ {i ∈ ω | RMi(a1i , . . . , ani )} ∈ U ,
and we interpret function symbols f(x1, . . . , xn) by
f([a1], . . . , [an]) = [fM0(a10, . . . , a
n
0 ), f
M1(a11, . . . , a
n
1 ), . . . ].
In particular, constants c are interpreted as
c = [cM0 , cM1 , . . . ].
We can now show that a variant of the fundamental theorem of ultraproducts,
or  Los´’s theorem, holds for this kind of model.
Theorem 9.5.9. For every formula ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) and every sequence of ele-
ments [a1], . . . , [an] ∈∏i∈ω(Mi,Di)/U , the following are equivalent:
(i)
∏
i∈ω(Mi,Di)/U |=ε ϕ([a1], . . . , [an]),
(ii) for all ε′ > ε, {i ∈ ω | (Mi,Di) |=ε′ ϕ(a1i , . . . , ani )} ∈ U ,4
(iii) there exists a sequence ε0, ε1, . . . with U-limit ε such that {i ∈ ω | (Mi,Di) |=εi
ϕ(a1i , . . . , a
n
i )} ∈ U .
In particular, if {i ∈ ω | (Mi,Di) |=ε ϕ(a1i , . . . , ani )} ∈ U , then we have∏
i∈ω
(Mi,Di)/U |=ε ϕ([a1], . . . , [an]).
Proof. Before we begin with the proof we note that for any formula ψ, if
ε0 6 ε1 and (Mi,Di) |=ε0 ψ, then also (Mi,Di) |=ε1 ψ. This can be directly shown
using induction over formulas in prenex normal form, together with the fact that
we have assumed every subset of Mi to be Di-measurable (see Definition 9.5.8).
4Here we also consider ε′ > 1, which is interpreted in the same way as in Definition 8.1.1. Of
course, this is not necessary if ε < 1, since ε′-truth is equivalent to 1-truth when ε′ > 1. However,
this way ε = 1 is also included.
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We first prove the equivalence of (ii) and (iii). If (ii) holds, let
δi = inf
{
ε′ > ε | (Mi,Di) |=ε′ ϕ([a1], . . . , [an])
}
if this set is non-empty, and 0 otherwise. Note that this set is U-almost always
non-empty, as can be seen by applying (ii) with an arbitrary ε′ > ε. Furthermore,
(ii) also tells us that the sequence δi converges to ε with respect to U . Now, the
sequence 12i converges to 0, so that the sequence εi = min(δi+
1
2i , 1) also has U -limit
ε. By definition of δi, we now have that (iii) holds for the sequence ε0, ε1, . . . .
Conversely, assume that (iii) holds and fix ε′ > ε. Because the sequence
ε0, ε1, . . . has U-limit ε, we know that {i ∈ ω | |εi − ε| < ε′ − ε} ∈ U . Using (iii)
we therefore see that also
{i ∈ ω | |εi − ε| < ε′ − ε} ∩ {i ∈ ω | (Mi,Di) |=εi ϕ(a1i , . . . , ani )} ∈ U
and using the observation above we directly see that this set is contained in
{i ∈ ω | (Mi,Di) |=ε′ ϕ(a1i , . . . , ani )}, so the latter set is also in U and we therefore
see that (ii) holds.
Next, we simultaneously show the equivalence of (i) with (ii) and (iii) using
induction over formulas ϕ in prenex normal form. For propositional formulas, this
proceeds in the same way as the classical proof. For the existential case, we use
formulation (iii): using the induction hypothesis, we know that∏
i∈ω
(Mi,Di)/U |=ε ∃xψ([a1], . . . , [an], x)
is equivalent to saying that there exists an [an+1] ∈∏i∈ω(Mi,Di) and a sequence
ε0, ε1, . . . with U -limit ε such that for U -almost all i ∈ ω we have that (Mi,Di) |=εi
ψ(a1i , . . . , a
n
i , a
n+1
i ), which is in turn equivalent to saying that for the same sequence
ε0, ε1, . . . we have for U-almost all i ∈ ω that (Mi,Di) |=εi ∃xψ(a1i , . . . , ani , x).
Finally, consider the universal case. By definition,∏
i∈ω
(Mi,Di)/U |=ε ∀xψ([a1], . . . , [an], x)
is equivalent to
Pr
E
({
[an+1]
∣∣∣ ∏
i∈ω
(Mi,Di)/U |=ε ψ([a1], . . . , [an+1])
})
> 1− ε.
By induction hypothesis, we know that this is equivalent to
Pr
E
( ⋂
ε′>ε
{
[an+1]
∣∣∣ {i ∈ ω | (Mi,Di) |=ε′ ψ(a1i , . . . , an+1i )} ∈ U}) > 1− ε.
Because we can restrict ourselves to the (countable) intersection of rational ε′, this
is the same as having for all ε′ > ε that
(31) Pr
E
({
[an+1]
∣∣∣ {i ∈ ω | (Mi,Di) |=ε′ ψ(a1i , . . . , an+1i )} ∈ U}) > 1− ε.
Observe that the set in (31) is precisely the basic measurable set[{an+1i ∈Mi | (Mi,Di) |=ε′ ψ(a1i , . . . , an+1i )}],
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where we once again use that every subset of Mi is Di-measurable. So, using
the definition of the ultraproduct measure (Definition 9.5.5), (31) is equivalent to
having for every δ > 0 that{
i ∈ ω ∣∣ Pr
Di
({
an+1i ∈Mi
∣∣ (Mi,Di) |=ε′ ψ(a1i , . . . , an+1i )}) > 1− ε− δ} ∈ U .
But this holds for all ε′ > ε and all δ > 0 if and only if we have for all ε′ > ε that{
i ∈ ω ∣∣ Pr
Di
({
an+1i ∈Mi
∣∣ (Mi,Di) |=ε′ ψ(a1i , . . . , an+1i )}) > 1− ε′} ∈ U .
which is in turn equivalent to having for all ε′ > ε that
{i ∈ ω | (Mi,Di) |=ε′ ∀xψ(a1i , . . . , ani , x)} ∈ U .
This completes the induction. 
Corollary 9.5.10. The ultraproduct is a weak ε-model.
Proof. For every formula ϕ = ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) and parameters [a
1], . . . , [an−1]
in
∏
i∈ω(Mi,Di)/U , Theorem 9.5.9 tells us that the subset of
∏
i∈ω(Mi,Di)/U
defined by ϕ and the parameters [a1], . . . [an−1] is exactly⋂
ε′>ε,ε′∈Q
{
[an] ∈
∏
i∈ω
(Mi,Di)/U | {i ∈ ω | (Mi,Di) |=ε′ ϕ(a1i , . . . , ani )} ∈ U
}
which is a countable intersection of basic measurable sets, and therefore measurable.

We remark that this construction, in general, does not yield an ε-model. For
example, if we have a binary relation R(x1, x2) and on each model (Mi,Di) the
relation R consists of the union of two ‘boxes’ (Xi × Yi)∪ (Ui × Vi), then we would
need an uncountable union of boxes of basic measurable sets to form R in the
ultraproduct model. This is, of course, not an allowed operation on σ-algebras.
A more formal argument showing that the ultraproduct construction does
not necessarily yield ε-models is that this construction allows us to prove a weak
compactness result in the usual way. If this would always yield an ε-model, this
would contradict Theorem 9.5.2 above.
Theorem 9.5.11. (Weak compactness theorem) Let Γ be a countable set of
sentences such that each finite subset is satisfied in a weak ε-model. Then there
exists a weak ε-model satisfying Γ.
Proof. Let A0, A1, . . . be an enumeration of the finite subsets of Γ. For each
Ai, fix a weak ε-model (Mi,Di) satisfying all formulas from Ai. Then the filter on
ω generated by {{i ∈ ω | (Mi,Di) |=ε ϕ} | ϕ ∈ Γ}
is a proper filter, so we can use the ultrafilter lemma (see e.g. Hodges [41, Theorem
6.2.1]) to determine an ultrafilter U on ω containing this filter. If U is principal,
then there exists an n ∈ ω with {n} ∈ U and therefore (Mn,Dn) satisfies Γ.
Otherwise we form the ultraproduct (where we note that we may assume every
subset ofMi to be Di-measurable by Theorem 9.5.7, provided we only assume that
Di is finitely additive). It then follows from Theorem 9.5.9 and Corollary 9.5.10
that this ultraproduct is a weak ε-model that satisfies every ϕ ∈ Γ. 

CHAPTER 10
Computational Hardness of Validity in ε-Logic
In this chapter we take a first look at the computational complexity of ε-logic.
Terwijn [119] has shown that the set of ε-tautologies is undecidable. This should not
be too surprising, because this is of course also the case for classical first-order logic.
Terwijn [119] also showed that the 0-tautologies are just the classical tautologies,
so 0-validity is in fact Σ01-complete. In this chapter we will show that ε-validity is
in fact Π11-hard for ε ∈ (0, 1) ∩Q. This shows that ε-logic is computationally much
harder than first-order logic and that we cannot hope to find an effective calculus
for it.
This chapter is based on Kuyper [64].
10.1. Many-one reductions between different ε
In this section we will show that for rational ε0, ε1 ∈ (0, 1), the ε0-tautologies
many-one reduce to the ε1-tautologies. Not only does this show that we only need
to consider one fixed ε for our hardness results (we will take ε = 12 below), but in
our proof of the Π11-hardness of ε-validity these reductions will also turn out to be
useful in a different way.
We will begin with reducing to bigger ε1. To do this, we refine the argument
by Terwijn [119], where it is shown that the 0-tautologies many-one reduce to the
ε-tautologies for ε ∈ [0, 1). Our argument is similar to the one given in section 9.4,
where we discussed reductions for satisfiability instead of for validity.
Theorem 10.1.1. Let L be a countable first-order language not containing
equality. Then, for all rationals 0 ≤ ε0 ≤ ε1 < 1, the ε0-tautologies many-one
reduce to the ε1-tautologies.
Proof. We can choose integers n and 0 < m ≤ n so that mn = 1−ε11−ε0 . Let
ϕ(y1, . . . , yk) be a formula in prenex normal form (see Proposition 8.1.7). For
simplicity we write ~y = y1, . . . , yk. Also, for a function pi we let pi(~y) denote the
vector pi(y1), . . . , pi(yk). We use formula-induction to define a computable function
f such that for every formula ϕ,
(32) ϕ is an ε0-tautology if and only if f(ϕ) is an ε1-tautology.
For propositional formulas and existential quantifiers, there is nothing to be
done and we use the identity map. Next, we consider the universal quantifiers. Let
ϕ = ∀xψ(~y, x). The idea is to introduce new unary predicates, that can be used to
vary the strength of the universal quantifier. We will make these predicates split
the model into disjoint parts. If we split it into just the right number of parts (in
this case n), then we can choose m of these parts to get just the right strength.
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So, we introduce new unary predicates X1, . . . , Xn. We define the sentence
n-split by:
∀x
(X1(x) ∨ . . . ∨Xn(x)) ∧ ∧
1≤i<j≤n
¬ (Xi(x) ∧Xj(x))
 .
Then one can verify that in any model, ¬n-split does not hold if and only if the
sets Xi disjointly cover the entire model.
Now define f(ϕ) to be the formula
¬n-split ∨
∨
i1,...,im
∀x((Xi1(x) ∨ · · · ∨Xim(x)) ∧ f(ψ)(~y, x))
where the disjunction is over all subsets of size m from {1, . . . , n}. (It will be clear
from the construction that f(ψ) has the same arity as ψ.) Thus, f(ϕ) expresses
that for some choice of m of the n parts, f(ψ)(x) holds often enough when restricted
to the resulting part of the model.
We will now prove claim (32) above. For the implication from right to left, we
will prove the following strengthening:
For every formula ϕ(~y) and every probability model (M,D) there exists a probability
model (N , E) together with a measure-preserving surjective measurable function
pi : N →M (i.e. for all D-measurable A we have that E(pi−1(A)) = D(A)) such
that for all ~y ∈ N we have that
(N , E) 6|=ε1 f(ϕ)(~y) if and only if (M,D) 6|=ε0 ϕ(pi(~y)).
In particular, if f(ϕ) is an ε1-tautology, then ϕ is an ε0-tautology. We prove this
by formula-induction over the formulas in prenex normal form. For propositional
formulas, there is nothing to be done (we can simply take the models to be equal
and pi the identity). For the existential quantifier, let ϕ = ∀xψ(x) and apply the
induction hypothesis to ψ to find a model (N , E) and a mapping pi. Then we can
take the same model and mapping for ϕ, as easily follows from the fact that pi is
surjective.
Next, we consider the universal quantifier. Suppose ϕ = ∀xψ(~y, x) and let
(M,D) be a probability model. Use the induction hypothesis to find a model
(N , E) and a measure-preserving surjective measurable function pi : N →M such
that for all ~y, x ∈ N we have that
(N , E) 6|=ε1 f(ψ)(~y, x) if and only if (M,D) 6|=ε0 ϕ(pi(~y), pi(x)).
Now form the probability model (N ′, E ′) which consists of n disjoint copies
N1, . . . ,Nn of (N , E), each with weight 1n . That is, E ′ is the sum of n copies
of 1nE . Let pi′ : N ′ →M be the composition of the projection map σ : N ′ → N
with pi. Relations in N ′ are defined just as on N , that is, for a t-ary relation R we
define RN
′
(x1, . . . , xt) by R
N (σ(x1), . . . , σ(xt)). Observe that this is the same as
defining RN
′
(x1, . . . , xt) by R
M(pi′(x1), . . . , pi′(xt)). We interpret constants cN
′
by embedding cN into the first copy N1. For functions f of arity t, first note that
we can see fN as a function from N t → N ′ by embedding its codomain N into
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the first copy N1. We now interpret fN ′ as the composition of this fN with pi′.
Finally, we let each Xi be true exactly on the copy Ni.
Then pi′ is clearly surjective. To show that it is measure-preserving, it is enough
to show that σ is measure-preserving. If A is E-measurable, then σ−1(A) consists
of n disjoint copies of A, each having measure 1nE(A), so pi−1(A) has E ′-measure
exactly E(A).
Now, since (N ′, E ′) does not satisfy ¬n-split (because the Xi disjointly cover
N ′), we see that
(33) (N ′, E ′) 6|=ε1 f(ϕ)(~y)
is equivalent to the statement that for all 1 ≤ i1 < · · · < im ≤ n we have
(34) Pr
E′
[
x ∈ N ′ | (N ′, E ′) 6|=ε1 (Xi1(x) ∨ · · · ∨Xim(x)) ∧ f(ψ)(~y, x)
]
> ε1.
By Lemma 9.4.3 above we have that (N ′, E ′) |=ε1 f(ψ)(~y, x) holds if and only if
(N , E) |=ε1 f(ψ)(σ(~y), σ(x)) holds. In particular, we see for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n that
Pr
E′
[
x ∈ N ′ | (N ′, E ′) |=ε1 Xi(x) and (N ′, E ′) 6|=ε1 f(ψ)(~y, x)
]
=
1
n
Pr
E
[
x ∈ N | (N , E) 6|=ε1 f(ψ)(σ(~y), x)
]
.
It follows that (34) is equivalent to
n−m
n
+
m
n
Pr
E
[
x ∈ N | (N , E) 6|=ε1 f(ψ)(σ(~y), x)
]
> ε1.
The induction hypothesis tells us that this is equivalent to
n−m
n
+
m
n
Pr
E
[
x ∈ N | (M,D) 6|=ε0 ψ(pi(σ(~y)), pi(x))
]
> ε1
and since pi is surjective and measure-preserving, this is the same as
Pr
D
[
x ∈M | (M,D) 6|=ε0 ψ(pi(σ(~y)), x)
]
>
n
m
(
ε1 − n−m
n
)
=
n
m
(ε1 − 1) + 1 = ε0.
This proves that we have (N ′, E ′) 6|=ε1 f(ϕ)(~y) if and only if (M,D) 6|=ε0 ϕ(pi′(~y)).
To prove the left to right direction of (32) we will use induction to prove the
following stronger statement:
If (M,D) is a probability model and ~y ∈ M are such that (M,D) 6|=ε1 f(ϕ)(~y),
then we also have (M,D) 6|=ε0 ϕ(~y).
In particular, if ϕ is an ε0-tautology, then f(ϕ) is an ε1-tautology. The only
interesting case is the universal case, so let ϕ = ∀xψ(~y, x). Let ~y ∈ M be such
that (M,D) 6|=ε1 f(ϕ)(~y). Assume, towards a contradiction, that (M,D) |=ε0 ϕ(~y).
Then
Pr
D
[
x ∈M | (M,D) |=ε0 ψ(~y, x)
] ≥ 1− ε0
and by the induction hypothesis we have
(35) Pr
D
[
x ∈M | (M,D) |=ε1 f(ψ)(~y, x)
] ≥ 1− ε0.
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Because (M,D) 6|=ε1 ¬n-split, the Xi disjointly coverM, as discussed above. Now,
by taking those m of the Xi (say Xi1 , . . . , Xim) which have the largest intersection
with this set we find that
Pr
D
[
x ∈M | (M,D) |=ε1 (Xi1 ∨ · · · ∨Xim) ∧ f(ψ)(~y, x)
] ≥ m
n
(1− ε0)
= 1− ε1
which contradicts our choice of (M,D). 
Theorem 10.1.2. Let L be a countable first-order language not containing
equality. Then, for all rationals 0 < ε1 ≤ ε0 ≤ 1, the ε0-tautologies many-one
reduce to the ε1-tautologies.
Proof. We can choose integers n and m < n such that mn =
ε0−ε1
ε0
. We
construct a many-one reduction f such that for all formulas ϕ,
ϕ is an ε0-tautology if and only if f(ϕ) is an ε1-tautology.
Again, we only consider the nontrivial case where ϕ is a universal formula ∀xψ(~y, x).
We define f(ϕ) to be the formula
¬-n-split ∧
∨
i1,...,im
∀x(Xi1(x) ∨ · · · ∨Xim(x) ∨ f(ψ)(~y, x))
where the disjunction is over all subsets of size m from {1, . . . , n}.
The proof is almost the same as for Theorem 10.1.1. In the proof for the
implication from right to left, follow the proof up to (33), i.e.
(N ′, E ′) 6|=ε1 f(ϕ)(~y).
This is equivalent to the statement that for all 1 ≤ i1 < · · · < im ≤ n we have
Pr
E′
[
x ∈ N ′ | (N ′, E ′) 6|=ε1 Xi1(x) ∨ · · · ∨Xim(x) ∨ f(ψ)(~y, x)
]
> ε1.
Similar as before, using Lemma 9.4.3, we find that this is equivalent to
n−m
n
Pr
E
[
x ∈ N | (N , E) 6|=ε1 f(ψ)(σ(~y), x)
]
> ε1.
Again, using the induction hypothesis and the fact that pi is measure-preserving
we find that this is equivalent to
Pr
D
[
x ∈M | (M,D) 6|=ε0 ψ(pi(σ(~y)), x)
]
>
n
n−mε1 =
ε0
ε1
ε1 = ε0.
This proves that (N ′, E ′) |=ε1 f(ϕ)(~y) if and only if (M,D) |=ε0 ϕ(~y).
For the converse implication, we also need to slightly alter the proof of The-
orem 10.1.1. Assuming that (M,D) 6|=ε1 f(ϕ)(~y), follow the proof up to (35),
where we obtain
(36) Pr
D
[
x ∈M | (M,D) |=ε1 f(ψ)(~y, x)
] ≥ 1− ε0.
Define
η = Pr
D
[
x ∈M | (M,D) |=ε1 f(ψ)(~y, x)
]
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and take those m of the Xi (say Xi1 , . . . , Xim) which have the smallest intersection
with this set. Note that by (36) we have η ≥ 1− ε0. Then we find that
Pr
D
[
x ∈M | (M,D) |=ε1 Xi1 ∨ · · · ∨Xim ∨ f(ψ)(~y, x)
]
≥ m
n
+
(
1− m
n
)
η =
ε0 − ε1
ε0
+
ε1
ε0
η
≥ ε0 − ε1
ε0
+
ε1
ε0
(1− ε0) = 1− ε1.
which contradicts our choice of (M,D). 
Observe that, because of the inductive nature of the reductions above, we can
perform these reductions per quantifier. In particular, we can talk about what it
means for a formula with variable ε (that is, a separate ε for each quantifier) to be a
tautology. This way, we get something like Keisler’s probability logic mentioned in
the introduction; however, remember that we still have our non-classical negation
(unlike Keisler). This idea will be crucial in our hardness proof.
10.2. Validity is Π11-hard
To show that the set of ε-tautologies is indeed Π11-hard, we adapt a proof by
Hoover [42] which shows that LωP is Π11-complete. We will show that, to a certain
extent, we can define the natural numbers within probability logic.
Definition 10.2.1. Let ϕ be a formula in prenex normal form and N a
unary predicate. Then ϕN , or ϕ relativised to N , is defined as the formula where
each ∀xψ(x) is replaced by ∀x(N(x) → ψ(x)) and each ∃xψ(x) is replaced by
∃x(N(x) ∧ ψ(x)).
Theorem 10.2.2. Let L be the language consisting of a constant symbol 0, a
unary relation N(x), binary relations x = y,1 S(x) = y and R(x, y), and ternary
relations x + y = z and x · y = z. Furthermore, let f be the reduction from 0-
tautologies to 12 -tautologies from Proposition 10.1.1. Then there exists finite theories
T, T ′ in the language L such that, for every first-order sentence ϕ containing a
new predicate symbol Q, the following are equivalent:
(i) |= 1
2
f(¬(∧T )) ∨ ¬ (∧T ′) ∨ f (¬ϕN);
(ii) N |= ∀Q¬ϕ(Q).2
Proof. We will prove the contrapositives of the implications (i) → (ii) and
(ii) → (i). During the entire proof, one should mainly think about what it means
for a formula ψ that its negation ¬ψ does not hold. Note that we have that
(M,D) 6|=0 ¬ψ if and only if all universal quantifiers hold classically and all existen-
tial quantifiers hold on a set of strictly positive measure. Likewise, (M,D) 6|= 1
2
¬ψ
holds if and only if all universal quantifiers hold classically and all existential
quantifiers hold on a set of measure strictly greater than 12 .
1Here we do not mean true equality, but rather a binary relation that we will use to represent
equality.
2We denote by ∀Q¬ϕ(Q) the second-order formula ∀X¬ϕ(X/Q), where ϕ(X/Q) is the
formula where the predicate symbol Q is replaced by a second-order variable X.
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Inspired by this, we form the theories T and T ′. T consists of Robinson’s Q
relativised to N , axioms specifying that the arithmetical relations only hold on N ,
and some special axioms for N and R. That is, we put the following axioms in T
(keeping in mind that we are mostly interested in what happens when the negation
of these formulas does not hold, i.e. one should read the ∀ as a classical universal
quantifier and the ∃ as saying that the statement holds on a set of strictly positive
measure):
All equality axioms. For example:
∀x(x = x)
∀x∀y((N(x) ∧ x = y)→ N(y))
We should guarantee that 0 is in N :
N(0)
We now give the axioms for the successor function:
∀x∀y(S(x) = y → (N(x) ∧N(y)))
(∀x∃yS(x) = y)N
(∀x∀y∀u∀v((S(x) = y ∧ S(u) = v ∧ x = u)→ y = v))N
(∀x¬S(x) = 0)N
(∀x(x = 0 ∨ ∃yS(y) = x))N .3
In the axioms below, we will leisurely denote by ψ(S(x)) the formula ∀y(S(x) =
y → ψ(y)) and similarly for x + y and x · y. We proceed with the inductive
definitions of + and ·:
(∀x∀y∀z(x+ y = z → (N(x) ∧N(y) ∧N(z))))
(∀x(x+ 0 = x))N
(∀x∀y(x+ S(y) = S(x+ y)))N
(∀x∀y∀z(x · y = z → (N(x) ∧N(y) ∧N(z))))N
(∀x(x · 0 = 0))N
(∀x∀y(x · S(y) = (x · y) + x))N .
Finally, we introduce a predicate R. This predicate is meant to function as a sort
of ‘padding’. The goal of this predicate is to force the measure of a point Sn(0)
to be larger than the measure of {x | N(x) ∧ x > Sn(0)} (the precise use will be
made clear in the proof below).
(∀x∀y¬R(x, y))N
3We do not really need this last axiom, but we have added it anyway so that all axioms of
Robinson’s Q are in T .
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The last two axioms will be in T ′ instead of in T , because these need to be evaluated
for ε = 12 while the rest will be evaluated for ε = 0. So, because we will be looking
at when the negation does not hold, the existential quantifier should be read as
“strictly more than measure 12 many”.
∀x(N(x)→ ∃y(R(x, y) ∨ x = y))
∀x(N(x)→ ∃y¬(R(x, y) ∨ x < y))
Here, x < y is short for f(∃z(x + S(z) = y)), i.e. the usual definition of x < y
evaluated for ε = 0.
Note that for universal formulas it does not matter if they are in T or T ′
because in both cases the negation of the formula does not hold if and only if the
formula holds classically.
We will now show that these axioms indeed do what we promised. First, we
show that (i) implies (ii). So, assume N 6|= ∀Q(¬ϕ(Q)). Fix a predicate QN such
that N 6|= ¬ϕ(Q). Now take the model M = ω × {0, 1} to be the disjoint union
of two copies of ω, where we define S,+, ·,≤, 0 on the first copy ω × {0} of ω as
usual, and let these be undefined elsewhere. Let
N := ω × {0} and R := {((a, 0), (b, 1)) | µk [2k+1 > 3a+1] 6= b} .
We let QM(a, 0) hold if QN(a) and we never let it hold on the second copy of ω.
Finally, define D by
D(a, 0) = D(a, 1) := 1
3a+1
.
Then it is directly verified that
(M,D) 6|=0 ¬
(∧
T
)
∨ ¬ϕN ,
i.e. all formulas in T ∪ {ϕN} hold in (M,D) if universal quantifiers are interpreted
classically and existential quantifiers as expressing that there exists a set of positive
measure. Note that because all points have positive measure this is equivalent to
the classical existential quantifier, so all we are really saying is that T and ϕN hold
classically in M.
Furthermore, if we let a ∈ ω and denote b for µk[2k+1 > 3a+1] then we have
that
Pr
D
[
y ∈M | (M,D) |= 1
2
R((a, 0), y) ∨ (a, 0) = y]
=
1
2
− 1
2b+1
+
1
3a+1
>
1
2
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while we also have that
Pr
D
[
y ∈M | (M,D) |= 1
2
¬(R((a, 0), y) ∨ (a, 0) < y)]
= 1−
(
1
2
− 1
2b+1
+
∞∑
i=a+2
3−i
)
= 1− 1
2
(
1− 1
2b
+
1
3a+1
)
>
1
2
where the last inequality follows from the fact that b is the smallest k ∈ ω such
that 2k+1 > 3a+1, so that 2b ≤ 3a+1. Thus, we see that (M,D) 6|= 1
2
¬(∧T ′). But
then we see from (the proof of) Theorem 10.1.1, together with the remark below
Theorem 10.1.2 that there is a probability model (N , E) such that
(N , E) 6|= 1
2
f
(
¬
(∧
T
))
∨ ¬
(∧
T ′
)
∨ f (¬ϕN) ,
i.e. (i) does not hold.
Conversely, assume that statement (i) does not hold. Without loss of generality,
we may assume the equality relation on M to be true equality; otherwise, because
(i) does not hold and all equality axioms are in T we could look at M/= instead.
Again, from (the proof of) Theorem 10.1.1 we see that
(M,D) 6|=0 ¬
(∧
T
)
∨ ¬ϕN and (M,D) 6|= 1
2
¬
(∧
T ′
)
.
We will now use the three axioms involving R. Let m ∈ M with M |= N(m).
Then {a ∈ M | M |= a = m} ⊆ NM by the equality axioms, and similarly
{a ∈ M | m < a} ⊆ NM. So the axiom (∀x∀y¬R(x, y))N tells us that these two
sets are disjoint from {a ∈M | M |= R(m, a)}. Therefore, from the two axioms in
T ′ it now follows that
Pr
D
[
a ∈M | M |= m = a] > 1
2
− Pr
D
[
a ∈M | M |= R(m, a)]
> Pr
D
[
a ∈M | M |= m < a].
Thus,
(37) Pr
D
[M] > 1
2
Pr
D
[
a ∈M | m ≤ a]
We now claim that, if we denote S(x) for the unique y such that S(x) = y (as
guaranteed to exist and be unique by T ):
Pr
D
[{
0, . . . , Sk(0)
}]
>
(
1− 1
2k+1
)
Pr
D
[
N
]
.
For k = 0 this is clear: from the axioms in T it follows that for all elements
a ∈ N different from 0 we have a > 0, and therefore PrD
[{0}] > 12 PrD[N] by
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(37). Similarly, assume this holds for k ∈ ω. Then we have by (37):
Pr
D
[{
0, . . . , Sk+1(0)
}]
> Pr
D
[{
0, . . . , Sk(0)
}]
+
1
2
(
Pr
D
[
N
]− Pr
D
[{
0, . . . , Sk(0)
}])
so from the induction hypothesis we obtain
>
(
1− 1
2k+1
)
Pr
D
[
N
]
+
1
2k+2
Pr
D
[
N
]
=
(
1− 1
2k+2
)
Pr
D
[
N
]
.
Because this converges to PrD
[
N
]
if k goes to infinity, we see that all weight of N
rests on X := {Sn(0) | n ∈ ω} ⊆ N . Now, if some universal quantifier holds when
relativised to N , it certainly holds when restricted to X. Furthermore, if some
existential quantifier holds with positive measure in N , then it also has to hold
with positive measure in X because X ⊆ N has the same measure as N . Therefore,
we see that (M,D) 6|=0 ¬ϕN implies that also (MX,DX) 6|=0 ¬ϕX (see the
discussion at the beginning of the proof about what it means for the negation of a
formula to not hold).
However, we can directly verify thatMX is isomorphic to the standard natural
numbers N = (ω, S,+, ·, 0). So, by transferring the predicate Q from M to N (i.e.
letting QN(k) hold if QM(Sk(0)) holds) we find that indeed N 6|= ∀Q¬ϕ(Q). 
Putting this together, we reach our conclusion.
Theorem 10.2.3. For rational ε ∈ (0, 1), the set of ε-tautologies is Π11-hard.
Proof. From Theorem 10.1.1, Theorem 10.1.2 and Theorem 10.2.2. 
In fact, we have shown that even for languages not containing function symbols
or equality, ε-validity is already Π11-hard. Our proof above uses one constant: 0.
However, we could also replace 0 by a unary relation representing 0 = x and modify
the proof to show that the relational fragment of ε-validity is Π11-hard.
We do not yet know of an upper bound for the complexity of ε-validity. While
we have developed methods for proving upper bounds for ε-satisfiability, which will
be discussed in the next chapter, these methods do not seem to work for proving
any results about ε-validity. Thus, the exact complexity of ε-validity is still an
open problem.

CHAPTER 11
Computational Hardness of Satisfiability in
ε-Logic
In this chapter we study the computational complexity of satisfiability in
ε-logic. Unfortunately, it turns out that ε-logic is computationally quite hard: as
we already saw in the previous chapter, ε-validity is Π11-hard.
In this chapter, we will mainly study the fragment of ε-logic not containing
equality or function symbols, i.e. containing only relation and constant symbols.
For this fragment, we will show that ε-satisfiability is, in general, Σ11-complete,
refuting a conjecture by Terwijn [119, Conjecture 5.3]. At first one might think that
the Σ11-hardness of ε-satisfiability already follows from the Π
1
1-hardness of ε-validity
mentioned above: indeed, in the classical case a formula ϕ is satisfiable if and only if
its negation ¬ϕ is not valid. However, because our logic is paraconsistent (i.e. both
a formula ϕ and its negation ¬ϕ can hold at the same time) this complementarity
does not hold for ε-satisfiability and ε-validity. Therefore, we need to consider the
complexity of these two problems separately.
For ε = 0 the results are vastly different: as mentioned above, 0-validity
coincides with classical validity, as shown in Terwijn [119], so it is Σ01-complete.
In this chapter we show that 0-satisfiability is decidable, so 0-satisfiability is even
easier than classical satisfiability. This also clearly shows that the complexities
of 0-validity and 0-satisfiability are not complementary, as argued above. The
different complexities for ε-satisfiability and ε-validity are summarised in Table
1 below. Note that the exact complexity of ε-validity is still open, as there is no
known matching upper bound for the Π11-hardness.
ε ∈ (0, 1) ∩Q ε = 0
ε-satisfiability Σ11-complete decidable
ε-validity Π11-hard Σ
0
1-complete
Table 1. Complexity of validity and satisfiability in ε-logic.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. First, in section 11.1 we show that a
certain weak version of ε-satisfiability is Σ11. In section 11.2 we briefly turn towards
the problem of Skolemisation in ε-logic, which we will need for the later results in
this chapter. After that, in section 11.3 we show that the relational fragment of
ε-satisfiability is Σ11. Next, in section 11.4 we turn to 0-satisfiability and we show
that this problem is, quite surprisingly, decidable. This contrasts our result in
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section 11.5 that ε-satisfiability is Σ11-hard for rational ε ∈ (0, 1), which completes
our proof that ε-satisfiability is Σ11-complete for such ε. Finally, in section 11.6
we use the results from section 11.4 to show that 0-logic is compact, contrasting
Theorem 9.5.2 which says that ε-logic is not compact for rational ε ∈ (0, 1).
This chapter is based on Kuyper [66].
11.1. Towards an upper bound for ε-satisfiability
Our first goal is to show that (the relational fragment of) ε-satisfiability is Σ11.
Together with the proof in section 11.5 that ε-satisfiability is Σ11-hard for rational
ε ∈ (0, 1) this will show that ε-satisfiability is Σ11-complete. There are multiple
ways one could go about proving this. The first would be to reduce ε-satisfiability
to Keisler’s logic LωP . In Hoover [42], it is shown that validity for this logic is
Π11-complete, hence satisfiability for LωP (which is dual to validity in the same
way as for classical logic) is Σ11-complete. Keisler proves this through the use of a
deduction system with infinitary deduction rules.
We will take a different, more direct approach. We will prove that there is a
natural, equivalent formulation of ε-satisfiability of which we can directly see that it
is Σ11. This equivalent formulation is the hidden heart of the completeness proof for
LωP , and our method allows one to grasp the true essence of the proof. Of course,
this comes at the price of not having a deduction system, but it is questionable
how useful a deduction system with infinitary deduction rules is in the first place.
Furthermore, because of the reduction to Keisler’s logic, this deduction system
would talk about formulas containing Keisler’s quantifiers (Px ≥ r). So, we would
lose the advantage of using only the language of first-order logic. We will briefly
come back to this point in Remark 11.1.6 and Remark 11.3.6.
As a first step, we will show that a certain weaker form of ε-satisfiability is Σ11.
Definition 11.1.1. A weak ε-model is a pair (M,D) which satisfies the
conditions of Definition 8.1.2, except possibly for condition (16).
A finitely additive model is a pair (M,D) consisting of a first-order model M
and a finitely additive measure D over M.
We say that ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) is weakly ε-satisfiable (respectively finite additively
ε-satisfiable) if there exist a weak ε-model (respectively finitely additive model)
(M,D) and a1, . . . , an ∈M such that (M,D) |=ε ϕ(a1, . . . , an).1
Note that, by Theorem 9.5.7, every finitely additive measure D on a set X can
be extended to a finitely additive measure D′ on the power set P(X). This explains
why we did not impose any measurability conditions on our finitely additive models:
if ϕ is satisfied in some finitely additive model (M,D), then it is also satisfied in
the model (M,D′) in which every set is measurable.
1Because we did not impose any measurability conditions on our finitely additive model, it
could be the case that the set occurring in case (vi) of Definition 8.1.1 is not measurable. For
finitely additive models we therefore say that (M,D) |=ε ∀xϕ(x) if {a ∈M | (M,D) |=ε ϕ(a)} is
D-measurable and
Pr
D
[
a ∈M | (M,D) |=ε ϕ(a)
] ≥ 1− ε,
i.e. we let a universal quantifier be false if the corresponding set is not measurable.
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At first sight, finitely additive ε-satisfiability might seem to be much weaker
than weak ε-satisfiability. Surprisingly, it turns out that they are equivalent.
Theorem 11.1.2. A formula ϕ is weakly ε-satisfiable if and only if it is finite
additively ε-satisfiable.
Proof. Clearly any weak ε-model is also a finitely additive model, so if ϕ is
weakly ε-satisfiable it is certainly finite additively ε-satisfiable.
For the converse, assume (M,D) is a finitely additive model ε-satisfying ϕ.
Extend D to a finitely additive measure D′ on P(X) using Theorem 9.5.7 and take
an ultrapower (N , E) of (M,D′) (as defined in Definition 9.5.8). Then (N , E) is a
weak ε-model by Corollary 9.5.10 and it ε-satisfies ϕ by Theorem 9.5.9. 
In Example 9.1.5 it was shown that, in general, not every ε-satisfiable sentence
has a countable ε-model (i.e. the Downward Lo¨wenheim–Skolem theorem does not
hold in the usual sense). In contrast, this does hold if we look at finitely additive
models.
Definition 11.1.3. Let D be a probability measure. We say that D is
countable if the Boolean algebra on which D is defined is countable.
Theorem 11.1.4. (Downward Lo¨wenheim–Skolem theorem for finitely additive
ε-satisfiability) Let L be a countable first-order language. Let (M,D) be a finitely
additive model and let X ⊆M be countable. Then there exists a finitely additive
model
(N , E) ≺ε (M,D)
such that X ⊆ N and such that N and E are countable.
Proof. By Theorem 9.5.7, we may without loss of generality assume that the
domain of D is P(M). We will define a sequence X0 ⊆ X1 ⊆ . . . of countable
subsets of M and let N be the restriction of M to ⋃n∈ωXn.
Let X0 consist of X together with the interpretation c
M of all constants.
Next, given Xn, we show how to define Xn+1. Let Bn+1 be the Boolean algebra
generated by the ε-definable subsets of (M,D) using parameters from Xn. Since
Xn is countable, Bn+1 will also be countable. Fix an element xB ∈ B for every
non-empty B ∈ Bn+1. Now let
Xn+1 =Xn ∪ {xB | B ∈ Bn+1}∪
{fM(a1, . . . , am) | f ∈ L, f is m-ary and a1, . . . , am ∈ Xn}.
Then Xn+1 is countable and Xn ⊆ Xn+1 ⊆M.
As announced above, we let N beM  ⋃n∈ωXn. Note that if a1, . . . , am ∈ N ,
then there is some n ∈ ω such that a1, . . . , am ∈ Xn. Then fM(a1, . . . , am) ∈
Xn+1 ⊆ N so the functions on N are well-defined.
For every B which is in the Boolean algebra generated by the ε-definable
subsets of (M,D) using parameters from N , let E(B∩N ) = D(B). Note that such
a B uses only finitely parameters and hence is already ε-definable using parameters
from some Xn. We show that the finitely additive measure E is well-defined. To
this end, assume that B1, B2 in the Boolean algebra described above are such that
B1 ∩N = B2 ∩N . Let Xn be such that B1, B2 can be ε-defined using parameters
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from Xn. If B1 6= B2, then either B1 ∩ (M\ B2) 6= ∅ or (M\ B1) ∩ B2 6= ∅. In
both cases, one of these points gets added to Xn+1, hence B1 ∩ N 6= B2 ∩ N , a
contradiction. So, B1 = B2 and therefore D(B1) = D(B2), as desired.
It remains to show that (N , E) is an elementary finitely additive ε-submodel of
(M,D), i.e. that for all sequences a1, . . . , an ∈ N and for all formulas ϕ(x1, . . . , xn)
we have
(N , E) |=ε ϕ(a1, . . . , an)⇔ (M,D) |=ε ϕ(a1, . . . , an).
We prove this using induction over the formulas in prenex normal form. For
propositional formulas, this is directly clear. For the existential case, note that
(N , E) |=ε ∃xψ(x, a1, . . . , an)
clearly implies that this also holds in (M,D). For the converse, assume
(M,D) |=ε ∃xψ(x, a1, . . . , an).
Let Xm be such that a1, . . . , an ∈ Xm. By construction, we have added a point
from the non-empty set
{b ∈M | (M,D) |=ε ψ(b, a1, . . . , an)}
to N . So, there exists some point b ∈ N such that (N , E) |=ε ψ(b, a1, . . . , an).
Using the induction hypothesis, this directly implies that
(N , E) |=ε ∃xψ(x, a1, . . . , an).
For the universal case, let ϕ = ∀xψ(x, x1, . . . , xn). Let
B = {x ∈M | (M,D) |=ε ψ(x, b1, . . . , bn)},
C = {x ∈ N | (N , E) |=ε ψ(x, b1, . . . , bn)}.
Then by induction hypothesis we have
C = {x ∈ N | (M,D) |=ε ψ(x, b1, . . . , bn)}
= B ∩N .
From this we see that E(C) = D(B), and hence
(M,D) |=ε ∀xψ(x, b1, . . . , bn)⇔ (N , E) |=ε ∀xψ(x, b1, . . . , bn).
This concludes the induction. 
Theorem 11.1.5. Let L be a countable language and let ε be rational. Then
weak ε-satisfiability is Σ11.
Proof. From Theorem 11.1.2 and Theorem 11.1.4 we see that a formula ϕ is
weakly ε-satisfiable if and only if it is ε-satisfied in a countable finitely additive
model. We sketch how to express the latter as a Σ11-formula. Namely, we can
express this by saying:
• there exist interpretations RM ⊆ ωn for the relations R and interpreta-
tions for the constants (note that this can be done through one second-
order existential quantifiers, by using a pairing function);
• there exist Q ⊆ ω (representing the Boolean algebra) and D : ω → R;
such that:
• the sets Qn := {m ∈ ω | 〈n,m〉 ∈ Q} for n ∈ ω form a Boolean algebra;
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• the function mapping Qn to D(n) is a finitely additive measure;
• ϕ is ε-satisfied in (M,D).
It can be directly verified that all the items in the second list can be expressed as
arithmetical formulas. Combining this with the existential second-order quantifiers
from the first list, we obtain the desired result. 
Remark 11.1.6. In Keisler’s logic LωP , finitely additive models can be ob-
tained by taking a maximal consistent set of formulas in the calculus he calls weak
LωP (see Keisler [51, Definition 1.4.1 and Theorem 1.5.3]). By extending his logic
with rules for the existential quantifier, we would be able to obtain something
similar: note that ϕ = ∀x1∃x2 . . . ∀xnψ(x1, . . . , xn) is ε-satisfiable if and only if
(Px1 ≥ 1− ε)∃x2 . . . (Pxn ≥ 1− ε)ψ(x1, . . . , xn) is satisfiable. In fact, we can base
our system on the finitary fragment of weak LωP (i.e. we only need Keisler’s axioms
A1-A5) since our formulas correspond to formulas in Keisler’s positive fragment.
From this we find that weak ε-satisfiability is in fact even Π01. Since we are not
interested in weak ε-satisfiability and merely see it as a stepping stone for our
results on (regular) ε-satisfiability, which we have already shown to be Σ11-hard, we
will not pursue this matter any further.
Our next goal is to extend Theorem 11.1.5 to regular ε-satisfiability, instead
of just weak ε-satisfiability. Before we do so, we will first look at some results
concerning Skolemisation in ε-logic.
11.2. Skolemisation in ε-logic
For classical satisfiability, we can eliminate existential quantifiers by introducing
Skolem functions. Clearly, we can also do something similar here: for example,
if a statement ∀x∃yϕ(x, y) is 0-true in some model (M,D), we can extend M to
a model N such that (N ,D) |=0 ∀xϕ(x, f(x)) holds. We do not even need that
M |= ϕ(x, f(x)) holds for every x ∈ M for which M |= ∃yϕ(x, y) holds — it is
enough if this is true for almost all such x.
However, we have required our functions to be measurable. It is not directly
clear that we can also pick our Skolem functions in a measurable way. Our next
result shows that this is possible.
Theorem 11.2.1. Let ϕ be a formula not containing function symbols. Then
ϕ is ε-satisfiable if and only if its Skolemisation is ε-satisfiable.
Proof. We need to show that we can pick the Skolem functions in a measurable
way. First, assume ϕ does not contain the equality symbol. Now, if ϕ is ε-satisfiable,
then by Theorem 9.2.9 we may assume it is ε-satisfied in a model (M, λ) on [0, 1]
with the Lebesgue measure, with Borel relations. Then all definable sets are
analytic by Proposition 9.2.1.
Let ϕ = ∀x1∃y1 . . . ∀xn∃ynψ(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , yn) be in prenex normal form.
Now, we use recursion over 1 ≤ i ≤ n to define Borel measurable Skolem functions
f1, f2, . . . , fn, by performing the following steps:
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(1) Use the Jankov and von Neumann Uniformisation Theorem (see e.g.
Kechris [50, Theorem 18.1]2) to find a Lebesgue-measurable uniformising
function gi: that is, for all x1, x2, . . . , xi ∈ [0, 1], if there exists an yi ∈
[0, 1] such that
(M, λ) |=ε ∀xi+1 . . . ∃ynψ(x1, . . . , xn,
f1(x1), . . . , fi−1(x1, . . . , xi−1), yi, . . . , yn),
then we have, if we denote y = gi(x1, x2, . . . , xi):
(M, λ) |=ε ∀xi+1 . . . ∃ynψ(x1, . . . , xn,
f1(x1), . . . , fi−1(x1, . . . , xi−1), y, yi+1, . . . , yn).
(2) Let fi be a Borel function which is equal to gi almost everywhere; that
such functions exist is shown in Bogachev [10, Proposition 2.1.11], or can
easily be proven using Lusin’s Theorem on measurable functions (see e.g.
Kechris [50, Theorem 17.12]3).
In the case that ϕ does contain the equality symbol, we may assume it is
satisfied by a model on [0, r] plus atoms by Theorem 9.2.9. We can apply the
construction above on [0, r] and use AC to choose the values fi takes in the atoms;
since there are only countably many atoms, this does not alter the measurability
of the fi. 
It turns out we can do even more. We assumed that our formula ϕ did not con-
tain any function symbols, but now its Skolemisation does contain function symbols.
The next proposition shows that we can also construct a kind of Skolemisation
which does not need function symbols.
Theorem 11.2.2. Let L be a language not containing equality or function
symbols (but it may contain constant symbols). Then there exists a language L′
only containing relation symbols and a computable function mapping each formula
ϕ in the language L to a universal formula ϕ′ in the language L′ such that for
every ε ∈ [0, 1]: ϕ is ε-satisfiable if and only if ϕ′ is ε-satisfiable.
Proof. The idea of the proof is roughly as follows: because universal quantifi-
ers only talk about measure, we can always change the interpretation of a relation
on a set of measure zero without affecting the truth of the universal quantifiers.
Thus, we can always add witnesses of measure zero, as long as there are no con-
tradicting statements about a witness. Let R be a relation symbol, say of arity
k. To express which statements hold about which witnesses, we add a new copy
of R for every atomic formula of the form R(t1, . . . , tk) up to a permutation of
the universally bound variables. We then form the formula ϕ′ by replacing the
atomic formula by this new copy of R. If ϕ is satisfiable, then ϕ′ is satisfiable
just by interpreting the new relation symbol by the interpretation of R(t1, . . . , tk).
2Kechris only states that we get a partial function with as domain exactly the (analytic)
set of those x1, . . . , xi for which an yi as above exists, but we can easily extend this to a total
Lebesgue measurable function by letting its value be 0 outside this set.
3Kechris only states this theorem for Borel measures, but it holds for the Lebesgue measure
with exactly the same proof.
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Conversely, if ϕ′ is satisfiable, we pick our witnesses in a set of measure zero (say,
the Cantor set) and recombine all the relations into one relation R. We will now
give the proof in full detail.
Let R be a relation symbol, say of arity k. First, we enlarge our language by
adding a copy of R for every atomic formula of the form R(t1, . . . , tk), up to a
permutation of the universally bound variables. To this end, fix an enumeration
c0, c1, . . . of the constant symbols in L. Let AR be the set of functions from
{1, . . . , k} to {0} ∪ ({1, 2} × ω). To every atomic formula R(t1, . . . , tk) we assign
a function α ∈ AR by letting α(i) = 0 if ti equals some (universally bound) xj ,
by letting α(i) = (1, j) if ti equals (the existentially bound) yj and by letting
α(i) = (2, j) if ti equals the constant symbol cj . During the proof, we will say
that the α constructed in this way is the α corresponding to the atomic formula
R(t1, . . . , tk). Now, for every relation symbol R and every α ∈ AR, we introduce
a new relation symbol Rα, where the arity of Rα equals |{1 ≤ i ≤ k | α(i) =
0}|+ max{j ∈ ω | (1, j) ∈ ran(α)}.
Let ϕ = ∀x1∃y1 . . . ∃yn∀xnψ(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , yn) be a formula in L in prenex
normal form. We describe how to form ϕ′ = ∀x1 . . . ∀xnψ′(x1, . . . , xn) from ϕ. Let
R(t1, . . . , tk) be an atomic formula occurring in ϕ and let α be the function
corresponding to this atomic formula, as described above. Let m = max{j ∈ ω |
(1, j) ∈ ran(α)} and let s1, . . . , sk′ be the subsequence of t1, . . . , tk consisting of
just those ti which equal a universally bound variable xj (during the proof, we will
say that s1, . . . , sk′ is the universal subsequence of t1, . . . , tk). Then we form ψ
′
from ψ by replacing each R(t1, . . . , tk) with Rα(s1, . . . , sk′ , x1, . . . , xm).
We show that ϕ′ is as desired. First, assume ϕ is ε-satisfiable. So, by Theorem
9.2.9 there exists an ε-model (M, λ) with the Lebesgue measure λ and Borel
relations ε-satisfying ϕ. By the previous proposition, for each yi we can find a
Borel Skolem function fi : [0, 1]
i → [0, 1]. Let R be a relation symbol and let
α ∈ AR. We interpret RNα (s1, . . . , sk′ , x1, . . . , xm) as RM(v1, . . . , vk), where
vi :=

sj if α(i) = 0 and |{s ≤ j | α(s) = 0}| = i
fj(x1, . . . , xj) if α(i) = (1, j)
cj if α(i) = (2, j).
We claim that RN is both analytic and co-analytic; then it is Borel by Souslin’s
theorem (see e.g. Kechris [50, Theorem 14.11]). Let β be the function such that
βi(s1, . . . , sk′ , y1, . . . , ym) :=

sj if α(i) = 0 and |{s ≤ j | α(s) = 0}| = i
yj if α(i) = (1, j)
cj if α(i) = (2, j),
i.e. β ‘restores’ the atomic formula R(t1, . . . , tk) in the sense that R(t1, . . . , tk) is
the same as R(β(s1, . . . , sk′ , x1, . . . , xm)). Finally, let Bj be the graph of fj . Then
we have
RNα = {(s1, . . . , sk′ , x1, . . . , xm) | ∃y1 . . . ym(β(s1, . . . , sk′ , y1, . . . , ym) ∈ RM∧
(x1, y1) ∈ B1 ∧ · · · ∧ (x1, . . . , xm, ym) ∈ Bm)}
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so it is analytic, and
RNα = {(s1, . . . , sk′ , x1, . . . , xm) | ∀y1 . . . ym
((x1, y1) ∈ B1 ∧ · · · ∧ (x1, . . . , xm, ym) ∈ Bm)
→ β(s1, . . . , sk′ , y1, . . . , ym) ∈ RM}
so it is also co-analytic. Therefore, (N , λ) is an ε-model by Proposition 9.2.1.
We know that
(M, λ) |=ε ∀x1 . . . ∀xnψ(x1, . . . , xn, f1(x1), . . . , fn(x1, . . . , xn))
because the fi are Skolem functions. Let R(t1, . . . , tk) be an atomic formula with
corresponding α and let s1, . . . , sk′ be the universal subsequence of t1, . . . , tk. Let
R(u1, . . . , uk) be the atomic formula where fi(x1, . . . , xi) is substituted for each yi.
Then
{(x1, . . . , xn) ∈Mn | RM(u1, . . . , uk)}
= {(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Nn | RNα (s1, . . . , sk′ , x1, . . . , xm)}(38)
by the definition of RNα . Then it follows using formula induction that
{(x1, . . . , xn) ∈Mn | M |= ψ(x1, . . . , xm, f1(x1), . . . , fn(x1, . . . , xn))}
= {(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Nn | N |= ψ′(x1, . . . , xm)},
where the only interesting case is the atomic case, which is exactly (38). So, we
see that also (N , λ) |=ε ϕ′ holds.
Conversely, assume we have a model (N , λ) with the Lebesgue measure and
Borel relations satisfying ϕ′. We now need to put all the RNα together into one
RM. The basic idea is that, because universal quantifiers only talk about measure,
we can glue the relations together on a set of measure zero. We will pick all of
our witnesses inside Cantor space, which has measure 0 inside [0, 1]. To this end,
let ζ : C → ⋃1≤i≤n[0, 1]i be a Borel isomorphism of Cantor space (as subset of
[0, 1]) with copies of unit boxes of increasing dimension (that such an isomorphism
exists follows from Kechris [50, Theorem 15.6]). Also fix an injective function
η : ω ↪→ [0, 1] \ C, which we will use to interpret the constant symbols.
We construct a model M on [0, 1]. For any constant symbol ci, let cMi = η(i).
Next we show how to define RM of arity k. Let a1, . . . , ak ∈ [0, 1]. Let β(i) = (1, j)
if ai ∈ C and ζ(ai) has length j, let β(i) = (2, j) if ai ∈ ran(η) and η−1(ai) = j and
finally let β(i) = 0 if neither of these cases hold. We say that this β corresponds to
the sequence a1, . . . , ak. Let b1, . . . , bk′ be the subsequence of a1, . . . , ak obtained
by taking just those ai satisfying β(i) = 0. Let m = max{j ∈ ω | (1, j) ∈ ran(β)}
and let i be the least 1 ≤ j ≤ k such that β(j) = (1,m). Now let RM(a1, . . . , ak)
be defined as RNβ (b1, . . . , bk′ , ζ1(ai), . . . , ζm(ai)). We can prove that R
N is Borel
using Souslin’s theorem, in the same way as above.
Next, let R(t1, . . . , tk) be an atomic formula and let α correspond to this atomic
formula . Furthermore, let s1, . . . , sk′ be the universal subsequence of t1, . . . , tk.
Let m = max{j ∈ ω | (1, j) ∈ ran(α)}. Let b1, . . . , bk ∈ [0, 1] \ (C ∪ ran(η)) and
consider the sequence ai = t
M
i [xj := bj , yj := ζ
−1(b1, . . . , bj)]. Then it is directly
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verified that the β corresponding to the sequence a1, . . . , ak is equal to α. Thus,
by the definition of RN we see that
RM(t1, . . . , tk)[xi := bi, yi := ζ−1(b1, . . . , bi)]
holds if and only if
RNα (s1, . . . , sk′ , x1, . . . , xm)[xi := bi]
holds. So, from the construction of ψ′ we see that
{~x ∈ ([0, 1] \ (C ∪ ran(η)))n | M |= ψ(x1, . . . , xn, ζ−1(x1), . . . , ζ−1(x1, . . . , xn))}
= {~x ∈ ([0, 1] \ (C ∪ ran(η)))n | N |= ψ′(x1, . . . , xn)}.
Because ran(η) is countable we know that C ∪ ran(η) has Lebesgue-measure 0, so
using the fact that ϕ′ holds in (N , λ) we then directly see that
(M, λ) |=ε ∀x1∀x2 . . . ∀xnψ(x1, . . . , xn, ζ−1(x1), . . . , ζ−1(x1, . . . , xn))
holds and therefore (M, λ) |=ε ϕ holds, as desired. 
11.3. Satisfiability is Σ11
In the previous section we saw that every formula in a language not containing
equality or function symbols is equisatisfiable to a universal relational formula,
through a computable transformation. Therefore, in our proof of the Σ11 upper
bound for ε-satisfiability without equality or function symbols, we will only need
to consider the universal relational fragment.
In Section 11.1 we already showed that weak ε-satisfiability is Σ11. However, it
is not directly clear how to extend Theorem 11.1.5 to regular ε-satisfiability: the
relations in the ε-model we built there using an ultrapower will, in general, not be
measurable. Thus, if we want a result similar to Theorem 11.1.2 for ε-satisfiability,
we will need to impose extra conditions on our finitely additive models. Our extra
conditions will be motivated by the next lemma.
Lemma 11.3.1. Let D be a probability measure on a set X and let R be a Dn-
measurable set. Then for every m ∈ ω there exists k ∈ ω and D-measurable sets Xi,j
for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, 1 ≤ j ≤ n such that for every function f : {1, . . . , n} → {1, . . . , n}:
Pr
Dn
[
(a1, . . . , an) ∈Mn | (af(1), . . . , af(n)) ∈ (RM
4((X1,1 × · · · ×X1,n) ∪ · · · ∪ (Xk,1 × · · · ×Xk,n)))
] ≤ 1
m
.
Proof. Fix an enumeration f1, . . . , fs of all functions from {1, . . . , n} to
{1, . . . , n}. Let H(R) be the statement of the lemma, i.e. H(R) states that: for
every m ∈ ω there exists k ∈ ω and D-measurable sets Xi,j for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, 1 ≤ j ≤ n
such that for every function f : {1, . . . , n} → {1, . . . , n}:
Pr
Dn
[
(a1, . . . , an) ∈Mn | (af(1), . . . , af(n)) ∈ (RM
4((X1,1 × · · · ×X1,n) ∪ · · · ∪ (Xk,1 × · · · ×Xk,n)))
] ≤ 1
m
.
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We show that the class of subsets R ⊆ Xn for which H(R) holds is a monotone
class containing all finite unions of boxes, from which then follows that H(R) holds
for all Dn-measurable sets R by the monotone class theorem (see e.g. Bogachev
[10, Theorem 1.9.3]).
Clearly, H(R) holds if R is a finite union of boxes. Next, let R =
⋂
j∈ω Rj
with R0 ⊇ R1 ⊇ . . . be a monotone decreasing sequence and assume that H(Rj)
holds for all these Rj . Fix m ∈ ω. By countable additivity we can determine, for
each 1 ≤ i ≤ s an li ∈ ω such that
Pr
Dn
(a1, . . . , an) ∈Mn | (afi(1), . . . , afi(n)) ∈
⋂
j≤li
Rj
4R
 ≤ 1
2m
.
Let l be the maximum of these li. By our hypotheses H(Rj) we can determine for
each j ∈ ω a kj ∈ ω and measurable sets Xju,v such that for every 1 ≤ i ≤ s we
have
Pr
Dn
[
(a1, . . . , an) ∈Mn | (afi(1), . . . , afi(n)) ∈ (RMj
4((Xj1,1 × · · · ×Xj1,n) ∪ · · · ∪ (Xjkj ,1 × · · · ×X
j
kj ,n
))
] ≤ 1
2j+1m
.
Now consider the set
A =
⋂
j≤l
((Xj1,1 × · · · ×Xj1,n) ∪ · · · ∪ (Xjkj ,1 × · · · ×X
j
kj ,n
)).
Then A is of the desired form (i.e. it can be written as a finite union of Cartesian
products): by distributivity, A is equal to a finite union of expressions of the form
(X1u1,1 × · · · ×X1u1,k1) ∩ · · · ∩ (X lul,1 × · · · ×X lul,kl)
and this expression is equal to
(X1u1,1 ∩ · · · ∩X lul,1)× · · · × (X1u1,n ∩ · · · ∩X lul,n).
Furthermore, it is also directly verified that for every 1 ≤ i ≤ s we have
Pr
Dn
[
(a1, . . . , an) ∈Mn | (afi(1), . . . , afi(n)) ∈ R4A
] ≤ 1
2m
+
l∑
j=1
1
2j+1m
≤ 1
m
.
So, this shows that H(R) holds.
The case in which R is the union of a monotone increasing sequence can be
proven in a similar way, which completes the proof. 
Now, the important idea is that this property of ‘having finite approximations’
can be expressed in the language of ε-logic, and is hence preserved under taking
ultrapowers. Therefore, if we take an ultrapower as in the proof of Theorem 11.1.2,
this ultrapower will also possess these finite approximations. By taking a suitable
limit of a sequence approximating the relation R we will obtain a measurable
relation S that coincides with R almost everywhere. The next lemma expresses
that such an approximation is good enough for our purposes.
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Lemma 11.3.2. Let (M,D) be an ε-model and let R,S be two n-ary relation
symbols such that for every function f : {1, . . . , n} → {1, . . . , n} we have:
(M,D) |=0 ∀x1 . . . ∀xn(R(xf(1), . . . , xf(n))↔ S(xf(1), . . . , xf(n))).
Then for every universal formula ϕ not containing function symbols or constant
symbols, if we let ϕ′ be the formula where every occurrence of R is replaced by S:
(M,D) |=ε ϕ if and only if (M,D) |=ε ϕ′.
Proof. First we prove using formula induction that for every propositional
formula ψ(x1, . . . , xm):
(M,D) |=0 ∀x1 . . . ∀xn(ψ(x1, . . . , xn)↔ ψ′(x1, . . . , xn)).
For atomic formulas this follows from our assumption: since our language does not
contain function or constant symbols, every atomic subformula of ϕ is of the form
R(y1, . . . , yn) where y1, . . . , yn ∈ {x1, . . . , xn}. Now let f be the function such that
yi = xf(i) and apply the hypothesis. The other cases in the formula induction are
direct.
Because of our definition of →, which is only classical on the propositional
level, we see that α↔ β which is defined as (α→ β)∧ (β → α) is also only classical
on the propositional level. To ease our notation, for the rest of the proof we let
⇔ be the connective expressing ε-equivalence, i.e. we define (M,D) |=ε α⇔ β if
either (M,D) |=ε α ∧ β or (M,D) 6|=ε α ∨ β. In particular ⇔ coincides with ↔ on
the propositional level, so we see that
(M,D) |=0 ∀x1 . . . ∀xn(ψ(x1, . . . , xn)⇔ ψ′(x1, . . . , xn)).
Next, we note that universal quantifiers distribute over⇔ in 0-logic, i.e. we have
that (M,D) |=0 ∀x(α(x)⇔ β(x)) if and only if (M,D) |=0 (∀xα(x))⇔ (∀xβ(x)).
From this we see that for every propositional formula ψ we have
(M,D) |=0 (∀x1 . . . ∀xnψ(x1, . . . , xn))⇔ (∀x1 . . . ∀xnψ′(x1, . . . , xn)),
i.e. for every universal formula ϕ we have that (M,D) |=0 ϕ⇔ ϕ′. From this fact
the statement of the theorem directly follows. 
Before we continue with the completeness proof, we note the following inde-
pendently interesting corollary of the previous two lemmas.
Corollary 11.3.3. If a formula ϕ not containing equality, function and
constant symbols is ε-satisfiable, then it is also ε-satisfiable in a model on [0, 1] with
the Lebesgue measure where we can choose each relation to be either Π02 or Σ
0
2.
Proof. Let ϕ be ε-satisfiable; for now we assume that ϕ is a universal relational
formula. By Theorem 9.2.9 it is then also ε-satisfied in a model (M, λ) on [0, 1]
with the Lebesgue measure. For every relation R of arity n and every m ∈ ω use
Lemma 11.3.1 to determine km ∈ ω and Lebesgue-measurable sets Xm,i,j such that
for all functions f : {1, . . . , n} → {1, . . . , n} we have
Pr
Dn
[
(a1, . . . , an) ∈Mn | (af(1), . . . , af(n)) ∈ (RM
4((Xm,1,1 × · · · ×Xm,1,n) ∪ · · · ∪ (Xm,km,1 × · · · ×Xm,km,n)))
] ≤ 1
2m
.
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For every such Xm,i,j , let Ym,i,j be a Σ
0
1 set such that Xm,i,j4Ym,i,j has Lebesgue-
measure 0 (see e.g. Kechris [50, Theorem 17.10]). Now let N be the model where
the relations are taken to be the lim sup of these approximations; i.e. let
RN =
⋂
M∈ω
⋃
m≥M
((Ym,1,1 × · · · × Ym,1,n) ∪ · · · ∪ (Ym,km,1 × · · · × Ym,km,n)).
Then PrDn
[
RN4RM] = 0, see e.g. Bogachev [10, Theorem 1.12.6], so (M,D) and
(N ,D) satisfy the same universal formulas by Lemma 11.3.2. Furthermore, the
relations in N are clearly Π02.
In the general case, let ϕ be any formula and let ϕ′ be the universal relational
formula from Proposition 11.2.2. Then ϕ′ is satisfiable in a model with Π02 relations
by our argument above, and from the proof of Proposition 11.2.2 we directly see
that in fact then also ϕ is satisfiable in a model with Π02 relations.
Finally, if we want our relations to be Σ02, we can take the lim inf of Π
0
1 sets
Ym,i,j instead of the lim sup of Σ
0
1 sets Ym,i,j we took above. 
We will now formalise the ideas discussed above to obtain an analogue of
Theorem 11.1.2 for regular ε-satisfiability.
Theorem 11.3.4. Let ϕ be a universal formula in a relational language L.
Then the following are equivalent:
(i) ϕ is ε-satisfiable;
(ii) there exists a finitely additive model (M,D) such that (M,D) |=ε ϕ, and
such that for every m ∈ ω and every relation R occurring in ϕ there exists
km ∈ ω and interpretations XMm,i,j ⊆ M for 1 ≤ i ≤ km, 1 ≤ j ≤ n which
satisfy that for every function f : {1, . . . , n} → {1, . . . , n} we have that:
(39) (M,D) |= 1
m
∀x1 . . . ∀xn
R(x1, . . . , xn)↔ km∨
i=1
n∧
j=1
Xm,i,j
(
xf(j)
) .
Proof. The implication from (i) to (ii) directly follows from Lemma 11.3.1.
For the converse, we note that (39) can be expressed in the language L′ which
consists of L enlarged with countably many unary predicate symbols Xm,i,j . Thus,
if we have some finitely additive model satisfying (ii), then by Theorem 11.1.2 we
can find a weak ε-model (M′,D′) which also satisfies (ii). For every m ∈ ω, fix
km ∈ ω and interpretations XM′m,i,j ⊆M as in (ii). For ease of notation, write
Zm =
((
XM
′
m,1,1 × · · · ×XM
′
m,1,n
)
∪ · · · ∪
(
XM
′
m,km,1 × · · · ×XM
′
m,km,n
))
.
From (39) we directly see that
Pr
Dn
[
Zm4Zm′
] ≤ ( 1
m
+
1
m′
)n
.
In particular, we see that Z0, Z1, . . . is a Cauchy sequence in the pseudometric
d(X,Y ) = PrDn
[
X4Y ]. Since this metric is complete (see e.g. Bogachev [10,
Theorem 1.12.6]) we can determine a Dn-measurable set ZR to which this sequence
converges.
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Now, let ε′ > 0. Fix m such that 1m <
ε′
2 and such that d(Zm, ZR) <
ε′
2 . Then
from (39) it easily follows that
(M′,D) |=ε′ ∀x1 . . . ∀xn(R(x1, . . . , xn)↔ ZR(x1, . . . , xn)).
So, from the proof of Terwijn [119, Proposition 3.4] it then follows that
(M′,D) |=0 ∀x1 . . . ∀xn(R(x1, . . . , xn)↔ ZR(x1, . . . , xn)).
Now, if we let N be the model where RN = ZR, then (M′,D) and (N ,D) ε-satisfy
the same universal formulas by Lemma 11.3.2. In particular, (N ,D) is an ε-model
which ε-satisfies ϕ. 
Theorem 11.3.5. Let L be a countable language not containing equality and
function symbols. Then ε-satisfiability is Σ11.
Proof. We only need to consider universal relational formulas by Theorem
11.2.2. From Theorem 11.1.4 and Theorem 11.3.4 we see that a universal relational
formula ϕ is ε-satisfiable if and only if there is a countable finitely additive model
as in (ii) of Theorem 11.3.4. However, this last statement can be expressed as a
Σ11-formula, in a similar way as explained in the proof of Theorem 11.1.5. 
Remark 11.3.6. As in Remark 11.1.6, we can actually make finitely additive
models as in Theorem 11.3.4 (ii) by using a variant of Keisler’s calculus. The extra
requirement (39) corresponds to adding an extra deduction rule with countable
infinitely many hypotheses. We will not go into more detail here, for the reasons
explained in the beginning of section 11.1.
11.4. Decidability of 0-satisfiability
In this section we will prove that 0-satisfiability (for languages not containing
equality and function symbols) is not only Σ11, but is in fact decidable. This
stands in stark contrast to the fact that for ε ∈ (0, 1) we have that ε-satisfiability
is Σ11-complete, as will be shown in section 11.5. It also contrasts the fact that
0-validity is undecidable: the 0-tautologies are exactly the classical tautologies, as
shown in Terwijn [119].
As in the previous section, we only need to consider universal relational formulas
because of Theorem 11.2.2. First, we show that 0-satisfiability corresponds to
classical satisfiability in a natural way.
Proposition 11.4.1. Let m ∈ ω. If a universal relational formula
ϕ = ∀x1 . . . ∀xnψ(x1, . . . , xn)
with n ≤ m has an ε-model (M,D), and m!(m−n)! (1− (1− ε)n) < 1, then there exists
a finite, classical model N of size m which satisfies
ϕ˜ = ∀x1 . . . ∀xn(
∧
i<j
xi 6= xj → ψ(x1, . . . , xn))
classically. In particular, this holds if ε = 0.
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Proof. By Theorem 9.2.9 we may assume D to be the Lebesgue measure λ.
In particular the diagonals have measure 0. Since (M,D) |=ε ϕ we therefore have
that, for each injective function f : {1, . . . , n} ↪→ {1, . . . ,m}, the set
Af := {(a1, . . . , am) ∈Mn | ai 6= aj for i 6= j and M |= ψ(af(1), . . . , af(n))}
has Dm-measure at least (1− ε)n. Let
B =
⋂
f :{1,...,n}↪→{1,...,m}
Af .
Then we see that the set
M\B =
⋃
f :{1,...,n}↪→{1,...,m}
(M\Af )
has measure at most m!(m−n)! (1 − (1 − ε)n), which is strictly smaller than 1 by
assumption. So, we see that B has positive measure. In particular B is non-empty,
so choose any (a1, . . . , am) ∈ B. Then M restricted to {a1, . . . , am} classically
satisfies ϕ˜: indeed, if b1, . . . , bn ∈ {a1, . . . , am} are distinct elements, and we let f
be the function sending each 1 ≤ i ≤ n to the unique 1 ≤ j ≤ m such that bi = aj ,
then (a1, . . . , am) ∈ Af implies that M |= ψ(b1, . . . , bn). 
We would also like to have a converse to this proposition, i.e. we would
like to know if there exists an m ∈ ω such that if ∀x1 . . . ∀xn(
∧
i<j xi 6= xj →
ψ(x1, . . . , xn)) has a finite classical model of size m, then ϕ also has a 0-model. It
turns out that we can do this if we choose m big enough, by using Ramsey’s theorem.
In fact, the way we will use Ramsey’s theorem is very similar to the original use of
this theorem by Ramsey in [97], where Ramsey proved his combinatorial theorem
in order to prove that the variant of the Entscheidungsproblem asking if a universal
relational formula has an infinite model is decidable. First, we need a definition.
Definition 11.4.2. Let M be a first-order model, let X ⊆M and let < be
a linear ordering of X. Then we call (X,<) a sequence of indiscernibles if for
every n ∈ ω and all sequences a1 < a2 < · · · < an, b1 < b2 < · · · < bn both in
X we have for every formula ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) that M |= ϕ(a1, . . . , an) if and only if
M |= ϕ(b1, . . . , bn).
Theorem 11.4.3. (Ramsey [97, page 279]) Let ϕ = ∀x1 . . . ∀xnψ(x1, . . . , xn)
be a universal formula not containing function and constant symbols. Let M be a
classical model of size n which satisfies ϕ and for which there exists a linear order
< on M which turns (M, <) into a sequence of indiscernibles. Let (X,≺) be any
linearly ordered set. Then there exists a model N for ϕ on X which has (X,≺) as
a sequence of indiscernibles.4
Corollary 11.4.4. If for a propositional relational formula ψ the formula
ϕ˜ = ∀x1 . . . ∀xn(
∧
i<j
xi 6= xj → ψ(x1, . . . , xn))
4This is not entirely the way in which Ramsey formulated his theorem, but in fact his proof
directly yields us the result we stated here.
11.4. DECIDABILITY OF 0-SATISFIABILITY 153
has a model M of size n for which there exists a linear order < on M which turns
(M, <) into a sequence of indiscernibles, then
ϕ = ∀x1 . . . ∀xnψ(x1, . . . , xn)
has a 0-model.
Proof. By the previous theorem, there exists a model on [0, 1] satisfying
ϕ˜ which has ([0, 1], <) (where < is the usual ordering on [0, 1]) as a sequence of
indiscernibles. Because the diagonal has Lebesgue-measure 0, we then directly see
that also (N , λ) |=0 ϕ. The only thing we still need to verify is that (N , λ) is a
0-model. By Proposition 9.2.1 it is enough to prove that the relations RN are
Borel. Because ([0, 1], <) is a sequence of indiscernibles we have for every relation
R of arity k:
RN =
⋃{{(a1, . . . , ak) ∈ [0, 1]k | ∀1 ≤ i, j ≤ k(ai < aj ↔ f(i) < f(j))}
| f : {1, . . . , k} → {1, . . . , k} and RM(bf(1), . . . , bf(k))
}
.
Then RN is equal to a finite union of sets of the form
{(a1, . . . , ak) ∈ [0, 1]k | ∀1 ≤ i, j ≤ k(ai < aj ↔ f(i) < f(j))}
which are Borel because the ordering < on [0, 1] is Borel. So, RN is Borel, as
desired. 
The following result follows from the finite Ramsey theorem, together with the
fact that there are computable upper bounds for the Ramsey numbers.
Theorem 11.4.5. (Ramsey [97, page 279]) There exists a computable f : ω3 →
ω such that for every universal relational formula ϕ = ∀x1 . . . ∀xnψ(x1, . . . , xn)
containing k relation symbols of arity at most m, if ϕ has a classical model of size
at least f(n, k,m), then it also has a model containing a sequence of indiscernibles
of size n.
Putting all things together, we obtain:
Theorem 11.4.6. There exists a computable function f : Form→ ω such that
for every universal relational formula ϕ = ∀x1 . . . ∀xnψ(x1, . . . , xn) the following
are equivalent:
(i) ϕ is 0-satisfiable;
(ii) ϕ is ε-satisfiable for some ε ∈ [0, 1] satisfying f(ϕ)!(f(ϕ)−n)! (1− (1− ε)k) < 1;
(iii) ϕ˜ = ∀x1 . . . ∀xn
∧
i<j(xi 6= xj → ψ(x1, . . . , xn)) has a classical model of size
f(ϕ);
(iv) ϕ˜ has a classical model containing a sequence of indiscernibles of size n.
Proof. Let f˜ be the computable function from Proposition 11.4.5; this func-
tion directly induces a computable function f : Form→ ω. We prove the equival-
ences.
(i) → (ii): This is directly clear.
(ii) → (iii): This follows from Proposition 11.4.1.
(iii) → (iv): This was shown in Theorem 11.4.5.
(iv) → (i): Finally, this was shown in Corollary 11.4.4. 
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In particular, we see:
Theorem 11.4.7. 0-satisfiability is decidable for languages not containing
equality and function symbols.
Proof. By Theorem 11.2.2, we only need to consider universal relational
formulas ϕ. Let f be the computable function as in Theorem 11.4.6. If we want to
check if ϕ is 0-satisfiable, then by Theorem 11.4.6 (iii) we only need to check if
ϕ˜ = ∀x1 . . . ∀xn
∧
i<j
(xi 6= xj → ψ(x1, . . . , xn))
has a classical model of size f(ϕ), which is a decidable property. 
There is another interesting fact which follows from Theorem 11.4.6: the
equivalence of (ii) and (i) says that a formula ϕ which is ε-satisfiable for small
enough ε > 0 is in fact also 0-satisfiable. Thus, one can see 0-satisfiability as the
limit of ε-satisfiability for ε > 0, in the sense given below.
Corollary 11.4.8.
⋂
ε>0 ε-SAT = 0-SAT.
Proof. From Theorem 11.4.6. 
Note that we cannot have in general that
⋂
ε′>ε ε
′-SAT = ε-SAT. Namely, in
that case, one could prove using Lemma 11.3.1 that a universal relational sentence
ϕ is ε-satisfiable if and only if it has a finite ε′-model for every rational ε′ > ε.
However, the latter can be expressed as a first-order arithmetical sentence, while
the universal relational fragment of ε-satisfiability will be shown to be Σ11-hard in
Theorem 11.5.13.
11.5. Satisfiability is Σ11-hard
In this section we will show that ε-satisfiability is Σ11-hard for rational ε ∈ (0, 1).
Together with the result from section 11.3 this will show that ε-satisfiability is
Σ11-complete. We will prove this hardness step by step, interpreting more and more
of arithmetic within ε-logic as we go. As a first step, we will look at sentences of
the form ∃Qϕ(Q) in the language of arithmetic (that is, the language consisting of
S,+, ·, 0 and =) where ϕ is universal, in the sense the only quantifiers occurring
in ϕ are first-order universal quantifiers. Equivalently, we can see ϕ(Q) as a first-
order universal sentence in ϕ in the language of arithmetic enlarged with a unary
predicate Q, and ∃Qϕ(Q) is satisfiable in second-order arithmetic if and only if ϕ
is satisfiable in first-order arithmetic (i.e. there exists some interpretation QN such
that N |= ϕ under this interpretation for Q). We will implicitly use this equivalence
throughout this section.
Furthermore, to optimise our result and show that we do not need function or
constant symbols in our language to prove hardness (i.e. to show that the relational
fragment is already Σ11-hard), we will not look at S,+, · and 0 as functions or
constants, but instead as relations S(x) = y, x+ y = z, x · y = z and 0 = x. It is
easy to see that any universal sentence ϕ in the language with functions S,+, · and
0 can be transformed into a universal sentence in the language with relations for
S,+, · and 0. Henceforth, when we talk about the language of arithmetic, we will
mean the language with relation symbols for S,+, ·, 0 and =.
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Definition 11.5.1. In this chapter, the language of arithmetic is the language
consisting of relation symbols S(x) = y, x+ y = z, x · y = z, 0 = x and x = y. For
a formula ϕ in the language of arithmetic, we say that N |= ϕ if ϕ holds in the
natural numbers ω together with the usual interpretations for S,+, ·, 0 and =.
To formulate the first step in our interpretation, we need a few more tools.
Remember that ϕN is ϕ relativised to N , see Definition 10.2.1.
Definition 11.5.2. Let ϕ be a formula in prenex normal form and N a
unary predicate. Then ϕN , or ϕ relativised to N , is defined as the formula where
each ∀xψ(x) is replaced by ∀x(N(x) → ψ(x)) and each ∃xψ(x) is replaced by
∃x(N(x) ∧ ψ(x)).
Definition 11.5.3. Let ψ(x1, . . . , xn) be a propositional formula. Then we
denote by ψ#(x1, . . . , xn) the formula∧
f :{1,...,n}→{1,...,n}
ψ(xf(1), . . . , xf(n)).
If ϕ = ∀x1 . . . ∀xnψ(x1, . . . , xn) with ψ a propositional formula, then we denote by
ϕ# the formula ∀x1 . . . ∀xnψ#(x1, . . . , xn).
Note that for every universal sentence ϕ, if M |= ϕ holds classically, then also
M |= ϕ#. It is the following converse which we will need.
Lemma 11.5.4. For every propositional formula ψ(x1, . . . , xn) and every count-
able model M: if there exists an enumeration {a0, a1, . . . } of M such that for all
injective functions pi : {1, . . . , n} ↪→ ω we have M |= ψ#(api(1), . . . , api(n)), then
M |= ∀x1 . . . ∀xnψ(x1, . . . , xn).
Proof. To derive a contradiction, assume M 6|= ∀x1 . . . ∀xnψ(x1, . . . , xn).
Let ai1 , . . . , ain ∈M (not necessarily distinct) be such that M 6|= ψ(ai1 , . . . , ain).
Fix a subset A ⊆ ω of size n such that {i1, . . . , in} ⊆ A and fix a bijection
pi : {1, . . . , n} → A. Finally, let f : {1, . . . , n} → {1, . . . , n} be the function
mapping 1 ≤ j ≤ n to pi−1(ij). Then ij = pi(f(j)) soM 6|= ψ(api(f(1)), . . . , api(f(n))).
Therefore M 6|= ψ#(api(1), . . . , api(n)), a contradiction. 
Proposition 11.5.5. Let L be a relational language, let ϕ be a universal
formula in the language L and let (M,D) |=0 ϕ#. Then there exists a count-
able submodel N ⊆ M such that N |= ϕ classically. In fact, for Dω-almost all
(a0, a1, . . . ) ∈Mω we have that M  {a0, a1, . . . } |= ϕ classically.
Proof. Let ϕ = ∀x1 . . . ∀xnψ(x1, . . . , xn). For each injective function pi :
{1, . . . , n} ↪→ ω, the set
{(a0, a1, . . . ) ∈Mω | (M,D) |=0 ψ#(api(1), . . . , api(n))}
is measurable (by Proposition 8.1.3). Furthermore, one can easily see that it in
fact has measure 1, by using Fubini’s theorem and the fact that (M,D) |=0 ϕ#;
for this it is essential that pi is injective.
Therefore the set
B =
⋂
pi:{1,...,n}↪→ω
{(a0, a1, . . . ) ∈Mω | (M,D) |=0 ψ#(api(1), . . . , api(n))}
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is a countable intersection of sets of measure 1, and therefore has measure 1 itself.
From Lemma 11.5.4 we know that for every (a0, a1, . . . ) ∈ B we have that ϕ holds
classically in M  {a0, a1, . . . }, which completes our proof. 
Theorem 11.5.6. Let L be the language consisting of unary relation symbols
0 = x and N(x) (which will represent our set of natural numbers), binary relation
symbols S(x) = y, x = y,5 x < y, x ≺ y (which will represent x < S(y))
and R(x, y)6, ternary relation symbols x + y = z and x · y = z, and a unary
relation symbol Q. Furthermore, let f0 be the reduction from 0-satisfiability to
1
2 -satisfiability from Theorem 9.4.1, and let f 14 and f
3
4
be similar reductions for
1
4 - and
3
4 -satisfiability. Then there exists finite theories T0, T 14 , T
1
2
and T 3
4
in the
language L, containing only universal sentences, such that for every first-order
universal sentence ϕ in the language of arithmetic enlarged with Q,7 the following
are equivalent:
(i) f0((
∧
T0 ∧ ϕN )#) ∧ f 1
4
(
∧
T 1
4
) ∧ f 3
4
(
∧
T 3
4
) ∧∧T 1
2
is 12 -satisfiable;
8
(ii) N |= ∃Qϕ(Q).
Proof. For T0 we take the universal axioms of Robinson’s Q relativised to N ,
axioms specifying that our relations only hold on N , axioms for < and ≺, and some
special axioms for N and R. Some of the axioms will turn out to be redundant,
but we have added them anyway so that all axioms of Robinson’s Q are in T0.
The reason we only add the universal axioms and we avoid the axioms involving
existential quantifiers is that, while we can say that something exists (using the
∃ quantifier), we cannot say that something holds with strictly positive measure.
Our relation R is meant as a trick to work around this problem.
Thus, we will add the following axioms to T0.
All equality axioms. For example:
∀x(x = x)
∀x∀y((N(x) ∧ x = y)→ N(y))
We should guarantee that 0 is in N :
∀x(0 = x→ N(x))
5Here we do not mean true equality, but rather a binary relation that we will use to represent
equality.
6The intended interpretation of R(x, y) is quite technical. It is best to think of our model
M as consisting of two copies of ω: one living inside N , one living outside N . However, all the
operations will only be defined on the elements of N ; there is no extra structure on M\NM.
Our relation R will then be a subset of NM × (M\NM); the intended interpretation is then
that R(a, b) holds if a ∈ NM, b ∈M \NM and b 6= S(a).
7Remember, as defined above this is the language consisting of (relation symbols for)
S,+, ·, 0,= and Q.
8Strictly speaking, (
∧
T0 ∧ ϕN )# is undefined because it is not in prenex normal form. To
avoid the problem that prenex normal forms are not unique, we assume it has been transformed
into prenex normal form using some fixed algorithm (for example, the algorithm arising from the
proof of Proposition 8.1.7).
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We now give the axioms for the successor function:
∀x∀y(S(x) = y → N(x) ∧N(y))
(∀x∀y¬(S(x) = y ∧ 0 = y))N
(∀x∀y∀u∀v((S(x) = u ∧ S(y) = v)→ (x = y ↔ u = v)))N
We proceed with the inductive definitions of + and ·:
(∀x∀y∀z(x+ y = z → (N(x) ∧N(y) ∧N(z))))
(∀x∀y∀z(0 = y → (x+ y = z ↔ x = z)))N
(∀x∀y∀u∀v∀w((S(y) = u ∧ x+ y = w)→ (x+ u = v ↔ S(w) = v)))N
(∀x∀y∀z(x · y = z → (N(x) ∧N(y) ∧N(z))))N
(∀x∀y∀z(0 = y → (x · y = z ↔ 0 = z)))N
(∀x∀y∀u∀v∀w((S(y) = u ∧ x · y = w)→ (x · u = v ↔ w + x = v)))N .
Normally, we would be able to use an existential quantifier and the other relations
to define x < y and x ≺ y (the latter standing for S(x) < y). However, because we
are trying to avoid the existential quantifier in order to make the proof work, we
give axioms for < and ≺ which we need in our proof. It is easy to see that these
axioms are sound. Because our formula ϕ does not contain < or ≺, it is irrelevant
if they completely define < and ≺ or not, so we only add those axioms which we
need in our proof.
∀x∀y(x < y → N(x) ∧N(y))
∀x∀y(x ≺ y → N(x) ∧N(y))
(∀x∀y¬(S(x) = y ∧ x ≺ y))N
(∀x∀y(x < y ↔ (x ≺ y ∨ S(x) = y)))N
(∀x∀y¬(0 = y ∧ x < y))N
(∀x∀y(0 = x ∨ (0 = y → y < x)))N
(∀x∀y∀z(S(x) = z → (x ≺ y ↔ z < y)))N
Finally, we introduce a predicate R, with axioms which use < and ≺. This predicate
is meant to function as a sort of ‘padding’. The goal of this predicate is to force
the measure of {x | x = S(y)} to be exactly half of {x | x > y}. Since we will also
add an axiom saying that the set of points equal to 0 has measure 14 , this means
the set of points equal to Sn(0) will have measure 2−n−2. We will use this to show
that the collection of ‘standard submodels’ of M has measure 1. The intended
interpretation was described above. First, we want the second coordinate of R to
only hold outside of N .
∀x∀y(R(x, y)→ ¬N(y))
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The next axioms for R will be in T 1
2
instead of in T0, because these need to be
evaluated for ε = 12 while the rest will be evaluated for ε = 0. So, this means
in these axioms the universal quantifier will mean “for measure at least 12 many”
instead of the interpretation “for almost all” in T0.
∀x(N(x) ∧ ∀y(R(x, y) ∨ S(x) = y))
∀x(N(x) ∧ ∀y¬(R(x, y) ∨ S(x) = y))
∀x(N(x) ∧ ∀y(R(x, y) ∨ x ≺ y))
∀x(N(x) ∧ ∀y¬(R(x, y) ∨ x ≺ y)).
We also add axioms to T 1
2
to make sure that N has measure 12 :
∀xN(x)
∀x¬N(x).
Finally, we add the next two axioms to T 1
4
respectively T 3
4
to ensure that the points
equal to 0 together have measure 14 :
(∀x(0 = x))N
(∀x¬(0 = x))N
We will now show that these axioms indeed do what we promised.
(ii) → (i): Assume N |= ∃Qϕ(Q). Let QN witness this fact. Now take the
modelM := ω×{0, 1} to be the disjoint union of two copies of ω, where we define
S,+, ·,≤,≺, 0 on the first copy ω×{0} of ω as in N (remembering that x ≺ y should
mean S(x) < y) and let them be false elsewhere. For example, (a, 0) + (b, 0) = (c, 0)
holds if and only if a+ b = c, and it is false in all other cases. Let QM((a, 0)) hold
if QN(a) holds and let it be false elsewhere. Let
N = ω × {0} and R = {((a, 0), (b, 1)) | b 6= S(a)} .
Finally, define D by
D(a, 0) = D(a, 1) := 1
2a+2
.
Then it is directly verified that
(M,D) |=0
(∧
T0 ∧ ϕN
)#
,
because all formulas in T0 even hold classically in M.
Furthermore, N clearly has measure 12 and the points equal to 0 = (a0) have
measure 14 , so the axioms expressing this fact hold; in particular (M,D) |= 14
∧
T 1
4
and (M,D) |= 3
4
∧
T 3
4
. Next, if we let a ∈ ω then we have that
Pr
D
[
y ∈M | (M,D) |= 1
2
R((a, 0), y) ∨ S(a, 0) = y]
=
1
2
− 1
2a+3
+
1
2a+3
=
1
2
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while we also have that
Pr
D
[
y ∈M | (M,D) |= 1
2
R((a, 0), y) ∨ (a, 0) ≺ y]
=
1
2
− 1
2a+3
+
∞∑
i=a+4
2−i
=
1
2
.
Thus, we also see that the axioms expressing that these two sets have measure 12
hold, i.e. that (M,D) |= 1
2
∧
T 1
2
. But then we see that there is a 12 -model (N , E)
such that
(N , E) |= 1
2
f0
((∧
T0 ∧ ϕN
)#)
∧ f 1
4
(∧
T 1
4
)
∧ f 3
4
(∧
T 3
4
)
∧
∧
T 1
2
i.e. that (i) holds.
(i) → (ii): Assume (i) holds. Then there exists a probability model (M,D) such
that (M,D) |=ε Tε for ε ∈
{
1
4 ,
1
2 ,
3
4
}
and (M,D) |=0 (
∧
T0 ∧ ϕN )#.
By Proposition 11.5.5 we have that the set
B = {(a0, a1, . . . ) ∈Mω | M  {a0, a1, . . . } |=
∧
T0 ∧ ϕN}
has Dω-measure 1. In particular, because all universal Robinson axioms are in T0 we
see that for every (a0, a1, . . . ) ∈ B these universal Robinson axioms hold classically
in M  ({a0, a1, . . . } ∩NM). The only problem is that we do not know if the
two missing non-universal axioms ∀x(0 = x ∨ ∃yS(y) = x) and ∀x∃yS(x) = y also
hold. However, if we were able to find a subsequence (b0, b1, . . . ) of a permutation
of some (a0, a1, . . . ) ∈ B satisfying 0 = b0 and S(ai) = ai+1 for all i ∈ ω, these
two axioms would also hold in M  ({b0, b1, . . . }). Furthermore, note that T0
guarantees that {b0, b1, . . . } ⊆ NM, so we then have that M  {b0, b1, . . . } models
all the Robinson axioms. Even stronger: we have that this model is a model
isomorphic to N in which ϕ holds (note that ϕ is universal, so it holds in any
submodel of M  {a0, a1, . . . }), showing that (ii) holds. The rest of the proof will
therefore consist of showing that we can find such a sequence in B.
First, we restrict to a subset B′′ of B which still has measure 1. For every
sentence α ∈ T0, say ∀x1 . . . ∀xtβ(x1, . . . , xt) (so t ≤ 3), let α˜(y1, y2) be the formula
∀xtβ(y1, . . . , yt−1, xt). Then
B′ := B ∩
⋂
pi:{1,2}↪→ω
{(a0, a1, . . . ) ∈Mω | (M,D) |=0
∧
α∈T0
α˜(api(1), api(2))}
is still a set of measure 1: it is an intersection of measurable sets by Proposition
8.1.3 and all of these sets have measure 1 because (M,D) |=0 (
∧
T0 ∧ ϕN )#. We
make one more restriction. Let X be the set
{x ∈M | M |= ¬N(x)}∪{
x ∈ NM | Pr
D
[
y ∈M | R(x, y) ∨ S(x) = y] = Pr
D
[
y ∈M | R(x, y) ∨ x ≺ y] = 1
2
}
.
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Then X has measure 1: the union above is disjoint, ¬N has measure exactly 12
and by the axioms for R it follows that the second set has measure 12 . Now let
B′′ = B′ ∩Xω. Then our axioms hold inside B′′ in a strong sense (that is, the
axioms of T0 hold classically and the axioms about R hold classically in the first
coordinate), which is a fact we will use shortly.
For each n ∈ ω, let Dn be the set⋃
(m0,...,mn)∈ωn+1
{(a0, a1, . . . ) ∈ B′′ | 0 = am0 , S(am0) = am1 , . . . , S(amn−1) = amn}.
Then D0 ⊇ D1 ⊇ . . . . By Lemma 11.5.7 below, each Dn has measure 1. Therefore,⋂
n∈ωDn has measure 1 and in particular it is non-empty. Let (a0, a1, . . . ) ∈⋂
n∈ωDn. For each n ∈ ω, fix an αn such that
∃i0, . . . , in−1(0 = a0 ∧ · · · ∧ S(ain−2) = ain−1 ∧ S(ain−1) = aαn),
which exists because (a0, a1, . . . ) ∈ Dn. Now let (b0, b1, . . . ) be the sequence
(aα0 , aα1 , . . . ). Then 0 = b0. Also, we claim that S(b0) = b1. We know that there
exists some i0 such that ai0 = 0 and S(ai0) = b1. Now, becauseM  {a0, a1, . . . } |=∧
T0 classically, we know in particular that the equality axioms hold classically
in this model. Thus, ai0 = b0 and S(b0) = b1, as desired. In the same way, we
can show that S(bi) = bi+1 holds for any i ∈ ω. Therefore, as discussed above the
model M  {b0, b1, . . . } is isomorphic to N and ϕ(Q) holds in it, which shows that
(ii) holds. 
Lemma 11.5.7. Let Dn be as in the proof of Theorem 11.5.6. Then PrD
[
Dn
]
=
1.
Proof. Fix n ∈ ω. For k, i ∈ ω with 0 ≤ i < k, denote by Di,kn the set
{(a0, a1, . . . ) ∈ B′′ | 0 = ai ∧ S(ai) = ai+k ∧ · · · ∧ S(ai+(n−1)k) = ai+nk}.
Then Di,kn ⊆ Dn. From (M,D) |= 14 T 14 and (M,D) |= 34 T 34 we see that PrD
[
a ∈
M | M |= 0 = a] = 14 , so together with Lemma 11.5.8 below this gives us
Pr
D
[
Di,kn
]
=
1
4
1
8
. . .
1
2n+2
=
1
2cn
where cn =
(n+2)(n+3)
2 − 1 > 0. Clearly, for i 6= j the sets Di,kn and Dj,kn are
independent. So, we have
Pr
D
[ ⋃
i≤k
Di,kn
]
= 1− (1− 1
2cn
)k.
Combining this with the fact that
⋃
i≤kD
i,k
n ⊆ Dn for every k ∈ ω we thus have
Pr
D
[
Dn
] ≥ lim
k→∞
1− (1− 1
2cn
)k = 1. 
Lemma 11.5.8. Let B′′ be as in the proof of Theorem 11.5.6. Let (a0, . . . , an) ∈
Mn be any subsequence of a sequence in B′′ such that 0 = a0 and S(ai) = ai+1.
Then
Pr
D
[
a ∈M | M |= S(an) = a
]
=
1
2n+3
.
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Proof. Using induction over n. First, let n = 0. Then by the definition of
B′′ we have that
Pr
D
[
a ∈M | M |= S(a0) = a
]
=
1
2
− Pr
D
[
a ∈M | M |= R(a0, a)
]
= Pr
D
[
a ∈M | M |= a0 ≺ a
]
(where we use that R only holds outside N while S and ≺ only hold inside N , so
R is disjoint from < and ≺). We then have that
2 Pr
D
[
a ∈M | M |= S(a0) = a
]
= Pr
D
[
a ∈M | M |= S(a0) = a
]
+ Pr
D
[
a ∈M | M |= a0 ≺ a
]
= Pr
D
[
a ∈M | M |= a0 < a
]
.
(For this, we use the definition of B′ together with the axiom (∀x∀y(x < y ↔ (x ≺
y ∨ S(x) = y)))N .) Now, because 0 = a this is equal to
Pr
D
[
N
]− Pr
D
[
a ∈M | M |= 0 = a] = 1
2
− 1
4
=
1
4
.
So, PrD
[
a ∈M | M |= S(a0) = a
]
is one half of that, i.e. 18 .
Next, assume
Pr
D
[
a ∈M | M |= S(an) = a
]
=
1
2n+3
.
In the same way as above, we find that
Pr
D
[
a ∈M | M |= S(an+1) = a
]
= Pr
D
[
a ∈M | M |= an+1 ≺ a
]
.
Again, the sum of these two probabilities is
Pr
D
[
a ∈M | M |= an+1 < a
]
.
This is equal to
Pr
D
[
a ∈M | M |= an ≺ a
]
,
so by the induction hypothesis we now see that
Pr
D
[
a ∈M | M |= S(an+1) = a
]
=
1
2
1
2n+3
=
1
2n+4
. 
Next, we turn to the language of arithmetic enlarged with relation symbols
representing finitely many primitive recursive functions — say g1, . . . , gn. So, for
each of these primitive recursive function gi(x1, . . . , xmi) we add a relation symbol
gi(x1, . . . , xmi) = y to our language which represents this function. We next show
that Theorem 11.5.6 still holds if we add these finitely many primitive recursive
functions to our language.
Theorem 11.5.9. Let g1, . . . , gn be primitive recursive functions. Let f0, f 1
4
, f 1
2
and f 3
4
be as in Theorem 11.5.6. Then there exists finite theories T0, T 1
4
, T 1
2
and
T 3
4
, containing only universal relational sentences, such that for each universal
first-order sentence ϕ in the language of arithmetic enlarged with relation symbols
Q, g1, . . . , gn, the following are equivalent:
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(i) f0((
∧
T0 ∧ ϕN )#) ∧ f 1
4
(
∧
T 1
4
) ∧ f 3
4
(
∧
T 3
4
) ∧∧T 1
2
is 12 -satisfiable;
(ii) N |= ∃Qϕ(Q).
Proof. The proof is very similar to that of Theorem 11.5.6. We let T 1
4
, T 1
2
and T 3
4
be as in the proof of that theorem and we extend T0 with axioms for every
gi.
So, let 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Fix any sequence h0, . . . , hk of primitive recursive functions
in such that for each 1 ≤ j ≤ k, either:
• hj = 0, hj = S, or hj is a projection.
• hj is the composition of hs with ht1 , . . . , htm for some 1 ≤ s, t1, . . . , tm < j.
• hj is defined by primitive recursion from hs and ht for some 1 ≤ s, t < j.
• hk = gi.
We add axioms to define each such hj . It is clear what we need to do in the first
case. If hj(x1, . . . , xm) is the composition of hs with ht1 , . . . , htm , we take the
relativisation to N of the universal closure of
(ht1(x1, . . . , xn) = z1 ∧ · · · ∧ htm(x1, . . . , xn) = zm)
→ (hj(x1, . . . , xm) = y ↔ hs(z1, . . . , zm) = y).
Similarly, if hj is defined by primitive recursion over hs and ht, then we take
the relativisation to N of the universal closure of
0 = x→ (hj(x, y1, . . . , yn) = z ↔ hs(y1, . . . , yn) = z)
and of
(hj(x, y1, . . . , yn) = z ∧ S(x) = u)
→ (ht(x, z, y1, . . . , yn) = v ↔ hj(u, y1, . . . , yn) = v).
This completes our description of the construction of T0.
To prove that (ii) implies (i), we can follow the proof of the previous theorem,
giving every primitive recursive function g is usual interpretation on ω × {0} and
letting it be undefined elsewhere.
Conversely, in our proof that (i) implies (ii), we define B for our new formula∧
T0 ∧ ϕN . It will still have measure 1. Then for any (a0, a1, . . . ) ∈ B, the
axioms given above hold classically in M  ({a0, a1, . . . } ∩NM) and therefore the
primitive recursive functions hi, so in particular g1, . . . , gn, have their usual or true
interpretation in this restricted model. So, if we perform the construction above
with this new B, then we get a model M  {b0, b1, . . . } in which ϕ holds which
is not just isomorphic to N, but is even isomorphic to N enlarged with the usual
interpretations of g1, . . . , gn. Therefore we still see that (i) implies (ii) even with
the addition of these primitive recursive functions. 
Next, we will want to include relation symbols of the form {e}Q(x1, x2) = y.
Here, {e}Q(x1, x2) = y means that the eth partial computable functional halts
with oracle Q and input x1, x2 and outputs y, or in the notation of Kleene’s
normal form theorem for partial computable restricted functionals [54] (see e.g.
Odifreddi [87, Theorem II.3.11]), this means that both ∃zT1,2(e, x1, x2, Qˆ(z), z) and
U(µz[T1,2(e, x1, x2, Qˆ(z), z)]) = y.
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To this end, we add ternary relation symbols {e}Q(x1, x2) = y to our language
for all e ∈ ω (so, we do not see e or Q as a variable here; we add a relation symbol
for every e and the Q is purely notational). Using the normal form of partial
computable restricted functionals we can now easily expand our result to include
these functionals.
Theorem 11.5.10. Let f0, f 1
4
, f 1
2
and f 3
4
be as in Theorem 11.5.6. Then
there exists finite theories T0, T 1
4
, T 1
2
and T 3
4
, containing only universal relational
sentences, and a computable function e 7→ ψe mapping each e ∈ ω to a universal
relational sentence, such that for each universal sentence ϕ in the language of
arithmetic enlarged with relation symbols Q, {0}Q, {1}Q, . . . , the following are
equivalent:
(i) f0((
∧
T0∧
∧
{e}Q∈ϕ ψe∧ϕN )#)∧f 14 (
∧
T 1
4
)∧f 3
4
(
∧
T 3
4
)∧∧T 1
2
is 12 -satisfiable;
9
(ii) N |= ∃Q(ϕ), i.e. there exists some QN ⊆ ω such that N |= ϕ if Q is interpreted
as QN and {e}Q(x1, x2) = y is interpreted as {e}QN(x1, x2) = y.
Proof. We let U and T1,2 represent the primitive recursive functions from the
normal form theorem for partial computable restricted functionals, as discussed
above. Furthermore, we let V(x, y) represent the primitive recursive function which
outputs z + 1 if y has length at least x and the xth digit equals z, and which
outputs 0 otherwise. Now let the Tε be as in Theorem 11.5.9, applied to U , T1,2
and V.
We let W(x, y) represent “the sequence x is an approximation to Q up to digit
y”, so we add to T0 the relativisation to N of the universal closure of
(0 = y ∧ 0 = u ∧ S(u) = v ∧ S(v) = w)
→ (W(x, y)↔ ((V(y, x) = v ↔ ¬Q(y)) ∧ (V(y, x) = w ↔ Q(y)))),
and of
(S(z) = y ∧ 0 = u ∧ S(u) = v ∧ S(v) = w)
→ (W(x, y)↔ (W(x, z) ∧ (V(y, x) = v ↔ ¬Q(y)) ∧ (V(y, x) = w ↔ Q(y)))).
Finally, for each e ∈ ω, let ψe be the relativisation to N of the universal closure of
W(u, z) ∧ T1,2(e, x1, x2, u, z)→ ({e}Q(x1, x2) = y ↔ U(z) = y)).
The proof now proceeds in the same way as for Theorem 11.5.9, observing that our
new axioms ensure that {e}Q gets the right interpretation. 
So, now we have Π01-hardness. To get to Σ
1
1-hardness, we first put the Σ
1
1-
formulas into a more appropriate form.
Lemma 11.5.11. Let A be the set of those universal (relational) formulas ϕ
in the language of arithmetic enlarged with relation symbols Q, {0}Q, {1}Q, . . . for
which there exists some interpretation QN ⊆ ω satisfying:
• N |= ϕ if Q is interpreted as QN and {e}Q(x1, x2) = y is interpreted as
{e}QN(x1, x2) = y;
• For all n there is some m ∈ QN coding a string of length n.
9By {e}Q ∈ ϕ we mean that the relation symbol {e}Q occurs in the formula ϕ.
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Then A is Σ11-hard.
Proof. The set of indices of non-well-founded computable trees is Σ11-hard
(for example, see Odifreddi [87, Corollary IV.2.16]). This set many-one reduces to
A: for every index e ∈ ω, the expression “{e} computes a tree and Q ⊆ {e}” can be
written as a universal formula ϕ(Q) in the language as above. Now {e} computes
a non-well-founded tree if and only if there exists a Q as above, completing our
proof. 
So, we need to somehow expand our theories in such a way that it only allows
those Q which contain a string of every possible length. To achieve this, we will
add even more relation symbols to our language, and we will use some of these as
additional oracles. Let A ⊆ ω ×X for some set X. We view elements from the set
X as parameters: i.e. for all p ∈ X we will write {e}Q⊕Ap(x1, x2) = y if the eth
partial computable function halts with oracle Q⊕ {n ∈ ω | (n, p) ∈ A} and input
x1, x2, and outputs y. We will add a binary relation symbol A, a ternary relation
symbol B and a 5-ary relation symbol {e}Q⊕Ap(x1, x2) = y for every e ∈ ω to
our language. Using the same method as in the proof of Theorem 11.5.10 above,
we will guarantee that for every model (M,D) satisfying our theory we have for
almost all p ∈M that our interpretation of {e}Q⊕Ap(x1, x2) = y in the model M
agrees with its true interpretation in N. We will combine this with the construction
used in the proof of Theorem 9.5.2 where we showed that compactness does not
hold for ε-logic; in some sense, compactness failing is the same as forcing infinite
objects to exist, which explains the correlation with our current goal.
Theorem 11.5.12. Let f0, f 1
4
, f 1
2
and f 3
4
be as in Theorem 11.5.6. Then
there exists finite theories T0, T 1
4
, T 1
2
and T 3
4
, containing only universal relational
sentences, and a computable function e 7→ ψe mapping each e ∈ ω to a universal
relational sentence, such that for each universal sentence ϕ in the language of
arithmetic enlarged with relation symbols Q, {0}Q, {1}Q, . . . , the following are
equivalent:
(i) f0((
∧
T0∧
∧
{e}Q∈ϕ ψe∧ϕN )#)∧f 14 (
∧
T 1
4
)∧f 3
4
(
∧
T 3
4
)∧∧T 1
2
is 12 -satisfiable;
(ii) ϕ is in the set A of Lemma 11.5.11.
Proof. We start with the theories Tε and the universal sentences ψe as in
Theorem 11.5.10. We need to expand our theory in such a way that case (i) can
only hold if Q contains a string of length n for every n ∈ ω, using the relation
symbols A and B.
For this, we will make use of the construction which was used to show that
ε-logic is not compact in the proof of Theorem 9.5.2. There, sentences αn were
defined such that for any model (M,D) for some language containing a binary
relation symbols symbol E we have that (M,D) |= 1
2
αn if and only if we have that:
For almost all y (i.e. measure 1 many), there exists a set Cy of measure at least
1− 1n such that for all y′ ∈ Cy the sets Dy = {u | E(u, y)} and Dy′ = {u | E(u, y′)}
both have measure 12 , while Dy∩Dy′ has measure 14 (in other words, the two sets are
independent sets of measure 12). In the proof of Theorem 9.5.2, it was shown that
every finite subset of {α1, α2, . . . } is satisfiable, but no infinite subset is satisfiable.
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Fix an index e1 such that {e1}Q(n,m) computes the indicator function of
“there exists some n′ ≤ n such that n′ codes a string of length m and n′ ∈ Q”.
Our idea is to let αn hold, with E interpreted as {(x, y) | B(m,x, y)}, if and only
{e1}Q(n,m) = 0. Then, as discussed above, only finitely many of these αn are
allowed to hold for any fixed m, so we see that there has to be some n ∈ ω such
that {e}Q(n,m) = 1, i.e. Q contains a string of length m. This is precisely what
we want to achieve.
To this end we first need to change the definition of αn from Theorem 9.5.2
into a more uniform one. In that proof, we have a different formula for every
n (which in fact grows exponentially in n). We wish to change it into one fixed
formula α˜ which has n as a parameter, i.e. we want one formula α˜ such that αn is
equivalent to α˜(n) for every n ∈ ω. This is what we will use A for. If we unfold
the first two reductions in the definition of αn for n ≥ 2, and rename some of the
relation symbols Xi, Yi, we obtain the following formula:
∀yY1(y) ∧ ∀yY2(y)
∧
∧
I⊆{3,...,2n},|I|=n−1
∀y
(∨
i∈I
Yi(y)
)
∧
∧
1≤i≤2
∀y
(
Yi(y)
∧
∧
3≤i1<i2<···<in≤2n
∀y′((Yi1(y) ∨ · · · ∨ Yim(y)) ∧ α′(y, y′))
)
where α′ is a formula that does not depend on n. Here, we denoted by Yi(x) the
formula Xi(x)∧
∧
1≤j≤2,j 6=i ¬Xj(x) for i ∈ {1, 2} and Xi(x)∧
∧
3≤j≤2n,j 6=i ¬Xj(x)
for i ∈ {3, . . . , 2n}, and the Xi are new predicates.
Because we want to make a more uniform version of this formula, we want to
use the single binary predicate A instead of these predicates Xi and Yi. To this
end, fix an index e2 such that for all oracles Q,C and all binary sequences σ we
have that {e2}Q⊕C(σ, 〈n,m〉) computes the indicator function of
∃i ∈ σ
C(〈〈n,m〉, i〉) ∧ ∧
3≤j≤2n,j 6=i
¬C(〈〈n,m〉, j〉)
 .
Next, fix an index e3 such that {e3}Q(σ, n) computes if σ is a subset of {3, . . . , 2n}
of size n−1, and similarly an index e4 which computes if σ is a subset of {3, . . . , 2n}
of size n. Finally, fix an index e5 such that {e5}Q(n,m) computes the pairing
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function 〈x, y〉. We can now define our uniform version α˜(n,m) of αn:
∀yA(〈〈n,m〉, 1〉, y) ∧ ∀yA(〈〈n,m〉, 2〉, y)
∧ ∀u({e3}Q(u, n)→ ∀y{e2}Q,Ay (u, 〈n,m〉))
∧
∧
1≤i≤2
∀y
(
A(〈〈n,m〉, i〉, y)
∧ ∀u({e4}Q(u, n)→ ∀y′({e2}Q,Ay′ (u, 〈n,m〉) ∧ α˜′(m, y, y′)))
)
.
Here the formula α˜′(m, y, y′) is the formula obtained by replacing each occurrence of
E(x, y) by B(m,x, y) in α′. We freely wrote α(0) for ∀x(N(x) ∧ (0 = x→ α(x)));
we will interpret this formula for ε = 12 , and because N has measure
1
2 this
essentially means that for almost all x ∈ N we have that 0 = x→ α(x). We did
similar things for 1, for 2 and for the pairing function 〈x, y〉, using the index e5 for
the latter.
We now add the following formula to T 1
2
:
∀n∀m(N(n) ∧N(m) ∧ ({e1}Q(n,m) = 0→ α˜(n,m))).
Furthermore, we add ψe to T0 for e ∈ {e1, e3, e4, e5}. Like in the proof of Theorem
11.5.10, we add an axiom for W ′(x, y, z) specifying that W ′(x, y, z) holds if and
only if the sequence x is an approximation to Q⊕Az, where Az = {n | (n, z) ∈ A},
up to digit y. Finally, we add a rule for e2 to T0, namely the universal closure of
W ′(u, z, v) ∧ T1,2(e2, x1, x2, u, z)→ ({e2}Q⊕Av (x1, x2) = y ↔ U(z) = y),
where all quantifiers except the one for v are relativised to N .
We prove that the theories defined above are as desired. First, assume (ii)
holds. We define a model M in a similar way as in the proof of Theorem 11.5.10.
However, this time we do not take the universe to be two copies of ω, but instead
we take our universe to be the unit interval. We let our measure be the Lebesgue
measure. Fix a partition {U0, U1, . . . } ∪ {V0, V1, . . . } of [0, 1] such that all Un, Vn
are measurable with measure 12n+2 . Looking back at our proof of Theorem 11.5.10
(and Theorem 11.5.6), we identify the elements of each Un with the element n in
the first copy of ω and each Vn with the element n in the second copy of ω. This
allows us to define the relations in the language of arithmetic in the same way
as before: for example, we let x + y = z hold precisely if x ∈ Un, y ∈ Um and
z ∈ Un+m for some n,m ∈ ω. We let N(x) hold if x ∈ Un for some n ∈ ω. With
this in mind, it should be clear from the proof of Theorem 11.5.10 how to define R
and all the other relations already appearing in the proof of that theorem.
The only relations of which it might not be directly clear how to define them
are A and B. How to define B is explained in the proof of Theorem 9.5.2, while
how to define A follows from the proof of Theorem 9.4.1.
For the converse, assume (i) holds. Then, as in the proof of Theorem 11.5.10,
we can find a modelM  {b0, b1, . . . } which is isomorphic to N and a relation Q on
{b0, b1, . . . }, such that {ei}Q, {e2}Q⊕Ap have their usual interpretation and such
that ϕ holds in this model. Using similar ideas as in the proof of that theorem, we
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can even assume that our model satisfies our new axioms in the following way:
If {e1}Q(bn, bm) does not hold, then α˜(bn, bm) holds in the sense that all of the
following hold:
Pr
D
[
y ∈M | M |= A(〈〈bn, bm〉, b1〉, y)
] ≥ 1
2
Pr
D
[
y ∈M | M |= A(〈〈bn, bm〉, b2〉, y)
] ≥ 1
2
for all u ∈ {b0, b1, . . . }, if M |= {e3}Q(u, n)
then Pr
D
[
y ∈M | M |= {e2}Q⊕Ay (u, 〈bm, bm〉)
] ≥ 1
2
.
for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2, Pr
D
[
y ∈M | M |= A(〈〈bn, bm〉, bi〉, y)
and for all u ∈ {b0, b1, . . . }, if M |= {e4}Q(u, n)
then Pr
D
[
y′ ∈M | (M,D) |= 1
2
{e2}Q⊕Ay′ (u, 〈n,m〉) ∧ α˜′(m, y, y′)
] ≥ 1
2
]
≥ 1
2
.
Now one can directly verify (using the proof of Theorem 9.4.1) that under this
interpretation, α˜(bn, bm) is equivalent to the formula αn with E(x, y) replaced by
{(x, y) | B(m,x, y)}. However, we also have that if Q does not contain a string of
length m, then α˜(bn, bm) holds for all n ∈ ω, which is a contradiction (as explained
above). So, we see that Q contains a string of every length and therefore (ii)
holds. 
Theorem 11.5.13. For rational ε ∈ (0, 1) we have that ε-satisfiability is
Σ11-hard.
Proof. From Lemma 11.5.7 and Theorem 11.5.12. 
Theorem 11.5.14. Let L be a countable language not containing equality and
function symbols and let ε ∈ (0, 1) be rational. Then ε-satisfiability is Σ11-complete.
Proof. The Σ11-hardness was shown in Theorem 11.5.13, while Theorem 11.3.5
gives the matching upper bound. 
11.6. Compactness of 0-logic
We conclude this chapter by showing that 0-logic is compact (when considering
languages not containing equality and function symbols), which will quite directly
follow from the results from the previous section. This contrasts the fact that for
rational ε ∈ (0, 1) we have that ε-logic is not compact, as shown in Theorem 9.5.2.
First, we need the following strengthening of Theorem 11.2.2.
Theorem 11.6.1. Let L be a language not containing equality and function
symbols (but it may contain constant symbols) and let Γ be a countable set of
formulas in L. Then there exists a language L′ only containing relation symbols
and a computable function mapping each formula ϕ ∈ Γ in the language L to a
universal formula ϕ′ in the language L′ such that for every ε ∈ [0, 1] and every
subset ∆ ⊆ Γ: ∆ is ε-satisfiable if and only if ∆′ = {ϕ′ | ϕ ∈ ∆} is ε-satisfiable.
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Proof. We prove this in almost the same way as Theorem 11.2.2. We construct
ϕ′ as in that theorem, but instead of using relations Rα to define ϕ′ we use relations
Rα,ϕ. That is, we introduce new relation symbols for every formula ϕ, instead
of reusing the same ones. There is one exception to this rule: when α = 0 (i.e.
the function which is constantly 0) we always use the relation Rα, which does not
depend on ϕ.
Now let ∆ ⊆ Γ. For ease of notation we assume ∆ is infinite, say ∆ =
{ϕ0, ϕ1, . . . }; the finite case follows in the same way. If ∆ is ε-satisfiable, then one
can prove that ∆′ is ε-satisfiable in the same way as in the proof of Theorem 11.2.2.
For the converse we also use a similar proof, but we need to make some slight
modifications. Note that, in the proof of Theorem 11.2.2, we used the measure
0 Cantor set C ⊆ [0, 1] to provide us with witnesses. Now we partition C into
countably many uncountable Borel measure 0 sets. For example, we can take
Ci ⊆ C to be those x ∈ C which correspond to a sequence starting with 0i1. We
can then take Borel isomorphisms ζi : Ci →
⋃
1≤i≤n[0, 1]
i and use ζi to provide the
witnesses for ϕi.
More precisely, we show how to modify the definition of RM in the proof of
Theorem 11.2.2. Let a1, . . . , ak ∈ [0, 1]. If there are 1 ≤ i1 < i2 ≤ k such that
ai1 ∈ Cj1 , ai2 ∈ Cj2 but j1 6= j2, we let RM(a1, . . . , ak) be false (but it does not
really matter how we define RM in this case, as long as we make sure that the
resulting relation is Borel; for example, we could also define it to always be true
in this case). Otherwise, we let r ∈ ω be such that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k we have that
ai ∈ C implies that in fact ai ∈ Cr. Let α(i) = (1, j) if ai ∈ C and ζ(ai) has length j,
let α(i) = (2, j) if ai ∈ ran(η) and η−1(ai) = j and finally let α(i) = 0 if neither of
these cases hold. Let b1, . . . , bk′ be the subsequence of a1, . . . , ak obtained by taking
just those ai satisfying α(ai) = 0. Let m = max{j ∈ ω | (1, j) ∈ ran(α)} and let i
be the least 1 ≤ j ≤ k such that α(j) = (1,m). Now let RM(a1, . . . , ak) be defined
as RNα,ϕr (b1, . . . , bk′ , (ζ
r)1(ai), . . . , (ζ
r)m(ai)). The rest of the proof proceeds in the
same way as for Theorem 11.2.2. 
Theorem 11.6.2. For countable languages L not containing equality and
function symbols, 0-logic is compact. That is, if Γ is any (countable) set of
sentences such that any finite subset of Γ is 0-satisfiable, then Γ is 0-satisfiable.
Proof. By Theorem 11.6.1 we may assume all formulas in Γ to be universal
relational formulas. For every formula ϕ = ∀x1 . . . ∀xnψ(x1, . . . , xn), let
ϕ˜ = ∀x1 . . . ∀xn
∧
i<j
(xi 6= xj → ψ(x1, . . . , xn)).
Let Γ˜ = {ϕ˜ | ϕ ∈ Γ}. We claim: Γ˜ has an infinite classical model.
By classical compactness, it is enough to show that for every m ∈ ω and every
finite subset ∆˜ ⊆ Γ˜ there is a model for ∆˜ of size at least m. Let ∆ = {ϕ | ϕ˜ ∈ ∆˜}.
Then by assumption we have that
∧
∆ is 0-satisfiable. So, by Proposition 11.4.1
we see that
∧˜
∆ has a classical model M of size at least m. However, it is directly
seen that then in fact M |= ∆˜, so M is a classical model for ∆˜ of size at least m.
So, Γ˜ has an infinite classical model. Using the Ehrenfeucht–Mostowski theorem
[28] we then know that Γ˜ has a model on [0, 1] with ([0, 1], <) as a sequence of
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indiscernibles, see e.g. Chang and Keisler [18, Theorem 3.3.10]. Because ([0, 1], <)
is a sequence of indiscernibles we can directly see that the relations on this model
are Borel (in a similar way as in the proof of Corollary 11.4.4), and because the
diagonal has Lebesgue-measure 0 we see that (M, λ) |=0 Γ, as desired. 
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Samenvatting
In dit proefschrift wordt het samenspel van drie gebieden uit de wiskunde
bekeken, namelijk berekenbaarheid (Engels: computability), waarschijnlijkheid
(probability) en logica (logic). Voordat we het hierover hebben, is het van belang
iets meer te zeggen over wat wiskunde exact inhoudt. Velen zijn bekend met de
rekenkant van de wiskunde, getuige de vele malen dat een wiskundige de opmerking
“dus jij bent goed met cijfertjes” naar zijn of haar hoofd geworpen krijgt. Dat is
echter niet de kern van de wiskunde.
Zoals het woord wiskunde, van wisconst, al zegt, gaat wiskunde over de de kunst
van het gewisse; met andere woorden, de kunst van het zeker weten. De wiskunde
gaat over het bewijzen van stellingen: door te beginnen met eenvoudige basisaan-
names, de axioma’s, leidt een wiskundige met behulp van logisch redeneren nieuwe,
complexere feiten af, de zogenaamde stellingen. Het meest bekende voorbeeld van
een stelling is waarschijnlijk de stelling van Pythagoras over driehoeken. Ondanks
dat je uiteraard nooit alle driehoeken kunt controleren, kan een wiskundige door
logisch te redeneren toch bewijzen dat deze stelling voor alle driehoeken geldt en
daarin ligt de kracht van de wiskunde. Een stelling kan in het bijzonder gerelateerd
zijn aan berekeningen; in dit geval zegt de stelling dat een bepaald rekentrucje
altijd werkt.
In de logica bestuderen we de logische denkstappen van een wiskundige. Met
andere woorden, we bekijken de bewijzen die wiskundigen opschrijven. Dit kan
vanuit filosofische hoek, door te bekijken wat de geldige axioma’s zijn van waaruit
een wiskundige kan redeneren. De moderne wiskundige logica, waar dit proefschrift
over gaat, bekijkt de logica echter vanuit een andere hoek. Het cruciale idee is dat
een wiskundig bewijs zelf een wiskundig object is, waarover wiskundig geredeneerd
kan worden. Daarom kunnen we stellingen bewijzen over bewijzen. We weten
bijvoorbeeld, dankzij Go¨del, dat er onafhankelijke vragen bestaan: dat zijn vragen
waarvan we kunnen laten zien dat een wiskundige niet kan bewijzen dat het
antwoord ‘ja’ is, noch dat het antwoord ‘nee’ is. De kracht van de wiskunde is dus
niet onbegrensd.
In de recursietheorie, het deelgebied van de wiskunde dat berekenbaarheid
bestudeert, bekijken we het concept van een algoritme. Volgens Van Dale is een
algoritme een “systematisch stelsel voor het uitvoeren van rekenkundige bewerkin-
gen en de volgorde daarvan”. Bekijk bijvoorbeeld de opgave “gegeven drie getallen
a, b en c, geef een nulpunt x van ax2 + bx+ c = 0”. Zoals iedereen als het goed is
bekend is, is er een systematische manier om een nulpunt uit te rekenen, namelijk
met de abc-formule; dit is een algoritme voor deze opgave. We noemen dit probleem
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daarom berekenbaar, wat wil zeggen dat er een algoritme bestaat dat dit probleem
oplost.
De notie van een algoritme is informeel, maar is geformaliseerd door zowel
Church als Turing in 1936. Hoewel hun definities op het eerste gezicht lijken
te verschillen, blijken zij equivalent aan elkaar te zijn; dat wil zeggen, je kunt
wiskundig bewijzen dat ze allebei hetzelfde concept karakteriseren. De definitie van
Turing is wellicht het meest intu¨ıtief. Volgens deze definitie is een een probleem
berekenbaar precies als er een Turingmachine bestaat die het probleem oplost.
Ruwweg is een Turingmachine een abstracte vorm van de computer zoals wij die
kennen, met in het bijzonder de abstracte eigenschap dat de machine onbegrensd
veel geheugen heeft.
Het is interessant om te kijken naar de problemen die berekenbaar zijn, maar in
de recursietheorie zijn we vooral ge¨ınteresseerd in de problemen die niet berekenbaar
zijn. Dat zulke problemen bestaan werd als eerste opgemerkt door Turing, en
hij gaf zelfs een expliciet voorbeeld: het zogenaamde Stopprobleem. Als we dit
probleem terugvertalen naar de concrete computers zoals wij die kennen, zegt het
feit dat het Stopprobleem niet berekenbaar is dat er geen computerprogramma
bestaat dat detecteert wanneer een ander programma vastloopt. Er zijn echter
vele onberekenbare problemen en het is zelfs mogelijk om een stratificatie aan te
brengen die uitdrukt hoe onberekenbaar een probleem precies is.
Het eerste deel van dit proefschrift gaat over de combinatie van berekenbaarheid
en logica in de vorm van de Medvedev en Muchnik tralies. Dit zijn twee wiskundige
structuren, ge¨ıntroduceerd door Medvedev en Muchnik, die gedefinieerd zijn met
behulp van concepten uit de recursietheorie. Deze structuren zijn formaliseringen
van een eerder idee van Kolmogorov, die probeerde een klassieke interpretatie te
geven aan de intu¨ıtionistische logica.
Het verschil tussen de klassieke logica, de logica waarbinnen bijna alle wiskundi-
gen werken, en de intu¨ıtionistische logica, zit in de exacte elementaire denkstappen
die een wiskundige kan zetten. Een voorbeeld van zo een elementaire denkstap,
die zowel in de klassieke als in de intu¨ıtionistische logica geldt, is “als de uitspraak
A waar is, dan is de uitspraak ‘A of B’ ook waar”. Het verschil tussen de twee
logica’s zit echter in de zogenaamde wet van de uitgesloten derde: in de klassieke
logica nemen we aan dat voor elke uitspraak A de uitspraak ‘A is waar of A is niet
waar’ een ware uitspraak is, terwijl we dit in de intu¨ıtionistische logica niet doen.
Hoewel de klassieke logica de standaard is in de wiskunde, is het niettemin
interessant om de intu¨ıtionistische logica te bekijken vanuit een klassiek standpunt.
Daarmee bedoelen we dat we intu¨ıtionistische bewijzen bekijken als wiskundige
objecten, en over deze objecten vervolgens klassiek redeneren. Ee´n van de moge-
lijkheden om dit te doen is met behulp van de Medvedev en Muchnik tralies, die
laten zien dat er een sterk verband is tussen redeneren in de intu¨ıtionistische logica
aan de ene kant en berekenen aan de andere kant. In dit proefschrift bekijken we
dit verband nader.
In het tweede deel van dit proefschrift bekijken we enkele onderwerpen in de
algoritmische waarschijnlijkheid, een gebied dat een combinatie is van berekenbaar-
heid en waarschijnlijkheid. In de algoritmische waarschijnlijkheid bestuderen we de
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vraag: wanneer is een oneindige reeks willekeurig? Bekijk bijvoorbeeld de volgende
rij:
01010101010101010101 . . . .
In deze rij is een duidelijk patroon te herkennen, dus we zouden deze rij niet snel
als willekeurig bestempelen. Een rij als
00100100001111110110 . . .
lijkt al een stuk willekeuriger, maar is dat in feite niet. Het zijn namelijk de
decimalen van pi, maar dan in het binaire getallenstelsel zoals dat onder andere
door computers gebruikt wordt. Deze rij is exact uit te rekenen en daarom dus
voorspelbaar. Bekijken we echter een rij als
00100101110101010101 . . .
dan lijkt deze een stuk willekeuriger (deze rij heeft de auteur verkregen door 20
keer een munt op te gooien). Wat bedoelen we echter precies wanneer we zeggen
dat een rij willekeurig is?
Gezien de informele aard van dit begrip is het niet verrassend dat er meerdere
antwoorden mogelijk zijn. Er blijkt echter e´e´n notie te zijn die met kop en schouders
boven de rest uitsteekt om de beste kandidaat te zijn: Martin-Lo¨f-willekeurigheid.
De natuurlijkheid van deze notie wordt versterkt doordat er drie, op het eerste
gezicht compleet verschillende, maar equivalente definities blijken te zijn.
De onvoorspelbaarheidsdefinitie is het makkelijkste om uit te leggen. Stel je
voor dat je in een casino bent, en je mag je geld inzetten op een zekere onbekende
oneindige rij x van nullen en enen, zoals de drie rijen hierboven. Dat wil het
volgende zeggen: we beginnen met 10 euro, en mogen dit bedrag verdelen over de
optie 0 en de optie 1. Zet bijvoorbeeld 3,49 euro in op 0 en 6,51 euro op 1. Als de
rij x begint met een 0 krijgen we twee keer onze inleg op 0 terug, oftewel 6,98 euro,
en als de rij begint met een 1 krijgen we twee keer onze inleg op 1 terug, oftewel
13,02 euro. Dit geld zetten we vervolgens opnieuw in, maar nu op het tweede getal
uit de rij x. We krijgen opnieuw uitbetaald en kunnen nu inzetten op het derde
getal uit de rij, enzovoort. We gaan zo net zo lang door als we willen, totdat we
besluiten om te stoppen. Het geld dat we op dat moment hebben, nemen we mee
naar huis.
Als we volgens deze regels spelen, dan willen we graag inzetten op de eerste rij
die we hierboven noemden. We weten immers elke keer precies wat het volgende
getal wordt, dus we kunnen elke keer al ons geld op dat getal inzetten en op die
manier zoveel geld verdienen als we willen, mits we maar lang genoeg doorgaan.
Hetzelfde geldt voor de tweede rij. Voor de derde rij wordt het echter een ander
verhaal, want we kunnen niet anders doen dan willekeurig gokken en we kunnen
dus niet garanderen dat we met winst thuiskomen. Dit is de kern van de onvoorspel-
baarheidsdefinitie van Martin-Lo¨f willekeurigheid: een rij x is willekeurig als er geen
algoritme bestaat waarmee je willekeurig veel geld kan verdienen door lang genoeg
op x in te zetten, waarbij we met een algoritme in abstracte zin een Turing machine
zoals hierboven beschreven bedoelen, of in concrete zin een computerprogramma.
Voor de lezer die iets meer bekend is in de informatica is de tweede definitie
ook goed uit te leggen. Een oneindige rij x is Martin-Lo¨f-willekeurig als er geen
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compressiealgoritme (zoals gzip, RAR of ZIP) bestaat dat x comprimeert. Dus, de
oneindige rijen x zijn de rijen die zoveel informatie bevatten, dat ze niet op een
eenvoudige manier te comprimeren of samen te vatten zijn. Het feit dat de eerder
genoemde algoritmes toch in het dagelijks gebruik nuttig blijken te zijn berust dan
ook vooral op het feit dat de meeste computerbestanden die wij produceren niet
willekeurig zijn. De derde definitie is lastiger uit te leggen aan niet-wiskundigen en
noemen we daarom hier niet.
In dit proefschrift bestuderen we een verband tussen het begrip 1-genericiteit
(een begrip dat nauw verwant is aan Martin-Lo¨f-willekeurigheid) aan de ene kant,
en differentieerbaarheid van functies (een ander wiskundig begrip) aan de andere
kant. Verder bestuderen we verbanden tussen Martin-Lo¨f-willekeurigheid en grove
berekenbaarheid, een variant van berekenbaarheid die een mogelijke formalisering is
van ‘bijna berekenbaar’.
Het derde en laatste deel van dit proefschrift gaat over het combineren van
logica met waarschijnlijkheid, wat leidt tot zogenaamde probabilistische logica’s. We
bekijken een specifiek voorbeeld van een probabilistische logica, genaamd ε-logica.
Ter motivatie van deze logica bekijken we eerst de volgende situatie: stel, we lopen
langs een meer en zien daar een grote groep zwanen zwemmen. Het valt ons op dat
deze allemaal wit zijn. We vermoeden daarom dat alle zwanen wit zijn. Echter,
om de uitspraak ‘alle zwanen zijn wit’ te controleren, moeten we o´f alle zwanen
controleren en zien dat deze inderdaad allemaal wit zijn, o´f we moeten een zwaan
van een andere kleur vinden. We weten echter nooit wanneer we a´lle zwanen gezien
hebben, dus als we na het controleren van duizenden zwanen alleen nog maar
witte zwanen hebben gezien, zijn we geneigd om te concluderen dat inderdaad alle
zwanen wit zijn. Dit biedt echter geen garantie, want we kunnen vijf minuten later
bij toeval alsnog een zwarte zwaan tegenkomen. Met andere woorden, we kunnen
een ‘voor alle’-uitspraak niet empirisch bewijzen.
In ε-logica vervangen we daarom ‘voor alle’ door ‘voor bijna alle’, waarbij een
‘voor bijna alle’-uitspraak nog steeds waar kan zijn als er tegenvoorbeelden zijn,
zolang de kans maar klein is dat we een dergelijk tegenvoorbeeld tegenkomen. Om
terug te komen op de zwanen, als we duizenden witte zwanen hebben gezien zonder
ook maar een enkele niet-witte zwaan tegen te komen, kunnen we zoals hierboven
omschreven niet concluderen dat alle zwanen wit zijn, maar we kunnen we´l met
hoge waarschijnlijkheid concluderen dat bijna alle zwanen wit zijn. Aan de andere
kant, om te concluderen dat niet alle zwanen wit zijn is het genoeg om slechts e´e´n
zwaan tegen te komen die niet wit is. We noemen ε-logica daarom een leerbare
logica: gegeven een claim kunnen we empirisch controleren of de claim of zijn
ontkenning waar is.
We bekijken in dit proefschrift enkele wiskundige basiseigenschappen van deze
logica. Zo bewijzen we varianten van enkele belangrijke stellingen uit de klassieke
logica, zoals de neerwaartse Lo¨wenheim–Skolem-stelling en de stelling van  Los´.
Verder bekijken we hoe lastig het voor een computer is om over deze logica te
redeneren, waarmee de cirkel tussen Computability, Probability and Logic rond is.
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